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An SEIR infectious disease model 
with testing and conditional 
quarantine1
David Berger,2 Kyle Herkenhoff3 and Simon Mongey4
Date submitted: 28 April 2020; Date accepted: 29 April 2020
We extend the baseline Susceptible-Exposed-Infectious-Recovered 
(SEIR) infectious disease epidemiology model to understand the 
role of testing and case-dependent quarantine. During a period of 
asymptomatic infection, testing can reveal infection that otherwise 
would only be revealed later when symptoms develop. Along 
with those displaying symptoms, such individuals are deemed 
known positive cases. Quarantine policy is case-dependent in 
that it can depend on whether a case is unknown, known positive, 
known negative, or recovered. Testing therefore makes possible the 
identification and quarantine of infected individuals and release 
of non-infected individuals. We fix a quarantine technology—a 
parameter determining the differential rate of transmission in 
quarantine—and compare simple testing and quarantine policies. 
We start with a baseline quarantine-only policy that replicates 
the rate at which individuals are entering quarantine in the US in 
March, 2020. We show that the total deaths that occur under this 
policy can occur under looser quarantine measures and a substantial 
increase in random testing of asymptomatic individuals. Testing at 
a higher rate in conjunction with targeted quarantine policies can (i) 
dampen the economic impact of the coronavirus and (ii) reduce peak 
1 We thank David Dam, Meghana Gaur and Chengdai Huang for excellent research assistance. The views 
expressed in this study are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of the Federal Reserve 
Bank of New York or the Federal Reserve System.
2 Associate Professor of Economics at Duke, University.
3 Senior Economist, Federal Reserve Bank of New York; Assistant Professor, University of Minnesota.
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symptomatic infections—relevant for hospital capacity constraints. 
Our model can be plugged into richer quantitative extensions of the 
SEIR model of the kind currently being used to forecast the effects of 
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“Once again, our key message is: test, test, test.”
— @WHO, March 16, 2020
“We suggest a strategy of massive testing that goes far beyond the group currently being tested — those most likely infected.
Instead, we need to test as many people as possible. If we know who is infected, who is not and who has recovered, we could
greatly relax social isolation requirements and send both the uninfected and the recovered back to work.”
— Searchinger (Princeton), LaManita (Virginia Tech.), Douglas (Cornell Med.), March 23, 2020, Washington Post
Introduction
The goal of this paper is to better understand the role of testing asymptomatic cases and targeted quarantine in
the trajectory of the coronavirus pandemic. To do so, we incorporate incomplete information in the textbook SEIR
model (Susceptible-Exposed-Infectious-Recovered) (Kermack and McKendrick, 1927)1, which allows researchers
to study potential policies that vary depending on whether an individual case is an unknown, known positive,
known negative, or recovered (see Figure 1). This extension allows unknown, asymptomatic cases to be resolved
by testing and allows researchers to understand the trade-off between quarantining everyone at large social cost
versus testing everyone and applying quarantine in a more directed fashion.
We include the minimal necessary modifications of the SEIR model in order to be able to address the public
health effects of testing asymptomatic cases while stilling nesting the SEIR model. In the SEIR model an individual
may be characterized as being in one of four health states: susceptible (S), exposed (E), infected (I) and recovered
(R). Since our aim is to try to understand the role of asymptomatic transmission and how testing and / or quar-
antine of asymptomatic cases can effect the prorogation of infection and mortality, our key modifications therefore
make policies contingent on what is known about an individual. With incomplete information, an individual that
has contracted the corona virus, but is yet to present symptoms, will be infectious and subject to the quarantine
rule for unknown cases. If tested, however, the true health state of the individual is revealed and they are subject
to the same quarantine rules as known positive cases. Similarly such an individual, if untested, cannot be subject
to quarantine policies that apply to known positive cases.
We calibrate the model to data on the spread of the coronavirus and medical outcomes. As a baseline we
simulate the model without policy interventions, which delivers the same trajectory for the pandemic as the SEIR
model. We then consider a benchmark counterfactual with common quarantine measures and no testing. We then
ask the question, If we increase testing, how much can we relax quarantine measures while making sure that deaths do
not increase? We show that increasing testing can accommodate extensive relaxation of quarantine measures. If
we assume that economic output, and social well-being are inversely proportional to the number of individuals
quarantined, this implies that testing asymptomatic individuals can result in a pandemic with smaller economic
losses and social costs while keeping the human cost constant.
1Recent empirical evidence from random samples drawn in an Italian town suggest that around 50 to 75 percent of infected cases are
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Figure 1: Incomplete information, testing, and an example of targeted quarantine policies
Our analysis comes with a number of important caveats. First and more importantly, we are not epidemiolo-
gists. After consulting with epidemiologists and doing a thorough literature review, however, we concluded there
was not a framework for discussing some of the pressing public health policy questions of the early quarantine
period: in particular the potential role of broad testing in ameliorating quarantine measures.2 Some models feature
testing conditional on developing symptoms which allows for better care and reduced mortality, but to the best of
our knowledge no models considered testing asymptomatic individuals so that positive cases can be recognized
and isolated.
Second, our model does not feature the full set of features that one would desire in order to make quanti-
tative statements and predictions. These would include transmission across geography, an age distribution of
individuals with systematically different probabilities of infection conditional on contact with a positive case, or
non-perfect testing (false negatives). We also do not model the medical care block in detail and abstract from issues
such as congestion of medical services as in the standard SEIR model. Our hope for this paper is that it demon-
strates that incomplete information, testing and conditional policies can be simply and intuitively integrated into
richer models. We view the technical and computational costs low relative to the payoffs.3
Third, for most of this paper we fix an effectiveness of quarantine in reducing meeting rates of individuals. We
assume that complete isolation is off the table, however note here that improving quarantine would have large
effects. Therefore our exercise should be interpreted as follows: given access to a quarantine technology of some
fixed effectiveness, how does testing allow that technology be applied differently across individuals, potentially
mitigating costs of the pandemic. A different paper could be written on the quantitative effects of increasing the
effectiveness of quarantine. In Section 7 we repeat our main counterfactual under a more effective quarantine and
show how testing allows quarantine measures to be relaxed even further.
Finally, our model is not a behavioural economic model that integrates an epidemiological model as in Kremer
(1996) or the equilibrium model of Greenwood, Kircher, Santos, and Tertilt (2019). We think understanding the role
2We could of course be wrong. Moreover, we do not wish to implicate any of the epidemiologists who graciously answered our questions
and read this draft if we indeed are. We would be very happy to learn from medical professionals and epidemiologists that we have misread
the literature and that this has been studied before.
3Specifically, while the SIER model augmented for quarantine would have 8 states—the 4 S-E-I-R states each augmented for quarantine
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of testing in information acquisition should be key to any such integration. A simple S(E)IR model integrated into
an economic model with only common (non-targeted) quarantine / lock-down policies available will unavoidably
lead to a trade-off between mortality and economic activity. More quarantine, less mortality, and vice versa. By
increasing testing of asymptomatic cases and conditional quarantine, we show that the model can deliver constant
mortality rates and higher economic activity, as measured by the fraction of individuals who are healthy and out
of quarantine. Theories of economic-activity vs. mortality trade-offs with only a lock-down policy available to the
policy-maker are therefore discussions of second best policies, while testing presents a potentially better option.
This paper has seven sections. Section 1 reviews the related SEIR literature and recent papers using this model
to quantify the effects of the corona virus pandemic. Section 2 reviews some of the data regarding infection and
mortality, as well as policy responses in the form of testing and quarantine measures. Section 3 describes the model.
Section 4 provides details of how we calibrate the model and provides baseline simulations of the pandemic under
no policy response. This replicates the familiar trajectories of infection and mortality of SEIR models that have been
used to model the evolution of the pandemic. Section 5 provides our main counterfactuals, where we compare the
consequences of common quarantine and no testing with targeted quarantine and testing policies. Section 7 repeats
these counterfactuals under a more effective quarantine technology. Section 8 concludes.
1 Literature review
Brauer and Castillo-Chavez (2012) provide a summary of recent SEIR models. SEIR stands for Susceptible, Ex-
posed (people not yet infectious), Infectious, and Removed (quarantined or immune). In particular, they discuss
frameworks of quarantine (setting aside individuals who are exposed) and isolation (setting aside individuals who
are infected, often called hospitalization).
A recent policy paper by Imperial College COVID-19 Response Team (2020) incorporates several policy pa-
rameters into an SEIR model that is enriched to accommodate geographical transmission and age dependency of
transmission and mortality rates.4 In particular, they consider a model with quarantine, asymptomatic patients,
and testing of hospitalized patients, with policy thresholds that depend on positive test rates. Their predictions
have been reported widely in the press. Our contribution is to model (i) the matching process between different
subgroups, thus endogenizing R0, and (ii) highlighting the importance of testing asymptomatic patients and, (iii)
quarantine policies that are contingent on the testing outcomes. Lastly, we use our measure of the fraction of in-
dividuals quarantined as a measure of loss of economic activity. This allows us to evaluate the role of widespread
testing which, as a policy, may have a similar mortality rates but lower quarantine rates.
Recent examples of testing and diagnosis in an SEIR model include Chowell, Fenimore, Castillo-Garsow, and
Castillo-Chavez (2003) who model the Severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) epidemic in 2002. The purpose
of testing and diagnosis in Chowell, Fenimore, Castillo-Garsow, and Castillo-Chavez (2003) is an improvement
in healthcare, which reduces the rate of recovery from nearly one half.5 In our model, the role for testing and
4At the time of writing the codes for Imperial College COVID-19 Response Team (2020) were not publicly available, and the paper does
not feature any equations that would allow a researcher to replicate their model.
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diagnosis is being able to efficiently target quarantine measures. Contemporaneous work by Hornstein (2020) and
Piguillem and Shi (2020) also consider various testing policies in an SEIR model.
Recent examples of quarantine in an SEIR model include Feng (2007) who derive closed form expressions
for the maximum and final rates of infection. Feng (2007) has two notions of quarantine: one in which exposed
individuals (who may not be infectious) are set aside, and another in which infectious individuals are set aside
(often discussed as hospitalization). In our model, quarantine is similarly case dependent, but can only depend on
observed health status. Exposed individuals that do not display symptoms cannot be quarantined without being
identified in a random testing of asymptomatic individuals.
Empirically, the literature has begun to document the rate of transmission and incubation periods. Wu, Leung,
and Leung (2020) compile a summary ofR0 across various viruses (SARS-CoV, MERS-CoV, Commonly circulating
human CoVs (229E, NL63, OC43, HKU1)), and estimate an SEIR model with international outflows. Using data
from Wuhan, they report an R0 of 2.68, and an incubation period of 6.1 days. The World Health Organization
(2020) report that the time from symptom recovery to detection fell from 12 days in early January to 3 days in early
February 2020. After symptom onset, it typically takes 2 weeks for a mild case to recover, or 3 to 6 weeks for severe
cases.
The applied literature has also begun to document the role of quarantine in reducing transmission, and the
rate of asymptomatic transmission. Kucharski, Russell, Diamond, Liu, Edmunds, Funk, Eggo, Sun, Jit, Munday,
et al. (2020) estimate that in China, the basic reproductive rateR0 fell from 2.35 one week before travel restrictions
on Jan 23, 2020, to 1.05 one week after travel restrictions. They use an SEIR model and estimated on this data to
forecast the epidemic in China, extending the model to explicitly account for infections arriving and departing via
flights. Using data from Wuhan, Wang et al (2020) report a baseline reproductive rate of 3.86, that fell to 0.32 after
the vast lock-down intervention. They also find a high rate of asymptomatic transmission, leading us to consider
the asymptomatic state to be infectious as opposed to the baseline SEIR model which assumes that the ‘exposed’
state is non-infectious.6 A high rate of asymptomatic carry of the virus has been identified in Iceland, one of the
few countries to adopt random testing of asymptomatic individuals.7
In the recent economics literature Atkeson (2020b) provides a review of the SIR model. Fenichel (2013) com-
pares social planner and decentralized solutions for lock-down in an SIR model where all individuals recover.
Alvarez, Argente, and Lippi (2020), and Farboodi, Jarosch, and Shimer (2020) study optimal lock-down policy in
an SIR model with the possibility of death. The latter compares the solution of the planner’s problem to a decen-
tralized equilibrium in which individuals choose their level of engagement with the economy understanding the
health risks they face. Eichenbaum, Rebelo, and Trabandt (2020) and Glover, Heathcote, Krueger, and Ríos-Rull
(2020) nest a similar SIR model in quantitative general equilibrium macroeconomic models of consumption, sav-
ings and labor supply. The latter includes heterogeneity by age, income and assets with age-varying transmission
and mortality risk. These papers consider lock-down as the only available tool to the policy-marker. Our contri-
SARS mortality rate is 4 percent or more. They estimate a basic reproductive number R0 = 1.2. They model a diagnosis rate and diagnosed
state. Individuals recover at a fast rate if diagnosed (8 days without diagnosis, 5 days with diagnosis).
6https://www.medrxiv.org/content/10.1101/2020.03.03.20030593v1
7https://www.buzzfeed.com/albertonardelli/coronavirus-testing-iceland. “Early results from deCode Genetics indicate that a low pro-
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Figure 2: US cumulative cases and deaths - 4 weeks up to March 22
Notes: Source: John Hopkins CSSE, https://github.com/CSSEGISandData/COVID-19. Data reflect non-repatriated cases, and so exclude the
cases from the Diamond Princess and Grand Princess cruise ships.
bution is to enrich the underlying SEIR by introducing scope for testing policies which may mitigate the output
costs of quarantine policies while not exacerbating the decline in output. It would be relatively straight-forward
to integrate the information structure of our model into these models in order to evaluate the economic benefits of
broad based testing.
2 Data on cases, deaths, quarantine and testing
This section provides a short overview of the evolution of the coronavirus pandemic in the United States.
Cases. The first case was reported in the U.S. on January 22, 2020. Figure 2 plots the evolution of confirmed cases
and deaths resulting from COVID-19.8 Table 1 reports the growth rate of cases (new cases divided by cumulative
8We include our tabulations of the source data on our websites. At the moment data on recoveries is not particularly accurate, however we
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Figure 3: US testing
Notes: Source: John Hopkins CSSE, https://github.com/CSSEGISandData/COVID-19. Panel B plots the fraction of the untested population
that is tested each day. Let Tt be total cumulative tests—the black line in Panel A—, then Panel B plots (Tt − Tt−1)/(340m− Tt). The y-axis of
Panel B is in fractions of one percent, i.e. 0.01 on the y-axis corresponds to a daily testing rate of 0.01 percent.
cases) using different measurements. There are several dates with outlier growth rates due to testing rollouts. The
growth rate of cases is roughly 40 percent with these outliers included, and closer to 30 percent when we exclude
the outliers. Due to the lack of testing, the growth rate of cases in January and February is zero, thus lowering the
overall growth rate of cases significantly.
Deaths. Figure 2 also plots the number of deaths and the cumulative number of deaths. Similar to the number of
cases, the number of deaths is stagnant prior to March. It then grows at a high rate with pronounced spikes. The
average growth rate in deaths is 48 percent per day, but also includes significant outliers due to sudden changes
in reporting.
Testing. Figure 3 reports cumulative tests and the testing rate per day. At its peak to date, the US tested just short
of 0.02 percent of its untested population in a single day. We will use this rate to benchmark the rates of testing
considered in counterfactuals. In particular we will consider testing rates that are significantly higher than what
we currently observe in the United States.
Quarantine. Table 2 reports the fraction of individuals who are quarantined in the United States. There are large
discrete jumps in the quarantine rate when California, New York, and Illinois announced state-wide shelter in
place orders.9 This is another important policy parameter. We must convert this series into a daily quarantine rate.
Roughly 24% of the population was quarantined over the course of 19 days since March 4, 2020. We approximate
this with a quarantine rate of roughly 1% per day. More quarantines have followed rapidly during the writing of
this article.
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Table 1: US average daily growth rate of cases
Since first case on 1/22 21.2%
March - From 1st to 19th 40.8%
March - From 1st to 19th - Exclusing outliers with rates ≥ 50% 31.1%
Source: Derived from data available from John Hopkins CSSE, https://github.com/CSSEGISandData/COVID-19.
Table 2: US quarantine
Date Event Quarantined Frac. of US Pop.
3/4/2020 0 0.00%
3/10/2020 New Rochelle 79,946 0.02%
3/16/2020 Bay Area 6,747,000 1.98%
3/19/2020 California 39,639,946 11.66%
3/21/2020 Illinois, New Jersey 61,193,957 17.99%
3/22/2020 New York 80,647,518 23.72%
Source: Dates of enactment taken from various news outlets
3 Model
Throughout this section Figure 4 and Figure 5 may be useful to the reader. Figure 4 maps our model of transmission
into the SEIR model. Figure 5 overlays this with our model of information and testing.
3.1 Overview
We make five modifications to the standard SEIR model.
1. Health states. As shown in Figure 4 we relabel these states in order to make a later distinction in terms
of testing and quarantine. These we call health states. We allow for the possibility that the exposed state is
infectious in order to introduce asymptomatic transmission into the model.
i. Non-infected, Asymptomatic (NA) - Individuals that have not been exposed to the virus, and are by
definition asymptomatic. This corresponds to S in the SEIR model: Susceptible.
ii. Infected, Asymptomatic (IA) - Individuals that have met an infected individual but are as yet asymp-
tomatic. This corresponds to E in the SEIR model: Exposed. Relative to the SEIR model we allow that
these individuals may also transmit the virus albeit at a lower frequency.
iii. Infected, Symptomatic (IS) - Individuals that have met an infected individual and are now showing
symptoms. This corresponds to I in the SEIR model: Infectious.
iv. Recovered, Asymptomatic (RA) - Infected individuals that have entered the recovery phase and are
no longer infected. As in the textbook SEIR model we assume these individuals are immune.10 This
corresponds to R in the SEIR model: Recovered.
10To the best of our knowledge there is no empirical evidence regarding immunity following COVID-19. A quantitative version of this
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Figure 4: Transmission and the relationship between our model and the SEIR model
Notes: This figure shows how our states map into the SEIR model. To understand the role of testing we group the asymptomatic states S, E and
label these Non-infected,Asymptomatic (NA) and Infected, Asymptomatic (IA). Without testing, authorities nor individuals are able to differentiate
between these states. To denote this lack of information, we put a bar over them: NA, IA. Exposed individuals show symptoms, which is the I
state of the SEIR model. We label this Infected, Symptomatic (IS). Individuals may then recover, which is the R state of the SEIR model. We label
this Recovered, Asymptomatic (IA).
Figure 5: SEIR model with incomplete information and testing of asymptomatic individuals
Notes: This figure augments Figure 4 to show how we extend the SEIR model to accommodate testing and incomplete information. We add
two additional states that can be revealed by testing, which differentiate asymptomatic individuals {NA, IA}. We denote these with a tilde:
ĨA for identified infected, asymptomatic cases, and ÑA for identified non-infected, asymptomatic cases. We assume that symptomatic cases
IS are instantly identifiable so are known positives, and that recovered cases have been tracked such that RA cases are known negatives.
Figure 4 tracks an individual case through these states. In terms of medical transmission, we assume that
infected individuals are contagious, although with different rates of transmission. The different rates of trans-
mission nest the case that only IS individuals can transmit the disease, which is the case in the SEIR model.
Non-infected individuals cannot transmit the disease {NA, RA}.
The medical block of the model is very simple and could be enriched in many ways.11 Following the standard
SEIR model: (i) infected asymptomatic individuals show symptoms at rate δ, (ii) infected, symptomatic
individuals recover at rate ωR and die at rate ωD. Note that all individuals that become infected show
symptoms at some point, this could be relaxed.
2. Incomplete information. We allow for incomplete information, as described in Figure 5. In terms of policy,
11See http://gabgoh.github.io/COVID/index.html by Gabriel Goh for an example of an SEIR model of Transmission Dynamics that appends
a rich model of Clinical Dynamics which models hospitalization, length of hospital stay, and more. These states would intercede between IS,






















VETTED AND REAL-TIME PAPERS
we assume that unless tested, individuals without symptoms are indistinguishable and so must be treated
in the same way by quarantine policy. To achieve this we distinguish between two types of NA and IA
individuals. Adding these new cases in green to Figure 4 gives Figure 5. In the first case the diagnosis
regarding infection is unknown. These are unknown cases which we denote NA and IA. In the second case
the diagnosis regarding infection is known, which we denote ÑA and ĨA. This information structure implies
that testing and quarantine policies can not distinguish between the following pairs of cases: unknown cases
{NA, IA}, known positives { ĨA, IS}, and known negatives {ÑA, RA}. Our assumption that {ÑA, RA} are
not distinguishable is a simplifying assumption in order to maintain a finite set of states, which we discuss
below.
3. Meeting and transmission rates. We assume that the underlying parameters consist of an explicit interaction
of social meeting rates, which are mutable to quarantine / social distancing policies, and medical transmission
rates, which are the medical rates of transmission between two individuals that meet.
We denote quarantine and non-quarantine states by Q and NQ, respectively. Interacted with our 4 health
states, plus two additional information states, this gives 12 total states that individuals can be in. The meeting
rates of non-quarantined individuals is given by λ, and for quarantined individuals by λQ. We interpret the
ratio factor by which quarantine reduces the rate of social interaction (λ/λQ) as the quarantine technology and
treat it as a parameter.




for asymptomatic (symptomatic) cases to accommodate evidence
that transmission rates are higher in symptomatic cases. These give the probability that, conditional on
meeting an infected case (IA, ĨA, IS), a non-infected individual (NA, ÑA) becomes infected. Crucially, in-
dividuals do not know who is infected, and do not know that they have met an infected person.12
4. Testing. We introduce a role for testing. Our information structure has assumed that when symptoms
present, the individual and society know that the individual is infected. In this paper we do not cover
testing of symptomatic individuals, although this is obviously a hugely important area.13 We assume that
testing of asymptomatic individuals takes place at a rate τ. Testing fully reveals an individual’s health state.
Tests do not produce false negatives or false positives.
An issue arises in that individuals who have previously tested negative can become infected. This would
require them to transition to either ĨA or IA. If we assume either, then they move into a different group for
the purpose of policy. However the transition would not be observed since the individual remains asymp-
tomatic. Addressing this completely would require significantly enriching the model.14 To avoid this, and
12This seems like a reasonable assumption to us despite one of the requisites for testing in many countries being that individuals can identify
an infected individual that they interacted with.
13Note that in our model if we were to test symptomatic individuals then all tests would yield positives. In the data a small fraction of tests
yield positives. In the US our interpretation of this is not that the US is testing asymptomatic people, but rather that individuals with similar
symptoms due to common colds and the flu are being tested. To introduce testing of symptomatic individuals one would really want to extend
the model to introduce an additional disease that presents observationally identical symptoms that can then be separated by testing.
14A richer model would include something like the following. Individuals tests are viewed as ‘good’ for some number of days. Policies
may therefore apply to individuals who were tested in, say, the ‘last 60 days’. It is understood that some of these individuals would become
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in the spirit of this paper being a first step, we assume that testing has a ‘tagging’ property, such that the
transition from ÑA to ĨA is observed. We highlight this in the notes to Table 3.
5. Conditional quarantine. We allow for quarantine policy and restrict this to depend on the observable health
state of the individual. To keep the Markovian structure of the SEIR model, we quarantine individuals at
constant rates. When there is no testing, individuals are moved from non-quarantine (NQ) to quarantine (Q)
at rates ξu, ξ+, ξr, for unknown, known positive and recovered cases. When there is testing, individuals are
moved from non-quarantine (NQ) to quarantine (Q) at rates ξu, ξ−, ξ+, ξr, for unknown, known negative,
known positive, and recovered cases, where now the known positive cases include ĨA individuals. We
assume a set of corresponding rates at which individuals are released from quarantine: ru, r−, r+, rr.
3.2 Transmission
Given the above description of the model, we now describe transition rates of individuals between states. We
work in continuous time and when simulating the model we consider a discrete time approximation in which a
period is one hour and days are 14 hours long.
States. Individuals in the model are in one of 13 states:
- {Non-infected & Asymptomatic}×{Quarantine, Non-quarantine}×{Unknown, Known negative}→ 4 states
- {Infected & Asymptomatic}×{Quarantine, Non-quarantine}×{Unknown, Known positive}→ 4 states
- {Infected & Symptomatic} ×{Quarantine, Non-quarantine}→ 2 states
- {Recovered & Aymptomatic} ×{Quarantine, Non-quarantine}→ 2 states
- Deceased→ 1 state
There is initially a distribution of a unit mass of individuals. When we simulate the model, we will assume that
these individuals are non-quarantined, asymptomatic and unknown cases, with a small number being infected:
NA, NQ and IA, NQ. We denote the mass of individuals in a state X in period t by MXt .
Social interaction. In order to transmit the disease, individuals must first meet. We assume random matching.
Non-quarantined individuals meet other individuals at rate λ, while quarantined individuals meet others at rate
λQ. To save on notation we use, for example, NA to denote both NA and ÑA when distinguishing between the
two is not relevant.
The conditional probabilities of meetings are as follows. The mass of individuals that are out in the world to





law of motion for the fraction of ‘tested negatives’ that have since become positive. In this model individuals would require re-testing to keep
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Conditional on meeting an infected individual, the probability that the infected individual is symptomatic (asymp-



















individual they meet is asymptomatic (symptomatic). Once infected, an individual does not know that they are
infected as they are initially asymptomatic. A test, which occurs at rate τ, would reveal that they are infected, and
the subject to quarantine policies of infected individuals. We assume that infected individuals all show symptoms
and do not transition straight to a recovery.15 Infected, asymptomatic, individuals show symptoms at a rate δ.
Infected symptomatic individuals then recover at rate ωR and die at rate ωD. Recovered individuals gain complete
immunity in our experiments.
Transmission rate. Combining the above, the rate of infection of a quarantined (non-quarantined) person is given

























15This is to avoid the issue of having recovered individuals that do not know that they were ever infected. We plan to extend this later on.
The issue with this possibility is that we proliferate the state-space, adding a new state of Recovered, Uninformed, Asymptomatic. This will be
different to Non-infected, Uninformed, Aysmptomatic, due to the different immunity properties of the Recovered individual. Such a recovered
individual can then become infected, and so on and so forth, creating infinitely many states. Our assumption that all infected individuals
eventually know that they are infected by showing symptoms, and then know that they have recovered keeps the state-space finite while still
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Data on the rate of transmission alone will be insufficient to separately identify ρS and λ, although below we
discuss how variation in quarantine policy may be able to estimate these separately in future research.
3.3 Transition rates
As an example of the mechanics of the model, we describe the full set of transition rates for non-infected asymp-
tomatic individuals, and infected asymptomatic individuals. These are the two cases that can be distinguished by
testing asymptomatic individuals. Table 3 provides transition rates between all 13 states. Along with initial condi-
tions for the distribution of individuals across health and information states is sufficient to simulate the model.
3.3.1 Non-infected, asymptomatic individuals
We consider this state as all non-infected individuals in the model are assumed to begin in one of these states.
There are four possible states for non-infected, asymptomatic individuals. They can be an unknown or known
negative case, and they can be non-quarantined or quarantined.
1. Consider an individual that is an unknown case and non-quarantined: NA, NQ.
– Quarantine - At rate ξu they take up quarantine and transition to NA, Q














depending on who the meeting is with. The total transition rate to IA, NQ is therefore λαt.
– Testing - At rate τ, they are tested and since tests are perfect, learn they are not infected, so transition to
being a known negative case: ÑA, NQ.
2. Consider an individual that is an unknown case and quarantined: NA, Q.
– Quarantine - At rate ru they are released from quarantine and transition to NA, NQ.
– Infection - The rate of infection is lower in quarantine: λQαt ≤ λαt.
– Testing - At rate τ, they are tested, learn they are not infected, and transition to being a known negative
case: ÑA, Q.
3. Consider an individual that is a known negative case and non-quarantined: ÑA, NQ
– Quarantine - Since they are recognized as a negative case they may be quarantined at a lower rate
ξ− ≤ ξu. A policy of indiscriminate quarantine would have ξ− = ξu. A policy that allows negative
cases to circulate would have ξ− = 0.
– Infection - The individual still becomes infected at rate λαt and in this case becomes an known infected,
asymptomatic case: ĨA, NQ.






















VETTED AND REAL-TIME PAPERS
– Quarantine - Since they are recognized as a negative case they may be released from quarantined at a
higher rate r− ≥ ru. A policy of indiscriminate quarantine would have r− = ru. A policy that allows
negative cases to circulate would have r− = 1.
– Infection - The rate of infection is now reduced to λQαt
3.3.2 Infected, asymptomatic individuals
For brevity we consider the case only for non-quarantined individuals.
1. Consider an individual that is a unknown case: IA, NQ
– Quarantine - Since they are also unknown cases, the rate of quarantine is the same that which must
face NA, NQ individuals. At rate ξu they transition to quarantine: IA, Q .
– Infection - Since they are already infected there is no transition to infection.
– Testing - At rate τ, they are tested and since tests are perfect, learn they are not infected, so transition to
being a known positive case: IA, NQ.
2. Consider an individual that is a known positive case: ĨA, NQ
– Quarantine - Since this is a known case then it can be subjected to the same rate of quarantine as
infected, symptomatic cases. At rate ξ+ they transition to quarantine: ĨA, Q .
– Infection - Since they are already infected there is no transition to infection.
– Testing - Since they are already tested there is no further testing.
3.3.3 Transition rates between all states
Using the above logic and the structure of the model we can construct the matrix of flows between all 12 active
states and into the deceased state. Table 3 describes all such transition rates.
3.3.4 Nesting the SEIR and SIR models
The SEIR model is nested in our model under the following parameter restrictions.
- No quarantine: λ/λQ = 1
- No asymptomatic transmission: ρA/ρS = 0
- No testing: τ = 0
In this case individuals move from NA → IA → IS → RA, which correspond to the SEIR states. To obtain the
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A. Initial state B. Next instant states
Non-infected, Asymptomatic Infected, Asymptomatic Infected, Symptomatic Recovered Dead
NA, NQ NA, Q ÑA, NQ ÑA, Q IA, NQ IA, Q ĨA, NQ ĨA, Q IS, NQ IS, Q RA, NQ RA, Q D
NA NA, NQ ξu τ λαt
NA, Q ru τ λQαt
ÑA, NQ ξ− λαt
ÑA, Q r− λQαt
IA IA, NQ ξu τ δ
IA, Q ru τ δ
ĨA, NQ ξ+ δ
ĨA, Q r+ δ
IS IS, NQ ξ+ ωR ωD
IS, Q r+ ωR ωD
R RA, NQ ξr
RA, Q rr
Table 3: Transition rates between health and information states
Notes: This table gives the transition rates between states. Note that in any instant only one transition can occur. For example, an individual that is infected and asymptomatic
and not quarantined may transition to symptomatic and quarantined, but not to symptomatic and not-quarantined. The individual then may transition from symptomatic and non-
quarantined into quarantine. Blue terms refer to policies applied to unknown cases. Red terms refer to policies applied to known positive cases. Green terms refer to policies applied
to known negative cases. The Pink terms are the result of the testing-as-tagging assumption: once tested and known negative, the transition to infection is observed so the individual
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3.4 Measurement
3.4.1 Basic reproduction number
Consider a hypothetical ‘date-zero’ case. An individual is in the state IA, NQ, while the rest of the population
is in NA, NQ and there are no quarantine procedures in place. A summary statistic of the transmission rate is
the expected number of infections caused by this single infected person: RIA,NQ0 . We can state this recursively
as follows. At rate δ the individual becomes symptomatic, which will change their medical transmission rate to
ρS ≥ ρA :16
RIA,NQ0 = λρ
























The nested case of the SIR model, which removes the exposed state, is obtained by setting δ = 1 and has a transmis-





We can try to use data on transmission rates from Wuhan to bound the effectiveness of quarantine. We view











therefore the relative rates of transmission pre- and post-quarantine policy are informative of λ/λQ which is our




RIA,NQ0 . In Wuhan, R
IA,NQ
0 = 3.86, while post qurantine
measures leads toRIA,Q0 = 0.32. The Wuhan quarantine technology delivers λQ/λ ≈ 0.10. We therefore view this as
an upper bound on the quarantine technology in the United States: (λQ/λ)US ∈ [0.10, 1.00].
3.4.2 Measures of activity
To summarize some of our results we construct five metrics: Output, symptomatic infection, reported cases, mor-
tality and social well-being.
Output. A reasonable approximation of economic activity is that it scales with the number of non-quarantined
workers. We further assume that quarantined workers are Arel ∈ [0, 1) less productive than non-quarantined
















16In the case where ρI = ρA and the transition from asymptomatic to symptomatic is instantaneous—i.e. as in the SIR model—then we
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Parameter Source / Target Value
A. Known medical
Rate at which infected become symptomatic δ 6 days incubation period 1
/
6
Relative rate of asymptomatic transmission ρA
/
ρS No current evidence 1
Recovery ωR 14 day recovery period 1
/
14






Rate of meeting λ Normalized contact rate 1
Rate of transmission ρS Given λ, givesRIA,NQ0 = 2.5 0.0091
C. Policy parameters
Effectiveness of quarantine technology λQ/λ Half of that implied by Wuhan ∆R0 0.5
Testing of unidentified and asymptomatic cases τ 25 to 50 times peak US testing rate 0.5% per day
Quarantine rates for observable cases
{
ξu, ξ−, ξ+, ξr
}
See Section 5
Release rates from quarantine for observable cases
{
ru, r−, r+, rr
}
See Section 5
Table 4: Model parameters and values
In the initial period all individuals are non-quarantined, so Y0 = 1. Therefore Yt is in units of the percent change
in output from the initial period.
Symptomatic infection. A reasonable approximation of the load on the hospital system is that it scales with the
number of infected, symptomatic individuals. We therefore simply report symptomatic infection: MISt .
Testing and reported cases. Cases are reported when an asymptomatic infection case is tested, which occurs at
rate τ, or the instant an asymptomatic infection becomes symptomatic, which occurs at rate δ. Give Rt = 0, then
∆Rt = (τ + δ) MIAt .
Mortality. Since the death state is absorbing total mortality is simply Xt = MDt . In our counterfactuals we con-
sider combinations of testing and quarantine policies that keep this number at the end of the pandemic constant,
and compare the implications for symptomatic infections and output.
4 Calibration
4.1 Parameters
Parameter values are given in Table 4. The parameters of the model can be classified intro three groups. The first
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model, and that we can take from the literature that has formed so far.17 Obviously the extent to which these
parameters are well understood will evolve over time and we may use this information later on. The second
relate to parameters that are similarly technological in that we think that they represent immutable features of the
model, but that we do not have values for and require calibration. The third are policy parameters and relate to (i)
testing rates, (ii) effectiveness of quarantine, (iii) rules for quarantine. We describe these in the next section when
describing our counterfactuals.
Known medical. We assume that the rate at which infected individuals transition from asymptomatic to symp-
tomatic cases, δ, is such that the average incubation period is 6 days (Wu, Leung, and Leung, 2020). World
Health Organization (2020) report that the average recovery period is 14 days for mild infections, we therefore
set ωR = 1/14. There is little data on the relative rates of infection of symptomatic and asymptomatic individu-
als.18 We assume a common infection rate: ρA
/
ρS = 1.
From surveying estimates we target a mortality rate of 1 percent. In the model we denote this by πD, which is





We use this to determine ωD given ωR and πD = 0.01.
Unknown and calibrated. We use empirical estimates of the rate of basic transmission and equation (1) to calibrate
λ and ρS. We treat RIA,NQ0 as data, taking the value of 2.5, which is in the middle of the range of empirical





Without further data these parameters cannot be separately identified. We therefore set λ = 1 and back out the












In the future, within-region across-time variation in quarantine measures may allow us to separately identify{
λ, ρS
}
. We set the quarantine technology λQ/λ = 0.50.
5 Counterfactuals
Our aim is to provide a small handful of counterfactuals with a minimal set of parameters. The configuration of
these parameters is given in Table 5, and their values are given in Table 6. Section 5 and Section 6 refer to Case 1 in
17A number of recent papers have also discussed significant measurement challenges, e.g. Atkeson (2020a), Stock (2020) and Hortaçsu, Liu,
and Schwieg (2020). For these reasons we interpret our calibration as a proof of concept.
18https://www.buzzfeed.com/albertonardelli/coronavirus-testing-iceland. “Early results from deCode Genetics indicate that a low pro-
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these tables, we consider Case 2—in which we repeat the exercise under more effective quarantine—in Section 7
Initial conditions. We seed the economy by choosing initial conditions that replicate the U.S. COVID-19 experi-
ence. We assume an initial infected population of 300 individuals and 1 detected case. We measure all model and
data counterparts as of the 100th detected case.
Vaccine. We abstract from the long-run, and instead focus on testing and quarantine in the current phase of the
pandemic. Consistent with this, we assume that in each case a vaccine is introduced to the economy after 500 days.
The vaccine moves individuals in any of the NA states through to RA, NQ state, which makes them immune. The
vaccine rolls out slowly, at a rate of 0.10 percent per day.
Counterfactuals. We then consider three different cases for the policy parameters:
{




ru, r−, r+, rr
}
,
τ. We express these parameters as daily rates, despite the model being hourly. With so many parameters we have
many degrees of freedom. We constrain these parameters in a simple way across counterfactuals so that we can
be precise, but others may wish to consider many alternatives. We consider one at the end. Given that we have
assumed immunity, in all cases we set the quarantine rate of recovered individuals ξr to zero and their release rate
rr to 1.
Baseline. Our baseline model features no quarantine and no testing. With no testing ξ− and r− are off the table,
since no unknown cases are tested and identified as negative. We then set ξ+ = ξu = 0 and r+ = ru = 1.19 This is
the worst-case scenario in which the government does nothing to stop the spread of the virus.
Policy interventions. We consider two policy interventions that capture broad quarantine and targeted quaran-
tine with testing. These policies begin on March 18th, which is two weeks after the first 100 cases are reported in
the data and in the model. Aiming to cut down on parameters, we assume that in both cases known positive cases
are quarantined and not released: ξ+ = 1, r+ = 0. We therefore have 6 parameters remaining: ξu and ru in the
quarantine case, and ξu, ξ−, ru and r− in the testing case.
1. No testing - Common Quarantine. Our first policy is an approximation of what we have observed in the
United States in March, 2020. In this counterfactual there is no testing of asymptomatic individuals and so no
known negative cases. There is therefore a common quarantine rate for all asymptomatic individuals. We set this
rate in counterfactual number 2 to ξu2 = 0.010, implying a 1 percent per day quarantine rate. This is in line with
the data in Table 2, in which roughly 24 percent of the US population was quarantined within 19 days. We assume
that the rate of release from quarantine is zero.
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2. Testing - Targeted quarantine. Our second policy assumes that the government tests asymptomatic individu-
als at a rate τ. While the US is testing at a rate of roughly 0.01 percent of the population per day.20 We assume that
the US increases its testing capacity by roughly 50 fold to τ = 0.5% per day. In levels, this would require testing
1,700,000 asymptomatic people per day, while the US is currently testing around 50,000 symptomatic people per day.
In the spirit of our paper being a proof of concept, we choose for comparison a very simple policy. We maintain
the rate of quarantine of unknown cases and assume that known negatives are not released (r−3 − = 0). These
stack the decks against the testing policy having large effects. The only targeted quarantine measure that we take
is to assume that non-quarantined known negative cases are quarantined at rate ξ−3 = ∆× ξ
−
2 , with ∆ < 1. We
then choose a value for ∆ such that the policy delivers the same number of total deaths as the common quarantine
policy. This procedure delivers a value of ∆ = 0.20. When testing asymptomatic cases, the rate of quarantine of
known negative cases can be cut by a factor of five without increasing the total number of deaths caused by the
pandemic.
6 Results
Figure 6 plots our main results where we compare counterfactuals one and two. Statistics for these are given in
Tables 7, 8, 9, which include the Baseline simulation. Panel A plots the cumulative number of reported cases.
Panel B plots the number of infected, symptomatic cases. Given a constant rate of symptoms requiring medical
attention, we can think of Panel B as capturing the number of individuals entering the hospital system. Panel C
plots the cumulative fraction of the population that dies. Panel D plots measured output under the assumption
that non-quarantined individuals produce 50 percent as much as quarantined individuals (Arel = .5).21
Cases. Common quarantine is effective at slowing the cumulative number of reported cases. Testing and targeted
quarantine are slightly more effective.
Case load. Panel B plots the fraction of infected symptomatic individuals in the economy. Both counterfactual
policies ‘flatten the curve’ relative to the baseline. The reduction in peak infection load is lower under the testing
policy. If we interpret case load as the stress put on hospital capacity, targeted quarantine with testing generates
the smallest peak load of cases. Common quarantine pushes the peak infection back by about 170 days, whereas
the targeted quarantine with testing tends to put the peak case load back by 250 days, buying an additional quarter
to prepare the medical system. Table 9 reports these statistics.
Deaths. Quarantine is an effective tool at reducing the number of deaths. The current US common quarantine
policy, if continued to be enacted at the same rate (1% of the U.S. population entering quarantine per day), would
more than halve the fraction of the population that dies from the disease. Table 7 reports the deaths in levels in
20Countries like South Korea are testing at a rate of approximately 0.05 percent per day. This comes from reports of South Korean test-
ing capacity of 20,000 per day (https://www.wired.co.uk/article/south-korea-coronavirus) and a population in South Korea of 51.47
million.
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A. Counterfactuals B. Parameters
Quarantine rates Release rates Testing
ξ+ ξu ξ− ξr r+ ru r− rr τ
Baseline - Do nothing 0 0 — 0 1 1 — 1 0
Case 1 - Quarantine technology - λQ/λ = 0.50 - Section 5 & 6
1. No testing - Common quarantine 1 ξu — 0 0 0 — 1 0




0 0 0 0 1 τ
Case 2 - Strong quarantine technology - λQ/λ = 0.30 - Section 7
1. No testing - Common quarantine 1 ξu — 0 0 0 — 1 0




0 0 0 0 0 1 τ
Table 5: Configuration of policy parameters for each counterfactual
Notes: This table gives the configurations of the policy parameters of the model under our three counterfactuals. Recovered individuals are
immune and so never quarantined and always released. In the Baseline case there is no quarantine and no testing. Under the 1. No testing -
Common quarantine policy there is no testing, so uninfected and infected asymptomatic cases cannot be distinguished. Symptomatic cases are
the only known positives, and these are completely quarantined and not released. Unknown cases are quarantined at rate ξu2 and not released.
Under the 2. Testing - Targeted quarantine policy there is testing of asymptomatic individuals at rate τ > 0. Negative, asymptomatic cases are
distinguished, quarantined at a lower rate, but released at the same rate as unknown cases. Given a value of τ we choose ∆ such that overall
deaths from Cases 1 and 2 are equivalent.
Description Policy parameter Daily rate
1. No testing - Common quarantine
Common quarantine rate ξu 1.0 %
2. Testing - Targeted quarantine
Testing rate τ 0.50 %
Case 1 - Quarantine technology λQ/λ = 0.50
Differential quarantine rate: Known negatives ∆ 0.20
Case 2 - Strong quarantine technology λQ/λ = 0.30
Differential quarantine rate: Unknown cases ψ 0.30
Table 6: Counterfactual parameters
Notes: The parameter ∆ is chosen so that both counterfactuals incur the same total deaths.
each of the scenarios. We deliberately set the parameters of the targeted quarantine policy to deliver the same cu-
mulative deaths as the common quarantine policy, as can be seen clearly in Figure 6C. The testing policy backloads
these deaths. In the short run, there are fewer deaths, but in the long run, as known negative cases are quarantined
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Figure 6: Counterfactuals - Quarantine technology - λQ/λ = 0.50
Notes: The red dotted line corresponds to the counterfactual 1. No testing - Common quarantine. The blue dashed line corresponds to the
counterfactual 2. Testing - Targeted quarantine. Output is total non-quarantined, asymptomatic workers. Output in period zeros is equal to
one since all workers are non-quarantined and asymptomatic.
Output. Table 7 shows that the baseline economy features very little output loss, driven entirely by the massive
loss of life. This is the only tradeoff of quarantine in the textbook SEIR model: if a government quarantines
individuals to reduce deaths, the lower output. The testing model and policy provide a third way, where output
losses are less, due to relaxed quarantine but the same number of deaths is achieved.
In other words, targeted quarantine and testing alters the output-death tradeoff. With extra degrees of freedom
in terms of policy, the government can do better than common quarantine both in terms of deaths and output. Figure
6D shows this clearly. Under targeted quarantine and testing, fewer individuals needs to be quarantined, output
is significantly higher in the first 100 days of the pandemic and recovers more quickly. Accumulating output
produced each period over the first year of the pandemic, output is 10 percent higher under the testing policy. in
the long run the change in output only reflects the loss of life over the pandemic, and both policies deliver the
same loss of life, long run output is the same.
We also report these results relative to pre-COVID-19 levels in Table 8. With targeted quarantine, the level
of output is 10 percent higher in the first 200 days than with common quarantine, and then the two economies
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Experiment Deaths
After 100 days After 200 days After 300 days After 600 days
A. Deaths in Levels
Baseline - Do nothing 10,013 2,572,026 3,037,155 3,040,479
1. No testing - Common quarantine 731 23,989 228,605 879,634
2. Testing - Targeted quarantine 603 12,306 102,605 868,471
B. Deaths Relative to Baseline
1. No testing - Common quarantine -9,282 -2,548,036 -2,808,550 -2,160,845
2. Testing - Targeted quarantine -9,410 -2,559,719 -2,934,550 -2,172,008
Table 7: Counterfactual Deaths
Caution. While we do not want readers to interpret our numbers literally since we are not epidemiologists and
this is a not a rich quantitative SEIR model, we view Figure 6, panels C and D as illustrating our main point:
targeted quarantine allows governments that can implement significant testing to produce more output than under
the common quarantine policy. If the medical system produces fewer deaths under a more distant and lower peak
case load, then the testing policy would also deliver fewer deaths. The policy can produce fewer deaths and higher
output.
6.1 Robustness
For brevity we make one note regarding the robustness of our results to enriching the medical block of the model.
We use this to highlight the usefulness of benchmarking counterfactuals.
Quantitative models being used to forecast the trajectory of the pandemic have richer medical blocks that
incorporate congestion and capacity constraints in the health care system. From our understanding of these models
we think that the following is true. Take an SEIR model and append an arbitrarily rich medical block. Now
consider two policies A and B that deliver the same total number of infections over the pandemic—that is, the area
underneath the curve in Figure 6B. If policy A has a lower peak than policy B then policy A will result in fewer
deaths than policy B.
We have constructed our counterfactuals such that the area under the epidemiology curves are the same. To
see this recall that there is a constant rate of transition from symptomatic states to death. Therefore, under the law
of large numbers, fixing the total number of deaths across counterfactuals by construction fixes the total number
of infections across counterfactuals as well. That is, we know that by construction we have flattened the curve in
moving from the common quarantine to the test and targeted quarantine policy. Under a richer medical block, the
testing and quarantine policy will result in fewer deaths.
7 More effective quarantine
Before concluding we consider how our counterfactual and available policies change under a more effective quar-
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Experiment Output
After 100 days After 200 days After 300 days After 600 days
1. Baseline - Do nothing 1.00 0.91 0.99 0.99
2. No testing - Common quarantine 0.72 0.58 0.55 0.90
3. Testing - Targeted quarantine 0.75 0.65 0.62 0.91








Experiment Peak infection Days to peak
A. Levels
Baseline - Do nothing 68,368,137 166
1. No testing - Common quarantine 6,288,619 341
2. Testing - Targeted quarantine 5,921,942 403
B. Percent relative to Baseline
1. No testing - Common quarantine -90.80 % 105.42 %
2. Testing - Targeted quarantine -91.34 % 143.77 %
Table 9: Counterfactual Peak Infections
counterfactual exercise considered a half as effective quarantine technology in the US, such that λQ/λ = 0.50. We
now consider a more effective quarantine, halfway between these with λQ/λ = 0.30. Now with a more effective
quarantine, even if we set ∆ = 0 and quarantine no individuals that have tested negative, then the policy generates
fewer deaths than the no testing, common quarantine policy. This gives extra space for policy to reduce quaran-
tining other individuals. We again model this simply, reducing the rate of quarantine of unknown cases to ψ× ξu,
with ψ ≤ 1. Table 5 and Table 6 describe this additional counterfactual, and show that we can set ψ = 0.30 and
still incur the casualties from the epidemic as the baseline quarantine policy. Figure 7 shows that this substantially
reduces the decline in our measure of output, and again ‘flattens the curve’ in terms of projected symptomatic
infections.
8 Conclusion
This short paper conceptualizes a minor and easily implemented change to the standard SEIR model of infectious
disease transmission. We assume that quarantine policies can only depend on observed health states, which creates
a role for testing in distinguishing between infected and non-infected asymptomatic individuals. We demonstrate
via a simple calibration of the model, that testing asymptomatic individuals can stand-in for costly quarantine
measures. We make this notion precise by simultaneously reducing quarantine measures and increasing testing
such that the overall mortality rate of the pandemic remains constant at ‘Quarantine Everyone’ levels. With fewer
individuals quarantined, we infer that output of the economy would decline substantially less. Thus, targeted
quarantine and testing alters the output-death tradeoff. The government can do better than common quarantine
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Figure 7: Counterfactuals - More effective quarantine technology - λQ/λ = 0.30
Notes: The red dotted line corresponds to the counterfactual 1. No testing - Common quarantine. The blue dashed line corresponds to the
counterfactual 2. Testing - Targeted quarantine. Output is total non-quarantined, asymptomatic workers. Output in period zeros is equal to
one since all workers are non-quarantined and asymptomatic.
The model here is not immediately applicable for serious quantitative work. However, we think that our exer-
cises show that adding incomplete information and a role for testing through targeted quarantine does not overly
complicate the baseline model and allows discussion of testing policies that cannot be discussed in the baseline
complete information model. These additional features could be integrated into more quantitative epidemiology
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APPENDIX
A Additional tables and figures
Figure A1: Counterfactuals - Including baseline - Quarantine technology - λQ/λ = 0.50
Notes: In each panel the black solid line corresponds to counterfactual Baseline - Do nothing. The red dotted line corresponds to the coun-
terfactual 1. No testing - Common quarantine. The blue dashed line corresponds to the counterfactual 2. Testing - Targeted quarantine.
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Figure A2: Counterfactuals - Including baseline - More effective quarantine technology - λQ/λ = 0.30
Notes: In each panel the black solid line corresponds to counterfactual Baseline - Do nothing. The red dotted line corresponds to the coun-
terfactual 1. No testing - Common quarantine. The blue dashed line corresponds to the counterfactual 2. Testing - Targeted quarantine.
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We argue that occupations are a key explanatory variable for 
understanding the early transmission of COVID-19 in New York City, 
finding that they play a larger role than other key demographics such 
as race or income. Moreover, we find no evidence that commuting 
patterns are significant after controlling for occupations. However, 
racial disparities still persist for Blacks and Hispanics compared 
to Whites, although their magnitudes are economically small. We 
perform a daily analysis over a range of one month to evaluate how 
different channels interact with the progression of the pandemic and 
the stay-at-home order. While the coefficient magnitudes of many 
occupations and demographics decrease, we find evidence consistent 
with higher intra-household contagion over time. Finally, our results 
also suggest that crowded spaces play a more important role than 
population density in the spread of COVID-19.
1 We thank Michael Dickstein, Jonathan T. Elliott, and Daniel Waldinger for their useful comments. Any errors 
or omissions are our own.
2 Federal Reserve of Minneapolis and Chicago Booth.
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1 Introduction
COVID-19 has affected different locations to very different extents, with much of
this variation being explained by characteristics such as the number of international
travellers, weather conditions, local policies to control the pandemic, and the timing
of those policies. Surprisingly, large differences exist even across smaller geographical
units such as neighborhoods within a city. For example, Figure 1 shows the differences


























































































































Percent of patients testing positive for COVID-19
by zip code in New York City





zip code unknown = 89%
N = 38936 total cases as of March 31, 2020
Figure 1: Map of the rate of positives by zip code as of March 31, 2020.
From simple inspection, zip codes with the highest rates are found in the boroughs
of Bronx, Brooklyn, and Queens. These boroughs are not only those with the lowest
levels of average income but also home to the majority of Blacks and Hispanics living
in NYC.1
The spatial correlations between the incidence of the pandemic and demographics
has garnered the attention of many economists and policy makers. For example, Bor-
jas (2020) and Schmitt-Grohé et al. (2020) show that many of the spatial disparities
1These groups compose 29% and 56%, respectively, of all Bronx residents, 31% and 19% for
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in testing and positive rates across NYC neighborhoods are explained by demograph-
ics, and Sá (2020) shows how different socioeconomic variables relate to the number
of cases and deaths in the UK. Given that COVID-19 does not intrinsically discrimi-
nate across demographic groups, the reason for such disparities still remains an open
question. Therefore, the goal of this paper is to assess the importance of a set of
observable factors in explaining the existing disparities across NYC neighborhoods,
such as population density, commuting patterns, and occupations. We first focus on
occupations motivated by the hypothesis that workers in jobs with a higher degree of
human exposure are more likely to contract the disease.2 Because households from a
low socioeconomic status are more likely to have jobs with a higher degree of human
exposure, the pandemic has an unequal impact across society, with a larger impact
on those from a lower socioeconomic status. In light of this mechanism, the pandemic
can magnify existing inequalities – a problem that the world has previously witnessed
with past pandemics (Furceri et al., 2020). To the best of our knowledge, our analysis
is the first to find empirical evidence that occupations play a key role in the different
impact of COVID-19 across demographics.3
To understand the relevance of different mechanisms, we use data on the number
of tests and positives across NYC zip codes provided by Department of Health and
Mental Hygiene of New York City (DOH).4 Because these data have been released
(almost) on a daily basis, we are able to keep track of the number of tests and the
fraction of those that are positive since April 1. We combine the data on testing
with neighborhood and demographic indicators, which are provided by the American
Community Survey (ACS). Namely, we use zip code level data on population density,
commuting patterns, income, as well as race and age composition. We also include
employment data. To analyze the role of occupations, we include the share of workers
for 13 categories in each zip code constructed from the ACS according to their degree
of human interaction.5
Our results show that occupations are a key component in explaining the observed
differences across NYC areas at early stages of the pandemic. For example, in our
preferred specification, we find that a one-percentage-point increase in the number of
workers employed in transportation, an occupation that has been declared essential
2Another explanation could be selection of workers along comorbidities across occupations. For
example, as mining has been traditionally related to respiratory diseases, miners may show a higher
propensity of contracting the disease and of more severe symptoms. However, given as interactive
occupations have become more important in larger metros over time (Michaels et al., 2019), we
believe that explaining disparities through different degrees of human exposure is a more credible
hypothesis for workers in NYC.
3Barbieri et al. (2020) provide a descriptive analysis of different occupations in terms of human
exposure and point out that this could have played a key role in the early spread of the pandemic
in Italy.
4Unfortunately, at the time of this analysis, there is no data available with the number of deaths
by zip code.
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and has a high degree of exposure to human interaction, increases the share of positive
tests by 1% by April 20, six weeks into the pandemic. Moreover, we show that
length of commute and the use of public transport are not significant after controlling
for occupations.6 In terms of neighborhood characteristics, we also find that the
magnitude of the coefficient for household size is roughly six times larger than the
coefficient for neighborhood density for our preferred specification for April 20. This
result suggests that crowding of shared spaces plays a more important role than the
density of locations.
Several policy implication arise from our analysis. First, policy makers can target
specific groups of riskier occupations with the distribution of protective gear, testing,
and vaccination when these are scarce. These types of policies can easily complement
existing ones and it has a twofold purpose. First, it helps mitigate the unequal effects
of COVID-19 by targeting those who are more vulnerable, either because they are
more exposed to the virus or because other demographics or comorbidities make them
more likely to contract the disease. Second, if this type of policy targets those workers
that are more likely to be in contact with the rest of the population, it also mitigates
the risk of exposure for everyone in the population at large. Additionally, another
implication that arises from our analysis is that, while the subway may have played
a role in the spread of COVID-19 at the city level, focusing policy on the subway
may not help mitigate contagion at the local level. Finally, observe that our results
also suggest that low income households are more vulnerable to infection in part
because these households are on average more crowded than high income households.
In particular, we expect transmission due to crowded homes to be specially important
during lockdowns, when household members tend to spend most of the day together.
Thus, our results suggest a potential drawback for such policies and invite policy-
makers to rethink the way stay-at-home orders are designed. For example, local
governments could offer low income families the option of an alternative shelter during
the pandemic, such as vacant hotels. We believe that this type of policy is useful not
only for containing the pandemic but also for closing the gap of its impact across
demographic groups.
In each of our analyses we use the fraction of positive tests to date across NYC zip
codes as our dependent variable.7 Moreover, in all of our specifications we include day
6Harries (2020) argues that the NYC subway was crucial for spreading the pandemic in NYC.
More recently, Furth (2020) shows that “local infections are negatively correlated with subway use.”
A key aspect to bear in mind is that the data on commuting patterns provided by ACS documents
average public transport usage and commute times before the pandemic. Hence, the best way to
analyze such hypothesis is using daily commuting patterns across geographical units during the time
of the pandemic.
7We could also focus on the number of positive tests per capita. We refrain from doing so for
two reasons. First, random testing has not been possible in NYC due to the limited availability of
tests in early stages of the pandemic. Second, Borjas (2020) highlights that the incidence of different
variables on positive results per capita is composed of two things: A differential incidence on those






















VETTED AND REAL-TIME PAPERS
fixed effects that capture any time trends that are common to all neighborhoods in
NYC. We start by including a small set of neighborhood controls, such as commuting
patterns, population density, and health insurance controls.8
Additionally, our results are robust after including demographics, as well as bor-
ough fixed effects.9 Including demographics leads to several striking patterns. Whereas
simple correlations show that wealthier neighborhoods have a lower rate of positives,
we show that income is not significant when occupations are included. However, we
still see significant and positive effects on positive rates for minorities. These results
could be because minorities are less likely to get tested, they have to be in worse
conditions than Whites in order to get tested, or that they are more likely to contract
the disease due to existing comorbidities.10 However, whether these racial disparities
are economically relevant can be questioned. Moreover, their magnitudes decrease
over time as more testing becomes available – with Asians showing no statistical sig-
nificance at the end of our sample. For example, on April 1, one month after the
pandemic started in NYC, we find that a one-percentage point increase in the share
of Blacks correlates with an increase of 0.34% in the share of positive tests, for an
average number of 51% of positive cases. By April 20th, these numbers are 0.15%
and 54%, respectively. For Hispanics, the disparity is larger, where a one-percentage-
point increase in their population corresponds to an increase of 0.38% and 0.23% in
the rate of positives, for the same two dates.
In all of our specifications, we also include the share of the population being
tested, which we call “tests-per-capita.” We include this variable for two reasons.
First, it allows us to interpret our results as conditional on the number of tests per
capita that have been administered. Therefore, it helps to control for selection on
testing. Second, the limited availability of tests in NYC forced health authorities to
constrain testing to people showing sufficiently acute symptoms or determined to be
at high risk of infection at the beginning of the pandemic. Thus, we expect the daily
number of tests administered to be close to the population in that segment, which in
turn should be roughly proportional to the number of infected people.11 Therefore,
we use the number of tests per capita as a proxy for the overall level of the spread
of the pandemic within a neighborhood. We find that when the number of tests per
tested. Therefore, we believe that the fraction of positive tests is the variable that maps most closely
the actual spread of the disease within a neighborhood throughout our sample.
8The data provided by ACS are averages at the neighborhood level. Hence we cannot incorporate
neighborhood fixed effects given the lack of temporal variation of our covariates of interest.
9We use similar controls to those in Borjas (2020) for comparability purposes.
10Some evidence that the first two are plausible mecha-
nism can be found in www.modernhealthcare.com/safety-quality/
long-standing-racial-and-income-disparities-seen-creeping-covid-19-care. An ex-
ample for the third channel can be found in https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2020/05/
200507121353.htm. This study found that lower levels of vitamin D, which varies with the levels
of melanin in the skin, were positively correlated with higher mortality rates.
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capita increases, the share of positive tests also increases. This result stems from both
variables co-moving with the true number of infected people within a neighborhood.
However, we also find that, as testing becomes more widely available and more tests
are performed on the asymptomatic population, the magnitude of tests-per-capita
decreases over our analyzed time period.
Our daily analysis also reveals that, as the stay-at-home order starts to be effec-
tive, the magnitude of many occupations begins to decrease. For example, a one-
percentage-point increase in the number of workers employed in transportation de-
creases its size to 1% as of April 20, almost two months into the pandemic and one
month after the stay-at-home order went into effect. On the other hand, we still find
a rather stable coefficient of household size over time, which is consistent with the
stay-at-home order being more helpful at mitigating contagion at work or in public
spaces than within the household.12
We conclude that much of the disparity in the rates of positives across demographic
groups can be partially explained by a heterogeneous distribution of demographics
across occupations. In particular, a key channel appears to be the differences in
exposure to human contact across jobs. However, our results also suggest that the
relevance of these variables decreases over time, and that this change occurs in tan-
dem with an increase in intra-household contagion as days go by. These trends are
consistent with the progression of the pandemic and its interaction with the policies
set in place. In light of our results, we also propose policies focusing on minorities
that can not only help mitigate the effect of the pandemic among those demographic
groups, but that may have substantial positive spillovers on the rest of the population.
2 Data description and patterns
Our data on COVID-19 incidence and the number of tests performed is from the NYC
DOH. The DOH releases (almost) daily data on the cumulative count of COVID-19
cases and the total number of residents that have been tested, organized by the zip
code of residence. We have collected data starting from April 1, with only April 2
and April 6 missing from our sample.13
We obtain demographic and occupation data at the zip code level from the ACS.
The demographic characteristics we include are zip code median income, average age,
racial breakdown, and health insurance status. We also include commuting-related
variables: average commute time to work as well as means of transportation. A simple
analysis reveals that share of Blacks and Hispanics have a correlation coefficient of
0.426 and 0.312 respectively with a p-value smaller than 0.01 with the share of positive
tests. For Asians we observe no significant relationship, with a correlation coefficient
12Sá (2020) also finds a positive relationship between the number of household members and
number of cases for the UK.






















VETTED AND REAL-TIME PAPERS
of 0.009 with a p-value of 0.905. Finally, we observe a negative correlation coefficient
between log of median income and share of positives, with a correlation coefficient
of -0.530 with a p-value smaller than 0.01. To summarize, these correlations show
that, a priori, locations populated with more vulnerable groups show higher rates of
positive tests.
We also construct the shares of the working-age population employed at differ-
ent occupation categories. The ACS provides the number of workers employed in
each occupation by zip code of residence. We then categorize them according to
their essential definition, spatial correlations between them, and similarity in work
environments and social exposure.14 The final occupation groups that we use in our
regressions are: (1) Essential - Professional: Management, Business, Finance; (2) Non
essential - Professional: Computer and Mathematical, Architecture and Engineering,
Sales and Related, Community and Social Services, Education, Training, and Library,
Arts, Design, Entertainment, Sports, and Media, Administrative and Office Support;
(3) Science fields: Life, Physical, and Social Science; (4) Law and Related: Legal;
(5) Health practitioners; (6) Other health: Health technologists, Technicians, and
Healthcare Support; (7) Firefighting: Firefighting and prevention; (8) Law enforce-
ment; (9) Essential - Service: Food Preparation and Serving, Buildings and grounds
cleaning, and Maintenance; (10) Non essential - Service: Personal care and Service;
(11) Industrial, Natural resources, and Construction: Construction and extraction,
Material Moving, Farming, Fishing, and Forestry production; (12) Essential - Techni-
cal: Installation, Maintenance, and Repair; (13) Transportation. For our occupational
regressors, we count the number for workers in each of these occupations and nor-
malize by working-age population, which includes people between the ages of 18 to
65 years old.
14Leibovici et al. (2020) rank occupations according to an index of occupational contact-intensity,
defined from a survey by O*NET. They use ACS individual-level data at the four digit Standard
Occupation Classification (SOC) level and match it to 107 ACS-defined occupations. Unfortunately,
we only observe occupations at the SOC first level of aggregation for zip code data and cannot
match their classification to our spatial distribution. Nonetheless, our categorization closely follows
the intensity index grouping for the more specific group of occupations when aggregated to the first
SOC level. More importantly, when defining our 13 categories, we avoid mixing occupations with
large differences in their contact-intensity values. For robustness we have also performed our analysis
with two alternative classifications for occupations. First, we divided occupations between essential
and non-essential as declared by the US government. Second, we used the four categories defined in
Kaplan et al. (2020). In both cases, the high level of aggregation lead to non-significant estimates
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3 Results
3.1 General Results
In this section, we present the main empirical results for our four different specifi-
cations. Our unit of analysis is the zip code, and all models include the cumulative
share of positive tests by day as the dependent variable. In all of our specifications we
attach weights equal to population size to our geographical units. Additionally, we
include tests-per-capita as a proxy for the overall spread of infection within the neigh-
borhoods. The first specification includes some widely discussed potential factors of
the spread of COVID-19 in NYC: density and commuting patterns, specifically, log of
population density, percentage of workers using public transport, average commute
time, and the percentage of the population that is uninsured. We expand our sec-
ond specification by including our proposed mechanism, namely, the percentage of
the working-age population employed in each of the 13 occupation categories defined
above. The third specification adds demographic controls related to income, age,
gender, household size, race, and borough fixed effects. Exploiting the fact that we
have daily data over multiple days, we estimate a separate regression for each day,
which allows us to detect any time patterns in the correlations. Therefore, in all of
our specifications we run the following regression equation
share of positive testsit = αt + βttests per capitait + γtXi + εit,
where the set of controls Xi vary for each specification according to the description
above.
The first specification - see Table 1 columns 1,4, and 7, which correspond to April
1, April 20, and April 30, respectively - shows the effect of the variables commonly
used to explain the incidence of COVID-19 in NYC. Whereas Harries (2020) finds
subway use was a major factor of the virus spread, we find it does not have a sig-
nificant effect. This result could be due to the lack of cross-neighborhood variation
to identify this effect, because most New Yorkers use public transportation in their
daily commute. Nonetheless, commute time is a significant factor. For example, for
April 20 - column 4 of Table 1 - a 10% increase on average which equals to a four-
minute increase in commute time, correlates with a 0.02-point increase in the share of
positive tests, equivalent to approximately a 4-percentage-point increase in the share
of positive tests.15 We also find that the share of population that is uninsured has a
significant positive coefficient for most of our sample. This result could be because
uninsured patients are less likely to get tested for fear of medical charges, and there-
fore only submit a test when experiencing acute symptoms. For example, for April
20 - column 4 of Table 1, we find that a one-percentage-point increase in the share
of uninsured population is correlated with a 1.7-percentage-point (0.924*0.01/0.54)
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increase in the share of positive tests. Although the magnitude of this variable de-
creases as we include other covariates, its estimated coefficient remains positive and
significant.
In specification (2), columns 2, 5, and 8 in Table 1, we test the importance of
different occupations. We include the variables defined as the shares of the working-
age population employed in these occupations, so the coefficients are relative to the
working-age population who are unemployed. The coefficients can be read as the
effect of a one-percentage-point increase in the population employed in the particular
category on the share of positive tests. We find some occupations explain a significant
part of the variation in COVID-19 incidence. On the one hand, an increase in the
share of workers employed in non-essential - professional, other health (not health
practitioners), and transportation occupations are all associated with a higher per-
centage of positive tests. On the other hand, higher shares of workers in the science
fields category, legal occupations, and law enforcement have a negative correlation
with the share of positive tests. These results are discussed further in the time-trends
section.
Perhaps surprisingly, under this specification, neither commute time nor the share
of the population using public transport have a significant effect. This result suggests
commuting patterns are closely related to occupations, and most of the explanatory
variation for commuting patterns comes through this channel. This result also im-
plies the existence of within-city location and mobility patterns that are occupation
specific.
We include demographic variables in the third model - columns 3, 6, and 9 in Table
1. Notably, the income effect disappears when we control for occupations, suggesting
the previous correlation presented in Section 2 is due to income differences across jobs.
Still, some demographic effects remain significant, even after including borough fixed
effects. For example, on April 20 - column 6 in able 1, a one-percentage-point increase
in the share of Blacks and Hispanics leads to a 0.15% and 0.23% increase respectively
in the rate of positives, an effect that is economically small. A plausible explanation
for these patterns could be driven by a racial bias on the incidence of testing, as
pointed out by Borjas (2020). Another explanation is differences in adherence to the
shelter-in-place policy, as explored by Coven and Gupta (2020). We also find that
household size has a positive correlation with the share of tests that are positive. For
example, for the same regression, adding one extra person to the average household,
a 37% increase, corresponds with a 6.7% (0.37*0.099/0.54) increase in the percentage
of positive tests. On the other hand, for this specification, we do not find a significant
effect for neighborhood density. This result suggests that crowding of spaces may be
a more important factor in explaining the spread of COVID-19 than density.
The tests-per-capita coefficient is positive and highly significant across all days
for specification (3) - columns 3, 6, and 9 in Table 1. Because of the scarcity of tests,
testing was only performed on those showing sufficiently severe symptoms or who
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for the rate of infections within the neighborhood especially at early stages of the
pandemic.16 Its magnitude decreases over time as testing becomes more available to
the rest of the population.17
16A concern are potential large differences in the age distribution across NYC zip codes. In the
data, we find that the average age ranges from 27.5 to 45.5 across neighborhoods in NYC, with the
exception of zip code 11005. It is a fairly small zip code with 1700 residents, an average age of 76,
and mainly composed of retired immigrant women. Given such differences, we have excluded it from
our analysis.
17One should bear in mind that the variable tests-per-capita may be capturing other time-varying
unobservables that correlate with the share of positive tests, such as (lagged) daily commuting
patterns at the neighborhood level. Thus, the interpretation of its coefficient should not be done
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Table 1: Dependent variable - share of positive tests (cumulative, up to specified date)
April 1 April 20 April 30
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Controls Borough FE Controls Borough FE Controls Borough FE
Neighborhood + Occup. + Dem. & Neighborhood + Occup. + Dem. & Neighborhood + Occup. + Dem. &
Controls Borough FE Controls Borough FE Controls Borough FE
Tests per capita 9.017∗∗∗ 11.186∗∗∗ 12.050∗∗∗ 0.667 0.262 2.553∗∗∗ 0.723∗∗ 0.291 1.437∗∗∗
Log Density 0.015 0.022∗ 0.032∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗ 0.015∗ 0.016∗∗∗ 0.013∗ 0.005 0.010∗
% Public Transport -0.015 0.013 -0.059 0.010 -0.001 -0.017 0.006 0.019 0.023
Log Commuting Time 0.237∗∗∗ -0.016 -0.054 0.232∗∗∗ 0.001 -0.008 0.196∗∗∗ 0.014 -0.012
% Uninsured 1.002∗∗∗ 0.662∗∗∗ 0.150 0.924∗∗∗ 0.417∗∗ 0.351∗∗∗ 0.831∗∗∗ 0.424∗∗∗ 0.302∗∗∗
% Essential - Professional 0.156 0.766∗∗∗ -0.210 0.235 -0.153 0.039
% Non ess. - Professional 0.669∗∗∗ 0.544∗∗ 0.329∗∗ 0.224∗ 0.192∗ -0.008
% Science fields -4.703∗∗∗ -2.965∗∗∗ -1.931∗ -1.609∗∗ -1.000 -1.148∗
% Law and related -0.410 -1.427∗∗ -0.492 -0.898∗∗ -0.364 -0.876∗∗
% Health practitioners -0.432 -0.167 -0.155 -0.206 0.065 -0.130
% Other health 0.947∗∗∗ 0.346 0.815∗∗∗ 0.365 0.703∗∗∗ 0.307
% Firefighting 2.743∗∗ 1.629∗ 0.379 -0.156 -0.223 -0.953
% Law enforcement -0.301 -0.223 -1.970∗ -1.344∗∗ -1.017 -0.729
% Essential - Service -0.100 0.245 0.312 0.082 0.236 -0.075
% Non ess. - Service 0.769 1.154∗∗ -0.046 0.578∗ -0.042 0.281
% Ind. and Construction 1.091∗∗ 0.839∗∗ 0.271 -0.079 0.254 -0.007
% Essential - Technical -2.025∗ -0.319 -0.785 -0.908∗ -0.159 -0.917∗∗
% Transportation 1.752∗∗∗ 1.102∗∗ 1.253∗∗∗ 0.541∗ 1.028∗∗∗ 0.229
Log Income -0.010 -0.022 0.015
Share ≥ 20, ≤ 40 -0.357∗∗ -0.208∗∗ -0.028
Share ≥ 40, ≤ 60 -0.611∗∗ -0.198 -0.067
Share ≥ 60 -0.347∗ 0.002 0.276∗∗∗
Share Male -0.146 0.318∗∗ 0.218
Log Household Size 0.037 0.099∗∗∗ 0.090∗∗∗
% Black 0.175∗∗∗ 0.081∗∗∗ 0.083∗∗∗
% Hispanic 0.194∗∗∗ 0.125∗∗∗ 0.135∗∗∗
% Asian 0.141∗∗∗ 0.012 0.019
Bronx -0.014 -0.062∗∗∗ -0.036∗∗∗
Brooklyn 0.086∗∗∗ 0.034∗∗ 0.036∗∗∗
Queens 0.084∗∗∗ 0.023 0.034∗∗∗
Staten Island 0.083∗∗∗ -0.064∗∗∗ -0.029
Constant -0.671∗∗ -0.149 0.196 -0.682∗∗∗ 0.201 0.111 -0.513∗∗∗ 0.190 -0.024
Observations 174 174 174 174 174 174 174 174 174
R2 0.514 0.694 0.839 0.673 0.800 0.920 0.718 0.807 0.911 .763 0.821 0.896
Weighted OLS by population size. Robust standard errors.
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3.2 Daily comparison and time trends
In this section we present a time-varying analysis that could provide insights on both
the evolution of the pandemic effects as well as the health policies in place. We follow
specification (3):
share of positive testsit = αt + βttests per capitait + γtXi + εit,
where Xi is the vector of neighborhood characteristics including commuting patterns,
share of occupations, demographics, and borough fixed effects, and compare the esti-
mated coefficient of the same variable across different dates.
For illustrative purposes we start by plotting the evolution of some specific vari-
ables for all days in April. In Figure 2 we plot the estimated coefficients, γt, for
different variables in Xi, and confidence interval at 95% level from April 1 to April
30. For the top left panel, we plot the coefficients for the share of workers in Trans-
portation and Science. For the top right panel, we plot the coefficients for Density
and Household size. Finally, for the bottom panel we plot the coefficients for the
share of population who is Black as well as the share of Asians. For the evolution of
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Race relative to Whites
Figure 2: Daily evolution of coefficients
The first pattern the we observe is that the magnitude of the coefficients for
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importance of occupations in the spread of the disease decreased with time. This
pattern is consistent with the effects associated with the stay-at-home order that was
effective on March 22: As people were required to stay in their homes, the transmission
through human exposure in work places or in public spaces became less prevalent.
Second, we analyze the time-varying effects of neighborhood density and household
size. While both coefficients are positive and significant for most of our sample,
we see that the coefficient of household size is orders of magnitude larger than the
coefficient for neighborhood density, ranging from roughly 6 to 9 times larger after
April 7. The first conclusion that we draw is that intra-household crowding appears
to be a more important channel in the transmission of COVID-19 than neighborhood
density. Another implication that arises from these first two graphs together is that,
while shelter-in-place policies are useful at mitigating contagion in public spaces or
in workplace locations, it may not have been as useful to prevent intra-household
contagion.
Finally, another outstanding time pattern is that the coefficients on racial com-
position decrease in magnitude as testing becomes more widely available. This result
may suggest a stronger racial-selection component is at play among those in worse
condition at earlier dates. For example, an explanation for this pattern could be that
Black citizens were less likely to be tested or had to be in worse condition to access
testing compared to White citizens.18 See bottom panel of Figure 2 for the evolution
of the coefficients of racial composition.
Now we turn to the analysis of the rest of the variables using 1, by comparing the
estimated coefficients across columns 3, 6, and 9.
The result for the tests-per-capita variable is particularly salient; we observe a
strong correlation on the share of positive tests that becomes progressively smaller
over time. This result could be reconciled with the fact that in the earlier days of the
crisis, testing was severely limited. Zip codes with more tests implied a higher share
of people at high risk of having the disease. In light of this, a key takeaway from the
results of our daily comparison is the importance of widespread testing, because it
allows for a more accurate identification of the mechanisms that create demographic
and occupational differences in COVID-19 exposure.
Notable time trends exist in the correlations associated with occupations. Higher
shares of essential - professional and non-essential - service categories were associated
with higher percentage-point increases in the rate of positive tests at earlier dates.
On April 1, a one-percentage-point increase implied a 1.5- and a 2.2-percentage point
increase in the positive rate of tests. However, they eventually decrease, averaging
closer to a 0.3- and a one-percentage-point increase respectively on April 20, with
essential - professional not being statistically significant. A plausible explanation is
that these professions are either non-essential, or have the highest shares of remote
workers. Although they were highly exposed to the virus before the shelter-at-home
order, once the workers shelter in place, their correlation with positive tests decreases.
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The opposite happens in science fields and law occupations — they are negatively
correlated with COVID-19 incidence pre-shelter order, but the effect trends towards
zero.
We find interesting patterns for the essential occupations as well. An additional
percentage point in the share of transportation workers is associated with between
a 0.5- and a one-percentage-point increase in the rate of positive tests. The effect
seems to decay over time, but at a slower rate than other occupations. This result
could be due to its essential designation, but also due to the high exposure faced by
workers in this occupation. See top left panel of Figure 2 for the evolution of the
coefficients of the share of workers in Transportation and Science fields. The share of
industrial, natural-resources, and construction occupations begins with a positive cor-
relation with COVID-19 incidence. However, a week after the general stay-at-home
order, the Governor of New York determined construction was not essential, and this
order could explain the eventual attenuation of the correlation. Law-enforcement-
occupation shares have a consistently negative correlation on the share of positive
tests, whereas firefighter shares have a declining trajectory toward zero. A plausi-
ble explanation for this difference could be the partnership between the NYPD and
health care groups to provide free testing to its members.19 Furthermore, the NYPD
provided additional work flexibility for members with pre-existing conditions and ex-
tensive sick leave. It’s possible that early adoption of these measures protected the
most vulnerable workers from infection from the onset.20 The share of the uninsured
population increasingly predicts the variation in positive test results. We find that
an additional percentage point in the share of uninsured people predicts an almost
0.3-percentage-point increase in the share of positive tests. Although many health
care providers are waiving COVID-19-related out-of-pocket costs, these fees remain
very high for the uninsured, and so a higher incidence of COVID-19 in this group
could imply a severe financial burden.
4 Conclusions and policy implications
In this paper, we present evidence showing that occupations are an important channel
for explaining differences in the rates of COVID-19 across neighborhoods at the early
stages of the pandemic. Using data from NYC at the zip code level, we study the
relationship between the share of positive tests and the share of workers in different
occupations. The DOH provides daily updates of COVID-19 test data, allowing us to
study the aforementioned relationships over multiple days and to detect time patterns
in their magnitudes.
We begin by showing descriptive evidence of the heterogeneous incidence of pos-
itive cases across neighborhoods, income, race, gender, and household size. A zip
19See this link for more information.
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code’s median income is negatively correlated with its share of positive tests. Further-
more, we find that the shares of Black and Hispanic residents, and average household
size, positively correlate with the share of positive tests. Highlighting these differ-
ences is important because these observations confirm that the disease has had more
harmful effects on vulnerable communities. Finding an occupation mechanism that
explains it could guide policy measures intended to alleviate its impact.
We estimate several models to explore the effect of occupations. Our first spec-
ification only includes neighborhood characteristics, such as the use of public trans-
portation and the average length of daily commutes. Although commuting patterns
have been put forth as a major factor in the spread of the disease in NYC, we show
that, after including occupation controls, they fail to significantly explain variation
in share of positive tests at the zip code level.
We find the strongest positive correlation on the share of positive tests with the
share of workers in Transportation, Industrial, Natural-resources, Construction, and
Non essential - Professional, with clear time trends in their estimated coefficients.
For example, in the case of Transportation, a one-percentage-point increase in the
share of workers in these occupations leads to a one- to two-percentage-point increase
in the rates of positive results. Although the other two have a significant effect in
positive shares at earlier dates, their magnitude becomes insignificant by the end of
our sample period. This trend could be a result of the stay-at-home order. Conversely,
higher shares of workers in Science Fields and Law Enforcement reduce the number
of positive rates, with Science Fields decreasing in magnitude over time.
When adding demographic controls, we observe that racial patterns do persist,
suggesting that the occupation mechanism does not fully explain all of the racial
differences. However, their magnitude is small and arguably not economically rele-
vant. Income and most age groups do not contribute to the variation in positive tests,
suggesting the occupation mechanism can explain to a greater extent the disparities
along those demographics observed in the data.
In all of our regression models we include the number of tests per capita, and
find that it is a strong predictor of the share of positive tests. However, its relative
importance declines over time, as tests become more widely available. Moreover, as
this variable loses relevancy, more of the variation in COVID-19 incidence is explained
through the occupation channel.
Our results suggest clear implications for policy. First, they suggest that policy-
makers can target specific groups in the provision of protective gear, tests, and vac-
cinations. The purpose of this policy is twofold: while it provides extra protection
against the disease for those who are more vulnerable, it also has positive effects
which will mitigate the risk of contagion for the rest of the population. For exam-
ple, a policy that starts vaccinating and/or testing those workers with higher rates
of human interaction affects not only those directly targeted by the policy, but also
those who are likely to be in contact with them. Our results also suggest that health
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tance increases over time. Hence, local governments could incentivize the population
without medical insurance to get tested, implementing policies such as full coverage of
out-of-pocket costs in relation to COVID-19. Finally, we provide suggestive evidence
that the stay-at-home order has mitigated contagion rates at work or in public spaces,
while it has increased the probability of intra-household infections. This last result
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than the economic effect, and deaths were 19 percent higher in pro-
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Early UK mortality statistics relating to the COVID-19 pandemic1 reveal that the number of 
deaths were consistently larger in London, but it is widely known that cities are the most 
economically unequal places (Mingione, 1996; Glaeser et al., 2009). A closer examination of 
the data may reveal a more nuanced pattern about the propensity of different groups of people 
to die from the COVID-19 virus and their spatial patterns within and between conurbations; 
for instance, is the probability of dying from COVID-19 higher in specific socioeconomic or 
deprived groups who co-locate spatially? Although fine-grain individual-level statistical 
analyses of the COVID-19 pandemic are currently not feasible due to data availability, it is 
possible to gain insights into these issues by exploring available spatial data and by 
contrasting their socioeconomic characteristics. 
Geographies of deprivation have been cautiously analysed in attempts to understand 
the reasons for the Brexit vote (Rodríguez-Pose, 2018; McCann, 2019). Deprived areas 
experience more precarious socioeconomic conditions and higher levels of uncertainty, 
poorer diets and greater stress, and therefore their citizens have lower immune systems 
(Zaman et al., 1997; Bray et al., 2008; Berry et al., 2012; Kim et al., 2013; Matzner, 2013). 
Moreover, the onset of multimorbidity occurs 10-15 years earlier for people living in the 
most deprived areas compared with people living in the most affluent areas, with 
socioeconomic deprivation strongly associated with multimorbidity including poor mental 
health (Barnett et al., 2012). Meanwhile, the country is already expected to experience a 
negative economic shock at the end of the Brexit implementation period (Los et al., 2017). 
The current study alerts that the current pandemic is likely to exacerbate and deepen existing 
inequalities on the brink of a post-Brexit economic shock. 
This study investigates how regional inequalities, in terms of deprivation and cultural 
discrimination, are reflected in the current and future consequences of the COVID-19 
pandemic. Our paper has three aims: (i) to map the geography of the COVID-19 pandemic 
across England and Wales; (ii) to examine the relationship between the geography of the 
pandemic and the geography of deprivation and cultural diversity; and (iii) to identify the 
places that are becoming more economically vulnerable and more at risk of the consequences 
of economic shocks that are expected due to the lock-down and to follow the end of the 
Brexit implementation period. 
Using historic and current data for England and Wales on regional development, 
cultural and economic disparities, and COVID-19 mortality, this study applied data 
decomposition and 2SLS IV methods of analysis to improve understanding of the spatial 
disparities in the COVID-19 death toll. We explain disparities in the COVID-19 death toll in 
terms of the overall socioeconomic milieu of deprivation and the interaction of deprivation 
with cultural and economic belonging. We also add to the literature by identifying places that 
are experiencing faster rates of increase in economic instability in terms of unemployment 
and small business failure in order to identify the probable locations of future extreme 
deprivation. Thus, we highlight areas in which COVID-19 exacerbates inequalities leading to 
possible consequent social unrest. 
1  We are aware that improvements to COVID-19 mortality data are required and that constant updates and 
corections are being made. However, these updates regard the methods of data collection for the entire 
sample and therefore they do not concern the inequalities that are between groups within the sample. One 
and the same measurement error is most likely to be incurred across the groups, and therefore the between 
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We reveal that the effect of cultural discrimination on COVID-19-related mortality 
was five times greater than the economic effect, and that deaths were 19 percent higher in 
pro-Brexit areas. Our study brings closer attention to places that are likely to experience 
increases in grievances from being left behind. New grievances, which may coincide with 
economic change in the post-Brexit transition period and the morbidity and mortality 
consequences of the COVID-19 virus, will deepen existing inequalities. As growing 
economic inequality is known to be associated with social unrest (Hirschman and Rothschild, 
1973; Benabou and Tirole, 2006, 2009, 2011, 2016), urgent measures are needed to support 
and alleviate both economic losses, ongoing health issues and psychological traumas; this is 
especially the case in places where COVID-19 aggravates inequality and is associated with 
past tendencies towards social unrest due to deprivation and existing feelings of being left 
behind. 
The structure of this paper is as follows. Section 2 briefly summarises the voluminous 
literature on economic inequality in the UK. This section also reviews what we know about 
the geographies of deprivation and the Brexit vote, and how these link to what we know 
about inequality and the unrest-generating tunnel effect. Section 3 elucidates the suitability of 
the Culture-Based Development (CBD) methodology for the analysis of economic and 
cultural discrimination that may lead to disparities in the death toll and social unrest. Section 
4 outlines our analytical framework, hypotheses and data, with the empirical results presented 




2. Historical Roots of Inequality in the UK 
 
The UK is traditionally and historically a society of deep economic and social class division. 
Stobart (2011) outlines the quality of life of affluent people over the 1710-1790 period and 
describes the contemporaneous lavish Veblenian consumption of goods that signalled social 
status. Meanwhile, Perry (2005) and Gazeley and Verdon (2014) depict the dire conditions of 
households living in poverty in 18th Century England. An overarching dynamic of poverty in 
the UK also pervades the present, as is clear from the work of Smith and Middleton (2007). 
The historic roots of economic inequality in the UK were never successfully expunged, and 
they developed nuances that reflect new discriminatory trends and socioeconomic 
marginalization across gender, geography, ethnic and age groups that permeate into the 21th 
century (Lindert, 2000; Niemietz, 2009; Davies and Joshie, 2018; Cribb et al., 2018). 
The geography of inequality in the UK exposes one of the most severe signs of this 
deep-seated problem and its historical roots. Some studies reveal persistent inequalities in 
endowments and investments, as illustrated through the history of construction of the 
motorway network (Merriman, 2009). Spatial inequalities in the UK have many aspects, but 
one that has gained particular attention and traction in the literature is the cultural dimension 
(Massey, 1979; Lindert, 1996, 2000; Hall, 1997; Martin, 2004; Wei, 2015), which has been 
shown to have a trace of spatial persistence into the modern day (Hills, 2010). 
Documents reporting the economic history of pandemics, and specifically in the UK, 
are full of examples of connecting economic deprivation and inequality with mortality. 
Examples include the plague in London and its grave-digging practices (Howson, 1961; 
Hardling, 1989; Mack, 1991) and the foot-and-mouth disease (Woods, 2013). The effects of a 
health crisis are not irreversible and proper policymaking interventions could abate their 
ramifications for economic development. For example, explorations into the effects of 
malaria on the development of Southern European countries demonstrate that the health 
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policy (Bowden et al., 2008), suggesting that beneficial economic interventions can put 
economies on to a preferable developmental path. 
The issues of inequality and vulnerability that we are raising here are, of course, not 
unique for Britain. From a global perspective, inequality and pandemics have always been 
related, and the fall of empires are often accompanied by pandemics, such as plagues. Some 
researchers argue that the fall of empires have been due to growing inequality, leading to a 
deterioration in the health condition of the poor and greater exposure to foreign germs by the 
increasingly mobile rich (Kohn, 2007; Turchin, 2007). The relevance of these historical 
studies has been raised recently elsewhere in the context of the COVID-19 case (Turchin, 
2020; Spinney, 2020), as have the contributory effects of social factors in other global 
diseases such as Ebola (Grépin et al., 2020). Thus, historic or path dependent inequality is 
likely to be linked to the current spread of COVID-19 in a socioeconomically and spatially 
uneven manner, and timely policy interventions are essential to ameliorate the conditions and 
avoid destabilizing the socioeconomic development in the country. 
There is also historical evidence about how the deprived were often exploited in times 
of pandemics, such as the increased use of the Black labour force during pandemic times in 
South Africa (Packard, 1989). Similar sector-specific tendencies seem not far from modern 
reality in the UK when we see construction workers continuing to work during COVID-19 
social distancing and lockdown periods. Health care workers in elderly care homes also must 
put themselves in the front line to fight against this pandemic, and these jobs tend to be low-
paid and undertaken by women. There is an endogenous relationship here, as individuals’ 
decisions to comply or otherwise with social-distancing regulations depend at least in part on 
economic incentives, which themselves responded to current economic policy and 
expectations of future policies (Chang and Velasco, 2020). However, although individuals 
across the income divide may time-discount at different rates and therefore respond to 
economic incentives in different ways, it is good to know that inequalities in testing for the 
COVID-19 virus appears to be almost non-existent (Schmitt-Grohé et al., 2020). Poverty and 
inequality do need political will during a crisis in order to be ameliorated, as the market tends 
to widen existing inequalities.  
Thus, historic lessons seem to teach us that pandemic diseases can exacerbate existing 
inequalities, and these growing inequalities often lead to the fall of the unjust and unequal 
empires that created them. Although we are not necessarily expounding the fall in political 
regimes due to the COVID-19, our analysis elucidates that the spatial disparities in the 
COVID-19 death toll are related to the overall socioeconomic milieu of deprivation and the 
interaction of deprivation with cultural and economic belonging. Below we identify places 
that are experiencing faster rates of increase in economic instability in terms of 
unemployment and small business failure and therefore identify locations that are at greater 
likelihood of future extreme deprivation and consequent social unrest within England and 
Wales. 
 
Modern Deprivation and Brexit 
 
The geographies of deprivation in the UK have been one of the most widely debated 
explanations for the Brexit vote. Applications of different quantitative indicators and 
methodologies show that regions that are socioeconomically backward are also the ones that 
voted for Brexit. While the Brexit vote had other additional complex triggering mechanisms, 
protest voting as a form of mutiny by those left behind has been documented in the economic 
literature. Hirschman and Rothschild (1973) coined the term “the tunnel effect” to refer to the 
the fact that perceived economic unevenness and increasing inequality are bound to create 
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this can lead to social unrest. Further theoretical work and empirical evidence for the tunnel 
effect is provided in the work of some leading cultural economists (Benabou and Tirole, 
2006, 2009, 2011; Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln, 2007; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2010, 
2012; Passarelli and Tabellini, 2013), political economists (Scheve and Stasavage, 2006) and 
other recent high-profile contributions (Kerr, 2014). 
Existing links between the sentiment of being left behind and other socioeconomic 
factors in the context of radical voting, such as migration and human capital concentration 
across space, have been documented for the UK (Tubadji, Colwell and Webber, 2020), and 
the Netherlands (Tubadji, Burger and Webber, 2020).2 Those papers build on Hirschman and 
Rothschild’s (1973) and Tiebout’s (1956) models and show that existing deprivation and a 
lack of outmigration among the autochthonous population signals a perception of increasing 
deprivation and a cultural milieu of relatively poor opportunities for both outward and 
upward mobility. Such feelings of being ‘stuck behind’ exacerbate the feeling of being left 
behind; the strength of this psychological state was, in turn, expressed in a generalized 
political protest vote. We highlight an alert that these feelings of being stuck behind are likely 
to result in greater protests nationally and perhaps worldwide, as these are known 
consequences of fiscal policy interventions (Ponticelli and Voth, 2020). 
 
3. Hypothesis about the UK Geographies of COVID-19 
 
If there are spatially distinct cultural and economic discriminatory factors that enhance the 
vulnerability of groups of people and places, then it is opportune to employ a method that 
takes account of such cultural and economic factors. One novel paradigm that is growing in 
importance and use is the Culture Based Development (CBD) approach (Tubadji and 
Nijkamp, 2015, 2016, 2018; Tubadji, Angelis and Nijkamp, 2015, 2016; Tubadji et al. 2019). 
This paradigm is grounded on the premise that there is a cultural bias underpinning economic 
choices that predetermines the operation and outcome of any socioeconomic system in a path 
dependent manner (Tubadji, 2012, 2013, 2020a,b,c). The importance of cultural driven path 
dependence in the UK3 has been highlighted by Huggins and Izushi (2007) and McCann 
(2016). 
This study adopts the CBD paradigm in order to delve deeper into the cultural and 
economic disparities across the UK and to identify the reasons for inequalities in the COVID-
19 death toll. The highly plausible short-run socioeconomic consequences of this experienced 
inequality include the aggravated economic situation of individuals and businesses in 
deprived areas, expressed in disproportionally greater and increasing rates of unemployment 
and business failure (for evidence on Norway, see Mamelund et al., 20204). Moreover, the 
CBD approach emphasises that existing cultural and economic inequalities create and 
strengthen both a path dependency towards the exacerbation of economic deprivation of those 
already left behind and the potential for more significant pockets of future social unrest.  
The CBD approach postulates that: (i) cultural (ethnic) and economic discrimination 
and deprivation create feelings of being left behind among people and regions; (ii) these 
feelings have a cumulative nature and (iii) these feelings create path dependencies, as the 
experience of discrimination cannot be immediately removed through a policy intervention. 
The approach also suggests that policy intervention to abate discrimination can create a new 
2  Similar links between socioeconomic development and ultra-right voting exist for Greece (Tubadji and 
Nijkamp, 2019). 
3  For an overview of the importance of cultural path dependency for economic development in other countries, 
see Audretsch and Fritsch (2002), Fritsch and Mueller (2007), Fritsch et al. (2019) and Fritsch et al. (2020). 
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path dependent chain reaction. Abating the present discrimination is argued to be essential for 
the prevention of the escalation of social unrest that is driven by being left behind. Thus, the 
CBD approach to understanding the current geographies of the COVID-19 pandemic, its 
causes and aftermaths, can be summarized in three testable null hypotheses: 
 
H01:  Geographies of cultural discrimination within regions do not predict regional 
disparities in mortality from COVID-19.  
 
H02:  Past geographies of deprivation in the UK do not predict the mortality from COVID-
19. 
 
H03:  Mortality from COVID-19 does not predict the growth of deprivation (and therefore 
instability and radicalization) in a region. 
 
These null hypotheses are already testable given the available regional data. As the 
current health crisis unfolds, peaks and finally resolves, more detailed data will permit the 
generation of deeper insight and forecasting. Meanwhile, if the validity of these hypotheses is 
confirmed, then they can become instrumental in forming the basis of an effective warning 
system for policymakers in Britain who are interested in abating the movement towards 
greater instability and radicalisation. 
 
 
4. Modelling the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic 
 
Regional analyses that provide evidence of the causes and consequences of the COVID-19 
pandemic are dependent on the availability of data, which are still in their infancy and ever 
evolving. The immediacy of the crisis to the time of writing limits the size of the available 
dataset, but the health reporting systems already in place in the UK make such datasets 
valuable in terms of regional indicators. Currently available data for England and Wales for 
the number of deaths from COVID-19 are only available at the regional level (10 NUTS1 
regions) and from the 3rd of January to the 27th of March 2020 (13 weeks). See Appendix 1 
for information on the sources and descriptive statistics for each variable. 
Data corresponding to the number of COVID-19 deaths originates from the ONS and 
are tallies of COVID-19-related weekly deaths in hospitals. We use this data in levels and as 
a percentage of the population in a region in January 2020. As the percentage is very small, 
we multiply it by 1000 to enhance visualization and to enable more explicit interpretation of 
the magnitudes of the effects. Our instrumental variable for the number of deaths from 
COVID-19 is the number of lung cancer deaths from the previous year. We obtain the 
percentage of patients per population in the region and use this as an instrumental variable in 
our regressions. 
We have data on the share of Black, Asian, other-non-White, other and Whites per 
region. To quantify cultural discrimination, we first sum the percentages of Black and Asian 
and other non-White, and we use the mean value of this sum to identify the state of a region 
as culturally and ethnically more diverse than the rest of the country. We generate a dummy 
variable equal to 1 when the sum of Black, Asian and other non-White population in the 
region is above the average for the country. We used this variable to calculate the cultural and 
ethnic decomposition and the amount of cultural discrimination.  
We use three approaches to quantify the relative economic deprivation of a region. 
First, we use the average value of the Multiple Deprivation Index (MDI) for each region. 
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division than the region. Therefore, as a second approach, and building on the knowledge that 
urban areas are wealthier than rural areas, we use the percentage of the region’s population 
that resides in an urban area. Third, as the pro-Brexit vote in the 2016 elections was 
associated with greater relative deprivation and stronger feelings of being left behind, we use 
the percentage of the pro-Brexit vote of a region as an alternative measure for deprivation. 
This variable is also of interest in itself because COVID-19 may have implications for 
regional development and for the political development of the UK in the near future when 




We implement the Blinder-Oaxaca data panel decomposition analysis for testing H01 and 
H02. The test for each hypothesis is analogical, with variation only for the group for which 
the decomposition has been implemented. To test H01, our group for decomposition is the 
above average level of deprivation6. In the case of H02 being the above average non-White 
cultural and ethnic composition of a region. The decomposition procedure serving to identify 
the degree of discrimination between two groups can be stated as in model (1): 
 
Death_TollA = αA + βA XA      (1.1) 
Death_TollB = αB + βB XB      (1.2) 
    hat_Death_TollA = αA +βA hat_XA            (1.3) 
    hat_Death_TollB = αB +βB hat_XB      (1.4) 
       Discrimination = (αA - αB) + (βA - βB) * hat_Death_Toll     (1.5) 
 
where the hat values are predicted values, based on the regressions of (1.1) and (1.2), groups 
A and B are the discriminated group and the rest of the population respectively, and X is the 
set of independent variables that explain the outcome variable of interest. As we have data for 
10 regions over 13 time periods, X also contains controls for this panel structure. 
To test H01, we define group A as equal to 1 when the cultural-ethnic geographical 
pattern across regions contain an above average concentration of the Black, Asian and non-
White population. To test H02, we define group A using the economic deprivation measured 
as an above average level of deprivation. 
To test H03, we use an instrumental variable along a 2SLS approach and estimate 
model (2): 
 
Econ_Dev = α +β1 hat’_Death_Toll + β2X + e1    (2) 
 
where the local economic development (Econ_Dev) is a dependent variable, which we 
quantify using alternative measures of the claimant count per head of population, the number 
of SMEs in the region, or the percentage of pro-Brexit vote. Local economic development is 
explained by the death toll in the region and a collection of control variables, X, which 
includes population density. We use the percentage of lung cancer deaths to purge the 
5  Although we have numerous potential control variables (see Appendix 1) we cannot use all of them as 
controls because of the emergence of collinearities and the limited number of observations. Hence, instead 
we present results based on the most parsimonious economic modelling approach with the aim of achieving 
stable, reliable, plausible and feasible econometric estimates. 
6  This is identified as a below average value of the MDI index, as the MDI increases from 1 to infinity and 






















VETTED AND REAL-TIME PAPERS
economic endogeneity of the death toll, and then denote the respective purged variable7 as 
hat’_Death_Toll. The predicted value of the death toll (hat’_Death_Toll) is then used to 





We first present some descriptive statistics by looking at the distribution of deaths per region. 
We divide the regions into two groups: those above and below the mean of the UK’s MDI, 
after which we label regions as ‘less deprived’ and ‘more deprived’ relative to the MDI 
average.8 Mortality histograms for absolute and population-adjusted ratios are presented in 
Figure 1. This figure reveals that when we consider the absolute number of deaths, it seems 
that regions with less deprivation (implying more urbanization and higher incomes and 
productivity) are the places with a slightly higher number of deaths. However, when we 
consider the population-adjusted mortality indicator, the pattern now reveals that places with 




Figure 1: Deaths in more and less deprived regions, numbers and percentages 
Notes: The figure the weekly number of deaths per less deprived and more deprived regions. 
The figure to the left presents raw numbers and the figure to the right presents the percentage 
of deaths by number of people living in the region (the percentage is multiplied by 1000 for 
easier visualization purposes). 
 
 
Inspection of the top panels in Figure 2 reveals that there appears to be an historic 
distribution of greater lung cancer deaths that is related to the COVID-19 regional death toll. 
This suggests that deprivation-related health status could be a predisposition to COVID-19 
mortality. It also indicates that economic and health deprivations are often co-located 
throughout the country and jointly create pockets of intensified vulnerability.  
 
 
7  The procedure of the IV 2SLS is fully followed so the economic purging of the Death_Toll variable includes 
all regressors and the instrumental variable. 
8  As the measurement of the MDI represents a score which increases with the decrease of deprivation, 1 stands 
for the most deprived region and every other positive score is considered a value of lesser level of 
deprivation. We have considered this in the definition of more and less deprived regions with regard to the 


























Figure 2: COVID-19 deaths (%), lung cancer, cultural (Non-white), deprivation (IMD) 
Notes: The figure maps clockwise from top-left: COVID-19 deaths (%), lung cancer deaths 




Furthermore, as can be seen in Figure 2, the purple-coloured geographical distribution 
of COVID-19 mortality rates seems to be consistent both with the geography of deprivation 
(where lighter shading is associated with more deprivation; see footnote 9) and with the 
geography of ethnic diversity (where darker shading is associated with greater proportion of 
ethnic minorities). While ethnic diversity predicts COVID-19 death rates in the middle and 
eastern parts of the UK, the north and south-west regions seem to have a coincidence of 
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death toll of a more complex nature, with potentially economically endogenous character. 
Yet, both drivers of deprivation (economic disparity and ethnic diversity) seem to be 
associated with a higher COVID-19 death toll. 
 
Cultural and Economic Discrimination in Mortality 
 
To delve deeper into the realities of the COVID-19 death toll, we employ a detailed data 
decomposition analysis. Table 1 presents the aggregate part of the decomposition for two 
specifications. Specification (1) shows the decomposition by prevalence of the non-White 
population, while specification (2) shows the decomposition by level of economic 
deprivation, reflecting H01 and H02 respectively. 
 
 





Traditionally, we think first of economic deprivation. As can be seen from Table 1, a 
more fine-grain examination of economic deprivation in specification (2) reveals that the 
death toll is concentrated in more deprived areas, but there is only a 1-percentage point 
difference. However, when the cultural discrimination is analyzed in specification (1), it 
becomes clearer that the areas with greater than average concentrations of non-White 
populations experience a 5-percentage point higher death toll. The latter finding is also in line 
with reports from the USA and elsewhere, where Black and other non-White populations are 
experiencing greater exposure, contagion and death rates than their White counterparts 
(Arnold et al., 2020). This highlights the importance of the cultural element and corroborates 
the need to test H01.  
To crosscheck the validity of these results, we make a within-method triangulation 
robustness check in the following manner. As the aggregation of the MDI is not an ideal 
measure and as it is an index available only for England (thereby stopping us from 
implementing the analysis for Wales), we use alternative measures of deprivation: first, above 
average percentages of population in urban areas, and second, above average percentages of 
people in rural areas. We implement the same data decomposition analysis as before but this 
time using the two above alternative variables to define group A. These results are presented 
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Table 2 shows an indifference to the alternative variable for quantifying deprivation 
as the sizes of the coefficients remain the same across different specifications, thereby 
suggesting that the aggregate IMD measure is sufficiently good to distinguish between the 
regions in terms of their level of deprivation. The above analysis shows that the null 
hypotheses of H01 and H02 can be easily rejected, as there exists both economic and 
cultural/ethnic discrimination in the death toll across England and Wales. Moreover, the 
effect of cultural/ethnic discrimination seems to be about five times the size of the effect of 
economic deprivation. This highlights again that our cultural hypothesis has greater 
significance for the socioeconomic process of discrimination in the UK during this pandemic. 
 
Future Societal Vulnerability Due to the Path-Dependency in Discrimination 
 
While it is important to secure economic and social resilience (Martin, 2012; Reggiani et al., 
2015), it is even more important to prevent the development of vulnerabilities that blight the 
resilience of a place. Vulnerabilities affect a region’s resilience to economic shocks, just as a 
weaker immune system predisposes a person to death during a flu contagion. Inspired by this 
reasoning, we want to disentangle historical vulnerability from the predisposition to death 
from COVID-19. In serious cases, the COVID-19 virus restricts a person’s capacity to 
transport oxygen in their respiratory system by causing pneumonia, which is an inflation of 
the lungs. It is then logical to employ the incidence of lung cancer deaths in a region from a 
previous period as an instrumental variable to explain mortality in the current pandemic. 
Set within a 2SLS approach, we used the economically purged instrument of the 
COVID-19 death toll to explain the regional unemployment claimant count (H03, 
Specification 1) and the regional concentration of small businesses (H03, Specification 2). In 
addition, we used the same estimation procedure but looked at the relationship between the 
percentage of the pro-Brexit vote share and the concentration of COVID-19-related deaths 
(H03, Specification 3). 
Several observations can be identified in Table 3. First, the percentage of lung cancer 
deaths in a region predicts the COVID-19 mortality in a strongly significant positive manner, 
suggesting that health predisposition indeed affects the death toll. This is to be expected from 
a statistical perspective, because the correlation coefficient between the death toll and its 
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Table 3: 2SLS-IV for COVID-19 deaths, unemployment claims and businesses 
 
Notes: The table presents 3 specifications of IV 2SLS estimation, where percentage of lung 
cancer deaths is the IV for COVID-19 deaths. The dependent variable in Spec. (1) is 
unemployment (in terms of % claimant count per population); in Spec. (2) it is number of 
SMEs and in Spec. (3) it is pro-Brexit vote (in %). 
 
 
Second, there is a strong positive relationship between being in a deprived area, as 
characterised by high levels of unemployment, and the COVID-19 deaths (Specification 1). 
There is a similar corroborating but stronger relationship between the pro-Brexit vote share 
and COVID-19 deaths (Specification 3). The number of SMEs in a region seems to be 
negatively associated with the COVID-19 death rate, suggesting that COVID-19 had a 
weaker effect on economically prosperous places9. 
Collating these results together suggests that if the UK economy suffers over the 
longer term, then it is primarily because the most severe economic impact of the COVID-19 
pandemic has been on the most economically vulnerable and left behind parts of our 
population, thereby having an important negative effect on the demand side of the economy 
through lower consumption; after all, the poorer sections of the population have a higher 
marginal propensity to consume. Thus, the feeling of perceived deprivation will be even 
stronger than the actual level of aggravation of the socioeconomic inequality. Moreover, we 
know from the estimations in Table 1 that economic deprivation is associated with higher 
COVID-19 death rates by a relatively small 1 percentage point and the effect of the 
cultural/ethnic discrimination effect is five times greater with a 5 percentage points increase, 
suggesting that both cultural and economic discrimination enhance the COVID-19 death rate. 
From Specification 3 in Table 3 we learn further that for each 1 percent increase in the death 
toll, there is an increase of 19 percentage points in the probability that the area is pro-Brexit. 
We explore the reasons for this result in Figure 4 through the inspection of histograms for 
anti- and pro-Brexit areas. 
As seen from Figure 4, the impact of COVID-19 mortality is higher and more 
concentrated around the mean in areas that voted more strongly for Brexit, indicating that 
areas that are already feeling left behind and voted more strongly for Brexit seem to have 
experienced a higher COVID-19 death toll in the early part of the pandemic in the UK. Part 
of the reason for this could be connected to higher local levels of stress, more depression and 
lower levels of life satisfaction, which could be the focus of future research. Importantly, the 
above results indicate that we reject null hypothesis H03. Moreover, if the consequences of 
COVID-19 mortality are increases in unemployment and greater business failure in areas that 
are hit harder from the COVID-19 outbreak, then this pandemic will be similar to previous 
pandemics in that the more deprived, more-culturally diverse places and especially the left 
behind places will suffer the greatest economic loss. They are also more likely not to recover 
from the lock-down as they are likely to have lower levels of savings to tide them over and 
therefore more businesses may fail locally too due to lower local purchasing power. This 
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effect is likely to be exacerbated further if such areas have greater proportions of people in 
casual work and who are therefore not receiving any pay during the lock-down period. Such 
intensified economic deterioration of already deprived places is likely to affect their feelings 







Figure 3: Deaths (%), Unemployment, Business (num and %) 
Notes: The figure maps clockwise from top-left: COVID-19 deaths (%), unemployment (%), 
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Figure 4: Deaths (%) and Brexit vote  
Notes: The figure shows histograms of COVID-19 deaths for regions with below and above 





The unfolding COVID-19 pandemic is an extraordinary, unanticipated global phenomenon 
that gives scholars of all kinds the opportunity to understand how a sudden shock affects 
portions of the population differentially. In a seminal piece, Scheidel (2017) poses the 
argument that “catastrophic levellers” which wipe out tens of millions of lives globally, such 
as the Black Death, the Russian revolutions or the World Wars, no longer exist in industrial 
societies. The current study asked the question: what if such rare events had become only 
‘partial levellers’ in poorly redistributive social democracies, where one part of the 
population is healthy, resilient, and benefits from excellent socioeconomic infrastructure, and 
another is plagued with the opposite?  
Our study argues that unprecedented economic and cultural class cleansing is 
occurring throughout the world during the COVID-19 pandemic but at a low level of 
consciousness; we draw our evidence from the UK. The pandemic seems to affect 
disproportionately the economically and socially more vulnerable, but this vulnerability is 
defined even more broadly than before. Most vulnerable to COVID-19 are those groups of 
citizens who were previously subject to unconscious economic and cultural discrimination.  
The current study amassed historical economic and social data at the regional level 
and extracted regional economic insights on the geographic spread, determinants and 
potential consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic. Using a relatively but necessarily small 
dataset at the NUTS1 level for England and Wales over the early part of the pandemic period, 
this study proposes a Culture-Based Development (CBD) methodology for the identification 
of the importance of economic and cultural discrimination, highlighting its implications for 
future social unrest. The CBD methodology for economic and cultural discrimination relies 
on a detailed data decomposition analysis, while the economic impact of the pandemics relies 
on an IV 2SLS estimation approach. 
Our empirical approach provides evidence that poorer, more socioeconomically 
deprived and more rural areas experienced a disproportionately greater death toll. In this 
context, the cultural discrimination effect of the death toll seems to be five times stronger 
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however, amounting to almost 19 percentage points of impact, is the association between 
COVID-19 mortality and social unrest tendencies (related to the 2016 Brexit vote). This 
suggests that those places that are feeling left behind and who voted for Brexit seem to be the 
places that are experiencing the strongest losses per head of the population from the current 
pandemic. If we roll the reel forward, the dismal implications of these findings are clear: 
further social radicalization due to economic and cultural discrimination is to be expected on 
the horizon and especially in pro-Brexit voting areas. A further negative economic shock is 
expected in the UK at the end of 2020 with the implementation of Brexit. Thus, areas with 
greater vulnerability created during the pandemic will are more likely to have their local 
economies stuck into development traps, which will prolong the stagnation and possibly will 
lead to greater radicalization of places that are pockets of deprivation and discrimination.  
Plans to create greater socioeconomic resilience should be formulated in time to 
support the most vulnerable groups and localities, and specifically the places which 
experience greater cultural and economic discrimination and feel left behind. Use of the 
current findings and methodology can enable the identification of spatial pockets of 
vulnerability that need to receive socioeconomic interventions to improve regional economic 
resilience. 
Cultural and economic discrimination and their socioeconomic consequences are most 
prominent areas for the application of the Culture-Based Development research paradigm. 
Nevertheless, there are many other aspects of the socioeconomic condition of the pandemic 
situation that should not be neglected. The CBD approach could be used to explore aspects of 
the latter since every economic question is sensitive to its cultural context, as the CBD 
approach is specialized in handling and understanding the impact of cultural contexts and the 
impact from the complex dynamic sociocultural system of formal and informal institutions 
more generally. 
The cultural context is essential when analyzing regional development, and therefore 
makes context-related ceteris paribus assumptions unrealistic (Nijkamp, 2007). Such context-
related effects in the case of the COVID-19 pandemic include: economic impoverishment and 
its effect on ordinary citizens mental health, the role and support of the cultural sector in 
repairing poor mental health conditions, and the difference that using fiscal rather than 
monetary policy can have on improving the mental health of an economy’s citizens. These 
further aspects can also be handled by the CBD paradigm, which can offer analysis and 
policy recommendations along individual, regional and macro-level lines to ensure 
socioeconomic support is efficiently targeted at the region and groups hit hardest by the 
pandemic. 
In summary, this paper has applied the CBD analytical approach to identify how the 
path dependent geography of cultural and economic discrimination predict the locations with 
high number of deaths in the UK during the early part of the COVID-19. This study also 
demonstrates how this information can be used to identify places that are endangered by 
falling into development traps with greater perceived deprivation in left behind regions. 
These regions are also the places where post-Brexit social unrest can be expected to emerge 
due to increased inequality throughout the current pandemic. Inequality creates vulnerability 
and is thus a source of destabilization of places under a variety of negative external shocks, 
such as the exogenous COVID-19 pandemic or the forthcoming endogenous economic shock 
of Brexit. Timely efforts for alleviating the inequality might be a way to prevent and build 
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Older adults and those with underlying medical conditions 
seem especially vulnerable to the COVID-19 pandemic. The U.S. 
government’s efforts to contain the infection, on the other hand, have 
a disproportionate impact on the working age population. To be able 
to capture the impact of the pandemic and the resulting mitigation 
efforts on a population that is heterogeneous by age, income and 
health status, we use an overlapping generations model that mimics 
the U.S. economy along those dimensions in 2020. We introduce an 
unexpected COVID-19 shock in the economy and examine the resulting 
impact on aggregate output, labor supply, savings, and consumption 
behavior of the different agents. We find that mitigation efforts that 
target certain age and health groups result in significantly smaller 
disruptions in the economy. Going forward, introducing subsidies 
to those with underlying health conditions and/or the elderly to self 
isolate might prove to be a useful path in opening up the economy.
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1 Introduction
There is ample evidence that older adults and those with underlying medical conditions seem especially
vulnerable to the COVID-19 pandemic. Meanwhile, efforts to mitigate the spread of the infection in the
U.S. have included closing all businesses that are deemed unessential. This has resulted in more than 26
million initial claims for unemployment insurance in five weeks. In order to examine the effects of COVID-19
and the resulting mitigation efforts on the economy, we use an overlapping generations model where agents
are heterogeneous with respect to age, income, and health status. All individuals retire exogenously at age
65 and may live up to age 100. Survival probabilities at each age depend on the education level and the
health status of an agent. We calibrate this economy based on historical data on demographics, survival
probabilities, and health status. Distribution of income, age, and health status in the model matches the
most recently available U.S data at which point we subject the economy to a large, unexpected health shock
which infects a large fraction of the population and changes their survival probabilities. The government’s
response to the pandemic includes efforts to quarantine parts of the population. Consequently, a fraction of
the population is forced to stay home. Government provides pandemic assistance to help those unemployed.
We calibrate the impact of the disease in the population under different assumptions on the progression of
the infection and trace the changes in the economy’s labor, capital, saving, and output in the short-run and
in the long-run for several different scenarios.
We calibrate our benchmark experiments with mitigation to a projected number of 60,000 deaths in the
U.S. and a fatality rate of 0.3%. We assume the mitigation measures taken in the U.S. to result in 50%
of the population to be unproductive for three months. Since the time period in the model is a year, this
corresponds to 12.5% of the population to stay home for a year. While there are significant uncertainties
regarding many of these measures, their precise level is less of a concern for the three main experiments we
conduct. In these experiments, we keep the fatality rate, the infection rate, and the precent of the population
under quarantine the same and just change the population sub-group that faces the stay-at-home orders.
In the first case, we implement the lockdown by randomly quarantining 12.5% of the population. In the
second case, we quarantine only the older population (73 and older) who make up 12.5% of the population.
Finally, in the third case, we quarantine agents based on their health status. Specifically, we impose stay
home restrictions on all individuals in the bad health state and those 80 and older and in fair health state.
Unsurprisingly, we find the largest economic declines to happen under the first scenario, i.e, the case
where a random quarantine of 12.5% of the population is imposed. This is primarily due to the fact
that an indiscriminate lockdown prevents the healthy and highly productive members of the economy from
contributing to the economic activity. On the other hand, quarantining the unhealthy/older individuals with
low/zero labor productivity, hurts economic output substantially less. For example, output declines by 13%
under random lockdown as opposed to 1.8% where stay home restrictions are based on health status. We
interpret the findings from these experiments useful for thinking about ways to opening up the economy.
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may have significant economic benefits. Of course, it is not obvious if, in reality, these three cases would
lead to the same infection and fatality rates. On the one hand, the elderly and those in bad health states
are the most vulnerable to this pandemic. Such a policy may help reduce the risks they face. On the other
hand, some of the current mitigation measures are directed at reducing the interactions between people and
may prove more effective in reducing the spread of the disease. There is not enough evidence to help pin
down the effectiveness of different mitigation measures in reducing the spread of the disease at the moment,
however. Some other possible ways to open up the economy that are discussed involve large scale testing,
contact tracing, isolating those who test positive, and allowing individuals with antibodies to go back to
work. Given the possible political challenges involved in these options, introducing subsidies to those with
underlying health conditions and the elderly might prove to be a useful path in opening up the economy.
We also conduct experiments and document the macroeconomic consequences of COVID-19 assuming no
mitigation efforts by the government based on implications of an SIR model.3 Currently there is significant
uncertainty regarding several key parameters governing the health impact of the pandemic. In order to
understand the economic consequences of COVID-19, one needs to know the infection rate, the mortality
rate, and of course how long the pandemic would last. One of the most important parameters, but also the
most difficult to pin down, is the fatality rate — fraction of those infected dying from the disease. A major
issue in getting reliable estimates of this parameter is due to the lack of knowledge of the true infection rate
in the population. Individuals who are tested are usually those showing mild/severe symptoms. Given that
a large fraction of the population may be asymptomatic, hence undiagnosed, makes any available estimate
of the fatality rate biased upwards. To navigate this issue, we use data from Iceland which is known to have
carried out significant random testing and use a fatality rate of 0.3%. Current experiments conducted in LA
county and Santa Clara county point to similar fatality rates. We compare the economic consequences of
the pandemic under different assumptions on the reproduction number, which defines the mean number of
secondary cases generated by one primary case with no mitigation efforts, based on the SIR model. Using
reproduction numbers commonly mentioned in the epidemiology literature we estimate that the pandemic
could have infected 84% to 95% of the population in a year if unmitigated. With a fatality rate of 0.3%
an unmitigated pandemic would have led to large number of deaths. Next, we compare the results in the
unmitigated cases to our benchmark experiment where the government imposed stay-at-home restrictions
leads to much lower infection rates. Since mitigation involves agents to be ordered to stay at home, the
decline in output in this economy is about double the decline in the economies without mitigation. However,
taking into account the value of statistical lives lost in the unmitigated cases easily erases the extra gains in
output.
Overall, our main findings indicate significant differences in the economic consequences of who to quaran-
tine during this pandemic. We find that stay home recommendations that are based on health and age reduce
the economic severity of the pandemic by more than 10 percentage points of GDP under very conservative
3Standard Inflammatory Response (SIR) model describes the dynamics of the progression of an epidemic. See Kermack and
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estimates. Going forward, it may be possible to introduce subsides to the elderly or those with underlying
health conditions to self-isolate until a vaccine or a cure is available. Fiscal consequences of such a policy
are likely to be much lower than what is currently spent on pandemic assistance which includes providing
unemployment insurance to a large fraction of the working-age population.
2 The Model
We model the initial steady state of the economy based on the historical behavior of the U.S. economy
along several dimensions such as the distribution of income, age and health status. We account for the
aging population in the U.S. by changing the population growth rate along the transition path and follow
the economy as it reaches a future steady state with a higher old-age dependency ratio as compared to the
initial steady state. The transition from the initial steady state to the final one without the disruptions
caused by the pandemic form our baseline U.S. economy. Next, we shock the first transition period (2020)
by an unexpected health shock and examine the new transition to the same future steady state under several
different assumptions on the transmission of the diseases and the containment efforts by the government.
We assume that the time period is a year and the impact of the pandemic on infections lasts one year.
Eventually the economy converges to the same final steady state as the impact of any pandemic-induced
policy or health changes last as long as the youngest generation in the population that got exposed to the
shock.
2.1 Initial Steady State
Consider an economy populated by J overlapping generations. In each period a new generation is born whose
mass grows at rate n. Individuals are assumed to enter the economy with several exogenous characteristics
that do not change over the life-cycle. Specifically, each individual is assumed to be of some education type
e ∈ εd where Πes(εd) denotes the invariant joint probability measure over education type of an incoming
generation.
In each period, individuals are characterized by health status h ∈ H. Agents are assumed to enter
the economy in the highest health state h. Health then evolves stochastically over the life-cycle. The
stochastic process for health status follows a finite-state Markov chain with stationary transitions over time.
The Markov process is assumed to differ by age, and level of education, but is otherwise identical and
independent across agents:
Qhje(h,H) = Prob(h′ ∈ H |h, j, e) = Qhje(h,H),
Agents of age j, education e, and health status h survive to age j + 1 with positive probability ψjeh. At age
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In each period, individuals are endowed with a unit of time that may be devoted to leisure or to earning
wages in a competitive labor market. An individual’s productivity in the labor market has an age-, education-
specific (εje), and health specific component (ξh) estimated directly from the data and an idiosyncratic
shock (η). The stochastic process for the labor productivity shock follows a finite-state Markov chain with
stationary transitions over time and which is identical and independent across all agents:
Qηt (η, E) = Prob (η′ ∈ E | η) = Qη (η, E) .
Let Πη (E) denote the invariant probability measure associated with Qη. All individuals retire exogenously
at age jr, at which point labor productivity is equal to zero (εje = 0 ∀j ≥ jr) and they receive social security
income SSe which is a function of their education level.






βj−1u (cj , `j)

where β is a per-period discount factor, c consumption, and ` hours worked. Expectations are taken with
respect to stochastic processes for health status and labor productivity.
2.1.1 Market Structure and the Government
We assume individuals are unable to insure against idiosyncratic health and labor productivity risk by trading
private insurance contracts. Furthermore, we assume there are no annuity markets to insure against mortality
risk. Agents may self-insure by saving one-period risk-free bonds that earn interest rate r. However, agents
are not permitted to maintain a negative asset position between periods (i.e. borrowing is not allowed). A
non-negative asset limit ensures agents do not die in debt. Assets from the deceased are distributed evenly
in a lump-sum fashion across all individuals entering the economy the following period. These unintended
bequests are denoted by Tr.
The government uses labor income taxes, τl, to fund the Social Security system. In addition, there are
lump-sum taxes Tx that are used to fund a minimum consumption level, c for the poorest in the society.
2.1.2 Technology
Aggregate output (Y ) is produced by a representative firm using the technology:
Y = AKαN1−α α ∈ (0, 1) , (1)
where K and N are the aggregate capital stock and labor inputs (measured in efficiency units), A is total
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rate of capital, r, and the wage rate w, are given by:
r = αA(K/N)α−1 − δ and w = (1− α)A(K/N)α. (2)
2.1.3 Decision Problem
At the initial steady state, an individual can be characterized by a vector of state variables z = (a, η, j, e, h),
where a is current holdings of one-period, risk-free assets, η is a stochastic labor productivity shock, j is age,
e is level of education, h is health status. Given this state vector, an agent chooses consumption c, labor
supply `, and next period assets a′ to maximize expected lifetime utility. The decision problem facing an
agent is given by:
ν (z) = max
c,`,a′
{u (c, `) + βψjehEη′h′x′ [ν (z′)]}
subject to







εjeξhη` if j < jr
SSe if j ≥ jr,
(3)
and
a′ ≥ 0, c ≥ 0, 0 ≤ ` ≤ 1
where value function ν (.) is the expected discounted lifetime utility with a given state vector. Note that
expectations are taken with respect to stochastic processes for health status and labor productivity. The
first constraint is the budget constraint while the final line gives the borrowing constraint followed by
feasibility constraints on consumption and labor. Emergency relief is exogenously given when consumption
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2.2 COVID-19
We model COVID-19 as a health shock totally unexpected in its scale. We calibrate the progression of
the disease in the population under different assumptions on the mitigation process. Some individuals in
the economy get hit with this unexpected health shock in 2020, become infected, and face a big change in
their survival probabilities. Infection status x effects both the labor productivity, which now takes the form
εjeξhθx and the survival probability ψjehx of the agents. In addition, some fraction of the population is
ordered to stay home and are not able to work. We assume that individuals who become unemployed due
to the lockdown receive government provided temporary pandemic assistance (PA). The decision problem is
given by:
V (z) = maxc,l,a′ {u(c, l) + βψjehxEV (z′)}
subject to












εjeξhθxη` if j < jr and q = 0, x = 1
PA if j < jr and q = 1,∀x
SSe if j ≥ jr for ∀q,∀x
(4)
a′ ≥ 0, c ≥ 0, 0 ≤ l ≤ 1
3 Calibration
We calibrate the model in two steps. In the first step, we calibrate a set of parameters outside the model.
In the second step, we assume that the initial balanced growth economy is 2019 and jointly calibrate the
remaining parameters to match moments in the U.S. economy in that year. The following subsections
describe our calibration exercise in detail.
3.1 Preferences and Demographics
Each model period is one year. Individuals enter the economy at age 20 (model period j = 1) and die with
probability one at age 100 (model period J = 80 ). The growth rate of new 20 year old individuals in each
cohort (n) for the initial steady state is set at 0.3% in order to match an old-age dependency ratio of 28% in
2020 (UN 2019).4 We assume that retirement is exogenous for all agents at age 65 (model period jr = 45),
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which is the Normal Retirement Age (NRA) for claiming Social Security (SS) benefits in the U.S.5
Preferences over consumption and leisure are assumed to follow a standard Cobb-Douglas utility function:







where σ controls risk aversion and γ determines the relative weight of consumption. Note that utility exhibits
decreasing absolute risk aversion, which is standard in most reasonable preference classes. We set the value
of γ = 0.39 to match the average fraction of time working to a third of the time endowment. We assume
σ = 3.56, which implies an inter-temporal elasticity of substitution, −1γ(1−σ)−1 , of 0.5. The time discount
factor β is set to 0.96 match an annual capital-output ratio of 3.0.
3.2 Labor Productivity
The labor productivity in the model comprises of the stochastic component η, the health specific component
ξh, and a deterministic age- and education-specific component εje. We estimate the Markov chain for the
stochastic component of productivity by assuming an underlying AR(1) process in logs:





Parameters governing the stochastic process for productivity shocks are taken from Fuster, A. İmrohoroğlu,
and S. İmrohoroğlu 2007.6 We then use the Tauchen method to approximate this process with a Markov
chain over four discrete states.
We allow the fixed education state to take two possible values {college, non − college}. We use to data
from the U.S. Census Bureau to fix the share of college graduates to 28.6% in the model.7 We use the
deterministic age- and education-specific labor productivity εje estimates from Conesa, Costa, et al. 2018.
Finally, we set ξh to 1 for agents in best health state. For the bottom two health states, we set ξh = 0.78
and ξh = 0.66 to match the ratio of earnings for agents in fair and best health and poor and best health
states respectively.
3.3 Health and Mortality
Health can take three possible values {good, fair, bad} in the model. We identify these health states in the
Health and Retirement Study (HRS) data from the self-reported health status variable.8 Health transitions
5Social Security benefits can be claimed as early as age 62 and NRA is slightly different for different birth cohorts. SS
benefit claim is also independent from labor supply decisions. However, we simplify these aspects of the program in the model
to reduce computational burden.
6The authors use an income process which is education specific. We adjust their estimate for the average population.
7Current Population Survey, Annual Social and Economic Supplement, 2018.
8The Health and Retirement Survey asks respondents to self report their health on a scale of 1 to 5 where 1 is “Excellent”,
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Figure 1: Survival Probability by Age, Health and Education R0=3.1
(a) Non-College


















































across these states are then estimated by running an ordered probit of self-reported health status on previous
year health status, education, cohort, and a quadratic function of age. We assume that individuals are in
the best health state until age 50. This is mainly due to the fact that we do not observe these transitions
for younger individuals in our micro dataset.9
Survival probabilities in the model vary with age, education and health status ψjeh. These probabilities
cannot be directly derived from HRS as it does not sample the institutionalized population. So we estimate
these survival probabilities in two steps following Conesa, Kehoe, et al. 2020. First, we estimate the raw
profiles from the HRS data. The HRS Tracker file has information on death dates of the respondents which
are used to construct age and health specific survival probabilities by running an ordered probit model of
death indicator on self-reported health status, age quadratic, education and cohort dummies as mentioned
earlier. In a second step, we adjust these profiles to match both the age-specific survival probabilities in the
National Vital Statistics System data and the education survival premium. Figure 1 summarizes the survival
probabilities by age, health, and education status. In addition, the dashed lines show the changes that take
place in the survival probabilities due to the COVID-19 shock under a non-mitigated case that is explained
in more detail in Section 3.5.
point scale by grouping individuals of “Excellent” and “Very Good” health into the good health category and those in “Good”
and “Fair” into the “fair” category
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3.4 Government Transfers
The Social Security replacement rate is set to 44% following Fuster, A. İmrohoroğlu, and S. İmrohoroğlu 2007.
We set the consumption floor at 2.26% of income per capita in the baseline economy to match the average
annual Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program benefits reported by the United States Department of
Agriculture. The government also funds a pandemic relief package – a lump sum transfer of 25% of income
per capita — for those who experience a quarantine shock. Table 1 summarizes the calibration of the
economic parameters.
Table 1: Economic Parameters
Parameter Value Source / Target
Cohort growth n 0.3% Dependency ratio = 28%
Retirement age jr 65 Age of SS eligibility
Share of college graduates 28.6% U.S. Census Bureau
Discount factor β 0.96 K/Y = 3.0
Risk aversion σ 3.56 IES = 0.5
Consumption weight γ 0.39 Average hours = 0.33
Persistence ρ 0.83 [Fuster et al., 2007]
Variance σ2η 0.022
Capital income share α 0.36
Period depreciation δ 5.9% [Castaneda et al., 2003]
Social Security replacement rate 0.44 [Fuster et al., 2007]
Pandemic Assistance 25%
Consumption floor c 0.026 SNAP
Labor on floor ¯̀ 0.33 Assumption
3.5 COVID-19 Shock
We calibrate the benchmark economy with mitigation to a projected number of 60,000 deaths in the U.S.
One of the most important parameters but also the most difficult to pin down is the fatality rate — fraction
of those infected dying from the disease. A major issue in getting reliable estimates of this parameter is due
to the lack of knowledge of the true infection rate in the population. Individuals who are tested are usually
those showing mild/severe symptoms. Given that a large fraction of the population maybe asymptomatic,
hence undiagnosed, makes any available estimate of the fatality rate biased upwards. To navigate this issue,
we use data from Iceland which is known to have carried out significant random testing to obtain a the
fatality rate (0.3%).10 However, the fatality rate by itself does not provide information on the age and
health distribution of fatalities. It is important for the model to capture the fact that the fatalities from the
disease are concentrated disproportionately among the elderly and the unhealthy individuals. We use age
specific fatality rate estimates from Riou et al. 2020 and scale the survival probabilities for the bottom two
health groups using the age and health specific scale. For the latter, we assume that those in the worst health
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states are affected twice as badly as those in the middle health state. We also do not scale the mortality
for those below the age of 40 in the model as the fatality rates are very low for those below 40. Table 2
summarizes the age-specific fatality rates used in our experiments. The fatality rate of 0.3 along a death
rate of 0.018 (60,000 deaths in the U.S. population) implies 6.1% of the population to be infected within a
year.
Table 2: Fatality Rate = 0.3%








*Riou et al. 2020
**x differs by health state and infection scenario.
We assume that the mitigation measure involves 50% of the population to be quarantined for a quarter.
Given that the model period is a year, this implies 12.5% of the population being quarantined for a year
which results in an infection rate to 6.1%. Lastly, we calibrate the decline in the productivity of workers
based on the number of days lost due to the illness. Given the average duration of the disease of 18 days, we
assume that individuals experience zero productivity for those days, implying an annual productivity drop
of 5% in the period of infection.
For the experiments where the pandemic is not mitigated, we calibrate the parameters needed to describe
the COVID-19 infection shock using some of the predictions of an SIR model. This model tracks the
progression of the disease in a country where the total population is divided into three categories: those who
are susceptible to the disease (S), who are actively infected with the disease (I), and those who are no longer
contagious (R). Progression of the disease in the population depends on the transition between these states
where social distancing measures help reduce the spread. An important parameter in these calculations is
the reproduction number which defines the mean number of secondary cases generated by one primary case
with no mitigation efforts. There is significant uncertainty regarding this parameter. In our calibration, we
consider R0 equal to 3.1 based on H. Wang et al. 2020 and 2.2 based on Fauci, Lane, and Redfield 2020
which result in 94.7% and 84.4% of the population to be infected within a year respectively.11 Dashed lines
in Figure 1 display the changes in survival probabilities under the unmitigated case with R0 equal 3.1 for
different age, health status, and eduction groups. The implied transmission rate in the benchmark model
with social distancing measures is 1.23 which results in 6.1% of the population to be infected within a year.
11Imai et. al (2020) estimate an R0 between 1.5 and 3.5 using data from Wuhan China. Wang et. al (2020) set R0=3.1 based
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Table 3 summarizes the calibration of the different cases describing the COVID-19 pandemic.
Table 3: COVID-19 Scenarios
Mitigated (Rt = 1.23) Unmitigated (Rt)
Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 3.1 2.2
Infection rate (%) 6.1 6.1 6.1 94.7 84.4
Fatality rate (%) 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3
Deaths rate (%) 0.018 0.018 0.018 0.28 0.25
Quarantine rate (%) 12.5 12.5 12.5 - -
4 Results
Initial steady state of this economy resembles the U.S. in terms of the age distribution, health distribution,
and income distribution as well other macroeconomic targets such as the capital output ratio and hours
worked. Tables 4 to 6 summarize some of these properties.
Table 4: Income Distribution
Share of Income (%)
Income Quintiles
0-20% 20-40% 40-60% 60-80% 80-100%
Data 3 6.5 10.9 18.1 61.4
Model 0.45 3.53 11.17 30.96 53.89
Table 5: Age Distribution
Age Share
20-40 40-60 60-80 80-100
Data 0.36 0.34 0.25 0.05
Model 0.36 0.34 0.23 0.07
Table 6: Health Status by Education
Education
Data Model
Non College College Non College College
Good 0.32 0.53 0.21 0.28
Fair 0.55 0.42 0.55 0.55
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As discussed earlier, we shock the U.S. economy with COVID-19 in the first transition period. In order
to disentangle the behavioral response of the households to the shock from other general equilibrium effects,
we keep wage, interest rate, taxes, Social Security benefit levels, need based government transfers and
accidental bequests fixed at baseline transition levels. In the first set of experiments, we examine different
mitigation measures in a calibration that is designed to mimic the current projections for the U.S. economy.
In Section 4.3 we analyze the impact of the disease on population health and economic outcomes without
any mitigation measures from the government to contain the virus. These cases correspond to an R0 = 3.1
and 2.2 respectively.
4.1 Different Mitigation Measures
In this section, we analyze the economic impact of different mitigation measures, keeping infection rate
the same. Specifically, we experiment with different ways of implementing the lockdown under the low
infection scenario (R0 = 1.23). In the first case, we implement the lockdown by randomly quarantining
12.5% of the population. In the second case, we quarantine only the older population (73 and older).12
Finally, in the third case, we quarantine agents based on their health status. Specifically, we impose the
lockdown on all individuals in the bad health state and those 80 and older and in fair health state. It is not
surprising that we find the largest economic declines under the first scenario. This is primarily due to the
fact that indiscriminate lockdown prevents the healthy and highly productive members of the economy from
contributing to the economic activity. On the other hand, quarantining the unhealthy/older individuals with
low/zero labor productivity, while maintaining the same infection rate, hurts economic output substantially
less.13 As can be seen from Figure 2, output declines by 13% under random lockdown as opposed to 1.8%
where lockdown is based on health status. The decline in output when the elderly are quarantined (Case
2) is much smaller (0.6%) and is solely due to the decline in effective hours worked by the infected working
age population. The decline in hours worked in Case 2 is primarily due to some of the working age agents
deciding to lower their work hours while infected. In Case 3, there is an additional decline in hours due to
some of the agents in bad health status to be ordered to stay home as a part of the mitigation measure.
Naturally, in case 1, the additional decline in hours is due to a large fraction of the population being ordered
to stay home. Both wealth and consumption declines, in the periods of and following the infection, are the
highest is the first case as well due to reduced earnings of the productive working-age population.
12Note that quarantining any fraction of the retirees (those 65 and older) will result in the same economic outcome. However,
we report the lockdown for 73 and older for the sake of keeping the quarantine rate fixed at 12.5% across all experiments. While
our assumption of 65 and over being retired underestimates the contributions of that age group to economic output, the labor
force participation rate of 73 and over is relatively small in the data.
13We assume that quarantining different sub-groups (while keeping the number the same) will result in the same infection
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Figure 2: Experiments – Different Mitigation Methods
(a) Output





























































































Note: All variables are normalized by their baseline levels to reflect the changes under each experiment
relative to baseline transitions.
Figure 3 shows the changes in macroeconomic aggregates by different age and education groups of the
productive workforce. The young refers to those 20 to 49 years and the old refers to those 50 to 64 years old.
In these graphs, we first note that contrary to the old, the macroeconomic aggregates of the young under
cases 2 and 3 are exactly identical. This is mainly due to the fact that health starts declining after age 50 in
the model, as a result the quarantine based on health or age affect them in the same way — though decline in
productivity due to infection. A second interesting observation is that while consumption declines between
non-college and college graduates are somewhat similar (4.2 and 4.8% respectively for the young under case
1 for instance), declines in aggregate wealth are somewhat more disparate (1.6 and 2.4% respectively). This
is due to the fact that the flat PA amount (25% of average national baseline earnings) corresponds to an
income shock of varying magnitudes for different sub-groups in the model. For instance, among the lowest
productivity workers, PA for those with a college degree is roughly 55% lower than their baseline earnings
and only 32% lower for the non-college group. Finally, somewhat related to the previous point, we find that
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to figure 3f) due to somewhat generous PA amounts for this group. We discuss the heterogenous response of
individuals towards these different mitigation measures and pandemic assistance in more detail in the next
section.
Figure 3: Experiments – Different Mitigation Methods (Age and Human Capital)
(a) Hours – Young























(b) Hours – Old























(c) Consumption – Young




























(d) Consumption – Old






























(e) Wealth – Young

























(f) Wealth – Old

























Note: All variables are normalized by their baseline levels to reflect the changes under each experiment
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Note that we have assumed that under all these experiments, infection rates would stay the same (6.1%).
Of course, it is not obvious if in reality these three cases would lead to the same infection or fatality rates.
On the one hand, the elderly and those in bad health states are the most vulnerable to this pandemic. Stay
home policies specifically geared towards them may help reduce the risks they face. On the other hand, some
of the current mitigation measures are directed at reducing the interactions between people and may prove
more effective in reducing the spread of the diseases. There certainly is not enough evidence to help pin
down the effectiveness of different mitigation measures in reducing the spread of the diseases at the moment.
However, it is possible to have a rough idea about how much higher the infection rate would have to be
for the economic outcomes in these three cases to be the same. For example, in the case where quarantine
applies to the elderly only, the infection rate would have to increase from 6.1% to almost to the entire
working age individuals for output to decline 13% as it does under the random lockdown case. Moreover,
while the infection rate might be higher under Cases 2 and 3, fatality rate might not be if the elderly and
the unhealthy do follow the stay home recommendations.
4.2 Response to Pandemic Assistance
In all our experiments with some mitigation measure in place, we assume that the government provides
pandemic assistance to the fraction of the population affected by the lockdown. This aid is set at 25% of
average national baseline income for all. As a result, we find interesting heterogeneity in the impact of the
lockdown on different sub-groups. First note that flat PA amounts corresponds to an income shock of varying
magnitudes for different health, productivity and education type in the model. For instance, for those in
the lowest productivity group and without a college degree, PA is 31.7% lower than their baseline earnings.
At the same time, for those with a college degree and on top of the productivity distribution, PA is 89.2%
lower.
Figure 4 shows macroeconomic aggregates by the idiosyncratic productivity and health levels of the
workers relative to the baseline in the random lockdown case. We find that while the decline in hours
remains the same for each group, wealth and consumption changes differ significantly. For instance, aggregate
consumption drops by roughly 4.8% for the highest productivity group in the best health state and only
0.09% for those in the lowest productivity and worst health group. Analogously, we find that wealth of the
former group decreases by 2.1% and of the latter increases by 0.26%. This is mainly due to the fact that PA
turns out to be quite generous for the latter group – roughly 200% higher than their baseline earnings. At
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Figure 4: Experiments – Aggregates by Labor Productivity and Health
(a) Hours – Best Health






























(b) Wealth – Best Health





























(c) Consumption – Best Health
































(d) Hours – Worst Health






























(e) Wealth – Worst Health





























(f) Consumption – Worst Health
































Note: All variables are normalized by their baseline levels to reflect the changes under each experiment
relative to baseline transitions.
4.3 Different Infection Rates
Figure 5 shows the time paths of various macroeconomic variables, now under different infection rates. In the
first transition period (2020) when the shock hits the economy, there are large economic declines under each
scenario. For instance, output drops by roughly 10 and 8 percent in the no mitigation scenarios corresponding
to Rt = 3.1 and 2.2 respectively as compared to 13% percent in the mitigation scenario discussed above.
While the decline in output in the former two cases is driven primarily by loss in worker productivity due
to widespread infection levels, decline in the latter scenario is due to the interruption of economic activity
due to the lockdown.
Note that while the impact of the shock on output lasts for a single period it persists for roughly twenty
periods for consumption and aggregate wealth. This holds true in the model for two reasons. First, in the
period of the shock, individuals draw down their wealth due to reduced earnings in all three cases. However,
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to large scale deaths. A fraction of infected individuals die in the next period with positive wealth which does
not get distributed back into the economy. Second, our assumption of fixed baseline interest rate implies a
small open economy where capital moves freely. As a result, reduction in aggregate wealth does not result
in further reductions in output.
Figure 5: Experiments – Aggregates
(a) Output









































































































































Note: All variables are normalized by their baseline levels to reflect the changes under each experiment
relative to baseline transitions.
It should be noted that the reduction in output in figure 5a does not take into account the cost of
widespread infection to public health – value of lives lost to the disease. One way to incorporate the impact
of the lives lost is to adjust the decline in output for the value of statistical lives (VSL) lost under each
case. We use the age-specific estimates of VSL from Aldy and Viscusi 2008 to adjust the decline in output
with the value of lives lost in each infection scenario.14 The dashed lines in Figure 6 show the decline in
output after adjusting for the VSL lost due to the disease. It is no surprise that after accounting for the
high death rates under the no-mitigation scenario, output declines in the no-mitigation cases supersede that
14The authors provide estimates for ages 20 to 62. We assume that VSL of a 62 year old applies to the group 63-65. We
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of the mitigation case.
Figure 6: Adjusting for Value of Statistical Life



























Efforts to mitigate the spread of COVID-19 in the U.S. have included closing businesses that are deemed
unessential. This has resulted in more than 26 million initial unemployment insurance claims in five weeks.
Without large scale testing of the population, it is not clear how the economic activity may resume. In
this paper, we show significant differences in the economic consequences of who to quarantine during this
pandemic. We find that stay-at-home recommendations that are based on health and age reduce the economic
severity of the pandemic by 10% of GDP under very conservative estimates. Going forward, it may be possible
to introduce subsides to the elderly or those with underlying health conditions to self-isolate until a vaccine
or a cure is available. The fiscal consequences of either of these policies is likely to be much lower that what
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We investigate the effects of the COVID-19-induced shock in financial 
markets on aggregate venue selection/market share and market 
quality. We find that the shock is linked with an economically 
significant loss of market share by dark pools to lit exchanges. In 
line with theory, the loss appears linked to an increase in lit market 
volatility and a search for immediacy by traders active in stocks 
with dark trading access. The market quality implications of the 
reduction in dark trading are mixed: while it tempers COVID-19-
linked liquidity decline in the lit market, it exacerbates the loss of 
informational efficiency.
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The COVID-19 pandemic is a human tragedy with a growing impact on the global 
economy. As well as serious implications for our health, its emerging economic consequences 
are significant, with financial markets standing out as some of the more obvious channels 
reflecting the impact of the pandemic on the economy and society. How well financial markets 
perform their key functions of providing the liquidity and efficient price discovery needed to 
facilitate hedging, diversification and savings affects every individual’s financial well-being. A 
major fraction of all retirement savings is invested in global stock markets either directly or 
indirectly. Job growth, incomes, and therefore our standard of living depend on corporate 
investment, the financing of which in turn depends on well-functioning financial markets. 
Therefore, investigating the market quality effects of a grey rhino like the COVID-19 pandemic 
is of economic value and may lead to enhancing our understanding of such events, as well as 
aid efforts to develop measures to prevent the worst of their effects on financial markets in the 
future. 
Financial markets’ structures have changed significantly over the past two decades. One 
of the major outcomes of this structural evolution is the emergence of the modern dark pool. 
Dark pools are downstairs-type trading venues without pre-trade transparency. Prior to 2005, 
dark venues and structures were mainly used for block trading and had a very low market share 
(see Zhu 2014). However, technological advancements and regulation have led to a rapid 
growth in dark trading. For example, the volume of trading executed in dark pools accounted 
for 9.1% and 9.6% of all on-exchange activity in European markets in April and July 2019, 
respectively. These are some of the largest shares recorded since the implementation of the 
Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID) II, a provision which already imposes an 
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period.1 Furthermore, in the US, dark pools and other off-exchange trading venues executed 
38.6% of equity volume in April 2019.2 Despite their growing popularity, stakeholders remain 
concerned about the market quality effects of the lack of pre-trade transparency in dark pools.3  
At the heart of the debate on the market quality effects of trading in dark pools are the 
dynamics of venue selection4 by both informed and uninformed traders (see Hendershott & 
Mendelson 2000; Zhu 2014; Menkveld et al. 2017). Hence, understanding the dynamics of 
venue selection, i.e. the driver(s) of dark pools’ market share, is critical for the determination 
of the effects of dark trading on market quality characteristics. In this paper, we investigate how 
the COVID-19-induced shock in financial markets at its height in February and March 2020 
impacted aggregate venue selection choice/venue market share, and by extension, market 
quality. We focus on two critical market quality characteristics, namely market liquidity and 
informational efficiency.5 Our approach involves exploiting existing MIFID II dark trading 
regulatory restrictions to analyse the comparative differences in the evolution of market quality 
characteristics for stocks that can be traded at both lit and dark venues and for those with dark 
trading restrictions during our sample period. By using a selection criteria yielding stocks with 
similar microstructure properties across the two groups, this approach allows us to isolate the 
 
1 See https://www.thetradenews.com/dark-pool-trading-volumes-surge-pre-mifid-ii-levels/ and 
https://www.thetradenews.com/dark-trading-volumes-reach-highest-level-mifid-ii/ 
2 See https://www.wsj.com/articles/dark-pools-draw-more-trading-amid-low-volatility-11556886916 
3 In 2010, the US Senator Kaufman, in a letter to the then SEC Chair Schapiro, notes of the need to “examine 
whether too much order flow is being shielded from the lit markets by dark venues”. A survey conducted among 
market participants by the CFA Institute found that 71% of respondents are of the view that dark pools constitute 
problems for price discovery in the markets  (see Schacht et al. 2009). 
4 Reference to traders’ venue selection or choice implies their preference between dark and lit venues. 
5 In addition to the obvious economic imperativeness of examining the effects of COVID-19 on dark trading 
dynamics in financial markets, investigating shock-driven venue selection dynamics may help reconcile the mixed 
evidence on the impact of dark trading on market quality characteristics. For example, Buti et al. (2011) find no 
supporting evidence that dark trading is harmful to market liquidity. Based on their analyses of FTSE data, 
Aquilina et al. (2017) and Brugler (2015) show that dark trading leads to improved liquidity in the aggregate and 
the primary exchange respectively. Foley and Putniņš (2016) also find evidence of dark trading improving liquidity 
in the Canadian market. However, Nimalendran and Ray (2014) investigate trading data from one of the 32 US 
dark venues and find that dark trading is associated with increased price impact on quoting exchanges. This is 
consistent with the findings of  Degryse et al. (2015); using data from the Dutch market, they show that dark 
trading has a detrimental effect on market liquidity. Adding complexity to the question is the increasingly popular 
view that the effects of dark trading on market quality characteristics are non-linear (see Comerton-Forde & 
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effects of the COVID-19 shock on aggregate venue selection and its implications for market 
quality. 
We find that the COVID-19 shock in financial markets is linked with an economically 
significant shift in trading from dark to lit venues. This shift can be explained by recent 
theoretical predictions. Specifically, the movement of trading activity from dark to lit venues 
appears linked to the movement of informed traders from lit exchanges to dark venues, which 
in turn drives the migration of uninformed traders, who are wary of being adversely selected, 
from dark pools to lit venues (as in Zhu 2014). The net effect of the likely cross-migration is a 
loss of market share by dark pools and an increase in lit venues’ market share. The shift in 
trading from dark to lit venues is also consistent with Menkveld et al.’s (2017) pecking order 
hypothesis, which predicts that, as investors’ trading needs become more urgent, they relocate 
their trading activity from the low cost and low-immediacy venues, i.e. dark pools, to the high-
cost and high-immediacy venues, i.e. lit venues. Results obtained from further analysis are 
consistent with both Zhu (2014) and Menkveld et al. (2017).  
The market quality implications of the COVID-19-driven venue dynamics are mixed. 
Although, on aggregate, it is linked to the widening of spreads for all stocks in our sample, we 
find that while lit liquidity deteriorates (i.e. spreads widen) for all stocks, the severity of the 
liquidity shock is significantly smaller for stocks with dark trading privileges when compared 
with the stocks subject to dark trading restrictions. However, the impairment in the 
informational efficiency for the group of stocks with dark trading privileges is more severe than 
for those with dark trading restrictions. It is important to note that the comparative negative 
informational efficiency effects are lower than the positive liquidity effects for the stocks 
tradable in both lit and dark venues. The comparative worsening of the efficiency of the price 
discovery process could be linked to the net positive movement of informed trading activity to 























VETTED AND REAL-TIME PAPERS
 
 
may lead to delays in the incorporation of information held by dark pools-bound informed 
traders into stock prices, since dark pools do not offer pre-trade transparency.  
 
2. Trader venue selection and venue market share 
The existing literature suggests that traders’ venue selection decisions are driven by two 
related factors, i.e. volatility in the lit market (see Zhu 2014) and the need for immediacy (see 
Menkveld et al. 2017).  
Zhu’s (2014) model establishes volatility as a key driver in the overall dynamics of 
venue self selection and predicts a non-linear relationship between volatility and dark market 
share; specifically, for sufficiently small volatility, dark market share increases with volatility. 
However, for an excessive level of volatility, dark market share decreases with volatility. In the 
model, the addition of a dark pool to a market with a lit exchange results in an asymmetric self 
selection involving informed and uninformed traders. Specifically, under “normal” market 
conditions,6 uninformed traders gravitate towards the dark pool because they face lower adverse 
selection risk there, while informed traders concentrate on the lit exchange. Informed traders 
are incentivised to stay at the lit exchange because when volatility is at a moderate level, the 
exchange spread is not excessive, and thus the cost of execution risk in the dark pool is greater 
than the benefit of potential price improvements it may offer (for example, in Australia and 
Canada, price improvement is required to trade regular sizes in dark pools). However, when 
volatility in the exchange exceeds the maximum level needed for informed traders to avoid the 
dark pool, informed traders start to migrate to the dark pool in search of uninformed 
counterparties to trade with and in a bid to avoid the widening exchange spread. Thus, liquidity 
constraints in the lit market can result in informed traders entering into non-transparent/dark 
venues in order to reduce their transaction costs and increase their profits, as already reported 
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by some empirical studies (see Hendershott & Mendelson 2000; Nimalendran & Ray 2014). 
The informed traders’ migration consequently results in uninformed traders leaving the 
erstwhile safety of the dark pool for the lit exchange. 
Self selection when volatility is moderate is linked to an improvement in informational 
efficiency in the aggregate market, comprising of the lit exchange and the dark pool (see 
Aquilina et al. 2017). If all informed traders hold similar types of information sets (for example, 
fundamental information about the value of an instrument) as modelled by Zhu (2014), the self 
selection induced by dark trading can improve the efficiency of the price discovery process. 
This is because a reduction in the number of informed trades due to fewer uninformed traders 
in the lit market (informed orders execute against uninformed orders as in Glosten & Milgrom 
1985; Kyle 1985 and many others) results in a lowering of competition on the same private 
information set held by informed traders. 
For their part, Menkveld et al. (2017) propose and test a pecking order hypothesis to 
explain traders’ venue selection, which is a similar dynamic characterization of venue selection 
to Zhu’s (2014) model. The hypothesis suggests that when executing orders, investors “sort” 
dark and lit venues by the need for immediacy and the associated costs of trading, such as the 
bid-ask spread, price impact and information leakage, in the form of a “pecking order.” The 
venues at the top of the pecking order are those with the lowest cost and lowest immediacy (e.g. 
midpoint dark pools), while those at the bottom are venues with the highest cost of trading and 
highest immediacy (lit exchanges/limit order books). The hypothesis predicts that, as investors’ 
trading needs become more urgent, they migrate from the low cost and low-immediacy venues 
to the high-cost and high-immediacy venues. Consistent with their hypothesis, Menkveld et al. 
(2017) document qualitatively consistent intraday market share losses for dark venues and gains 
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earnings and changes to the VIX. Although those shocks are arguably exogenous, they are 
nevertheless economically driven factors with statistical effects that dissipate within the day. 
Although our study is similar to that of Menkveld et al. (2017), there are significant 
differences owing to research directions and the exclusiveness of the exogenous shock used in 
this current study. Firstly, Menkveld et al.’s (2017) aim is the testing of the pecking order 
hypothesis and the authors employ fundamentals-related shocks for this purpose. However, our 
aim is understanding the role of the COVID-19-induced shock on traders’ venue selection. 
Pandemic shocks on the scale of COVID-19 are rare, which makes them different from the 
economic fundamentals’ related shocks employed in Menkveld et al. (2017). Secondly, the 
COVID-19 pandemic is a grey rhino – a highly probable, high impact, yet neglected threat. It 
created not only an urgency beyond the scope of the shocks employed in Menkveld et al. (2017), 
it also generated a once in a generation panic, an element that is lacking in the shocks used in 
Menkveld et al. (2017). A shock may create an urgency that motivates traders to move their 
trading activities from dark to lit venues. However, a shock that induces panic is likely to force 
some traders to stop their trading altogether (see as an example, Choe et al. 1999). Therefore, 
traders may also delay their trading in dark venues during the COVID-19 shock.7 Thirdly, the 
shocks exploited in Menkveld et al. (2017) are short-term/intraday shocks with impacts that 
dissipate within minutes; this is empirically shown in Menkveld et al. (2017). However, the 
shock induced by COVID-19 in financial markets has been shown to have a much longer 
duration (see Figure 1 and Baker et al. 2020). This implies that while the short-term nature of 
the shocks Menkveld et al. (2017) employ allow them to investigate only the intraday dynamics 
of traders’ venue selection, complementarily, we study the inter-day dynamics of aggregate 
traders’ venue selection. Furthermore, it is logical to expect that the fact that the COVID-19 
shock is more enduring and severe than the intraday shocks in Menkveld et al. (2017) could 
 
7 Zhu (2014) also shows that traders can delay their trading in dark pools when there is an excessive level of 
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have economically significant implications for market quality characteristics, such as price 
discovery and liquidity. 
Finally, the COVID-19 shock is not limited to the financial markets, it has implications 
for many parts of the global economy, from supply chain networks to the capital markets. Its 
emergence triggered a multitude of responses, such as central banks’ interventions in markets, 
liquidity constraints, margin calls, etc., the implications of which are yet to be fully understood. 
This current study offers an early insight into how it has impacted venue market share and 
market quality characteristics. 
 
3. Institutional background 
The enactment of the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID) in November 
2007 introduced alternative high-tech trading venues known as multilateral trading platforms 
(MTFs). MTFs operate as intermediaries facilitating the exchange of financial instruments 
between a number of market participants. Concurrently, under MiFID, pre-trade and post-trade 
transparency requirements are imposed on all trading venues in order to reduce potential 
adverse selection costs linked to market fragmentation. However, MiFID also offers pre-trade 
transparency waivers for certain types of orders. These pre-trade transparency waivers include 
(1) reference price waivers (RPW); (2) negotiated trade waivers (NTW); (3) large in scale (LIS) 
and (4) order management facilities (OMF). RPW applies to trading systems that match trading 
at the midpoint current bid and ask price. NTW allows two parties to formalise negotiated 
transactions. LIS offers block traders the right to hide their trading intention when transaction 
size is larger than the prevailing normal market size. OMF allows orders to be held by 
exchanges in an order management facility pending disclosure. 
Since the commencement of MiFID, trades in dark pools operated by MTFs have 
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managers to protect their trading intention and reduce transaction costs. However, European 
regulators, concerned by the potential negative influence of dark liquidity on the price discovery 
process, enacted a second iteration of MiFID, the so-called MiFID II, and the Market in 
Financial Instruments Regulation (MiFIR), published in June 2014. An important goal of 
MiFID II and MiFIR is to secure a high level of market transparency and fairness. As a result, 
the double volume cap (DVC) was introduced to curb dark trading and force more trades to be 
executed on lit venues. The DVC dictates that the venue and aggregate market trading limits 
for each instrument are 4% and 8%, respectively. If the DVC is triggered in an instrument, then 
dark trading in that instrument will subsequently be suspended for 6 months. The DVC is 
calculated for each affected instrument on a daily rolling basis and relates to average daily 
trading volume over the preceding 12-month period. According to the first DVC-related data 
published in March 2018 by the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA), a total of 
744 and 643 instruments breached at least one of the caps in January and February 2018 
respectively, and were therefore subjected to six-month trading suspensions from 12th March 
2018. As of September 2018, six months after the implementation of the DVC, more than 1200 
instruments, mainly equities, were under dark trading suspensions. The affected instruments 
corresponded to about 35% of the most liquid European stocks. For our sample period, spanning 
24th January and 24th March 2020, ESMA data shows that 62 instruments’8 (55 out of which 
are European stocks) are under DVC dark trading suspensions; their suspensions are from 14th 
November 2019 until 13th May 2020. 
It is worth noting that an enforcement of the DVC in a stock does not fully preclude 
some form of dark trading in the stock. Large block trades are still allowed to trade in dark 
pools if the trade size is large enough to qualify for the LIS waiver. The LIS wavier threshold 
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ADV of less than €50,000, the LIS waiver threshold is €15,000 and for large-cap stocks with 
ADVs greater than €100 million, the LIS waiver threshold can be up to €650,000. In any case, 
market data shows that the dark trading volumes recorded once the DVC is enforced for a stock 
is zero to negligible. 
 
4. Sample selection and variables 
4.1 Sample Selection 
In this study, we investigate the effects of the COVID-19 shock in financial markets on 
traders’ venue choice. In order to directly investigate trader-level migration between venues, 
one requires a dataset, which provides trader identification (ID). As datasets such as this are not 
commonplace, we employ an empirical framework that presents an aggregate view of trading 
volume dynamics among venues. This approach is feasible with the more accessible ultra-high 
frequency times and sales datasets. Our empirical approach is a difference-in-differences (DiD)-
type framework consistent with the one deployed by Goldin and Rouse (2000). The main 
difference between this approach and the standard DiD modelling framework is that both the 
treated and control groups are shocked in our specification; by contrast, in the standard DiD 
framework, only the treated group is shocked. Our model is formally discussed in Section 5.1.2.   
Our treated group includes stocks that trade on both dark and lit venues, while the 
control group of stocks are restricted from trading on dark venues during our sample period. 
The dark trading restriction is due to the imposition of a dark trading cap under the MiFID II 
provisions. We first identify a group of stocks with restricted dark trading privileges during a 
period corresponding to one month before and after the start of the COVID-19 shock in 
European financial markets. Baker et al. (2020) show that the COVID-19-induced excessive 
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quickly in the US and Europe;9 hence, we select a sample period spanning 24th January to 24th 
March 2020. We subsequently identify the 55 European equities serving dark trading 
suspensions between 14th November 2019 and 13th May 2020, a period inclusive of our sample 
period, as the stocks in our control group. Next, we match every stock in the control group with 
a stock with dark trading privileges using the method described in Shkilko and Sokolov (2020). 
Specifically, we compute the matching error for price, spread, depth, order imbalance, volume, 
volatility and high-frequency trading (HFT); for consistency with the literature, we also employ 
size as a matching characteristic (see Shkilko & Sokolov 2020). Then, the 55 stocks with the 
corresponding lower matching errors for each of the 55 stocks in the control group are included 
in the treated group; hence, our total sample size equals 110 European stocks.10 The method 
works well because our key microstructure metrics do not differ economically and statistically 
between groups prior to the emergence of the COVID-19 shock (see Table 2).  
Furthermore, the identification process allows for isolation of the impact of the COVID-
19 shock on the dark trading dynamics in stocks eligible for dark trading. The shock is 
characterised in Figure 1, which shows the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on volatility in 
the 110 stocks in our sample. The volatility proxy is the daily cross-sectional average, 
𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑑, defined in Section 4.2 and Table 1. Consistent with Baker et al. (2020), there is 
a substantial increase in volatility from 24th February 2020. Specifically, 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑑 increases 
by about 3 times between 24th February and 24th March 2020 in comparison with the month 
before, which implies that indeed our sample period is able to capture the impact of the COVID-
19 shock on European markets. 
 
9 Although Baker et al.’s (2020) analysis is based on the US financial markets, and we focus on European markets, 
the volatility trend is consistent as shown in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1. Volatility 
The figure plots the day-by-day evolution of the cross-sectional average of  𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑑 for 110 European stocks employed in the study. 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑑 is 
computed as the standard deviation of hourly mid-price returns for stock i on day d. The sample period covers from 24th January to 24th March 2020. The vertical 
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4.2 Variable construction 
For every stock in the treated and control groups, we obtain ultra-high frequency 
intraday trading data from the Thomson Reuters Tick History (TRTH) v2 database. We collect 
data from the main venues where our selected stocks are traded: 1) the main market where 
stocks are listed (for example, London Stock Exchange (LSE) for the UK stocks, Xetra for the 
German stocks, etc.); 2) Cboe Europe, which hosts the most liquid pan-European limit order 
books and dark pools, including BXE and CXE; and 3) Turquoise, hosting one of the most 
liquid dark pools in Europe, Turquoise Plato (formerly Turquoise Midpoint Dark). According 
to market data from Cboe Europe, the venues included in our dataset account for a daily 
minimum of 93% of the currency trading value for the stocks in our sample; hence, our data is 
representative in the cases of the stocks in the sample. The dataset contains standard transaction-
level variables such as date, exchange time, transaction price, volume, bid price, ask price, bid 
size and ask size. Using the obtained dataset, we compute daily estimates of trading activity, 
liquidity, order imbalance, HFT and volatility.  
We proxy venue choice at an aggregate level by using dark market share and trading 
volume in lit markets – the two variables embody aggregate trader venue selection. The dark 
market share, 𝐷𝑀𝑆𝑖,𝑑, is computed as the dark trading volume divided by the total trading 
volume for stock i on day d. Trading volume, 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖,𝑑, is the number of shares traded in lit 
venues for stock i on day d.11 Within our framework, we aim to control for general market 
dynamics by including a number of relevant variables. We measure liquidity using relative 
quoted spread (𝑅𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑑) and depth (𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑑). 𝑅𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑑 is the relative quoted spread for 
stock i on day d and is computed as a time-weighted average of the difference between ask and 
bid prices divided by the mid-price (mid-price is the average of ask and bid prices) 
 
11 Throughout this paper, trading volume refers to trading volume in lit markets. Trading volume in dark markets 
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corresponding to each transaction. 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑑 is the top-of-book depth and computed as the 
natural logarithm of the sum of the best bid and ask sizes corresponding to each transaction for 
stock i on day d.  
𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑑 is a proxy for volatility and computed as the standard deviation of hourly 
mid-price returns for stock i on day d  (see Malceniece et al. 2019). 𝑂𝐼𝐵𝑖,𝑑 is the order imbalance 
metric described in Chordia et al. (2008) and is computed as the absolute value of the number 
of buyer-initiated volume minus the number of seller-initiated volume divided by total volume 
stock i on day d. 𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑖,𝑑 is the proxy for HFT and computed as the number of messages divided 
by the number of transactions for stock i on day d  (see Malceniece et al. 2019). Table 1 provides 
an overview of the different variables used in this paper. 
Table 1. Variable definitions 
This table defines the variables used in this study. Unit is the unit of measurement; Market is the market 
for which a variable is computed, and Definition provides a short definition and computation method.  
 
Variable Unit Market Definition 
𝐷𝑀𝑆𝑖,𝑑 % Dark, Lit Dark market share; computed as dark trading volume divided 
by the total trading volume for stock i on day d 
𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖,𝑑 Millions Lit Number of shares traded in stock i on day d 
𝑅𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑑 bps Lit Relative quoted spread for stock i on day d; computed as a 
time-weighted average of the difference between ask and bid 
prices divided by the mid-price (mid-price is the average of 
ask and bid prices) corresponding to each transaction 
𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑑 ln Lit The top-of-book depth; computed as the natural logarithm of 
the sum of the best bid and ask sizes for stock i on day d. 
𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑑  Lit A proxy for volatility; computed as a standard deviation of 
hourly mid-price returns for stock i on day d 
𝑂𝐼𝐵𝑖,𝑑  Lit Order imbalance defined in Chordia et al. (2008); computed 
as the absolute value of the buyer-initiated volume minus the 
number of seller-initiated volume divided by total volume 
stock i on day d 
𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑖,𝑑  Lit A proxy for HFT and computed as the number of messages 
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4.3 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for the 110 stocks, i.e. 55 treated and 55 control 
stocks, in the sample. Panel A reports summary statistics for the pre-event period (from 24th 
January 2020 to 23rd February 2020), whereas Panel B presents summary statistics for the event 
period (from 24th February 2020 to 24th March 2020).12 In both panels, we provide statistics for 
the treated and control groups of stocks separately and compute the statistical differences in our 
model variables in order to observe the differences in market dynamics for these groups; 
standard errors of the mean estimates are used for statistical inferences. 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics 
This table contains the pre- (Panel A) and event (Panel B) periods stock-day mean and standard deviation 
estimates for variables using data for 55 European stocks that could be traded at both lit and dark venues, 
i.e. treated stocks, and for 55 European stocks with dark venue restrictions, i.e. control stocks. The final 
column presents the t-statistics of two-sample t-tests of differences between the treated group’s and the 
control group’s variables. 𝐷𝑀𝑆𝑖,𝑑 is the dark market share and is computed as the dark trading volume 
divided by the total trading volume for stock i on day d, 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖,𝑑 is the number of shares traded for 
stock i on day d, 𝑅𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑑 is the relative quoted spread for stock i on day d and is computed as a time-
weighted average of the difference between ask and bid prices divided by the mid-price (mid-price is 
the average of ask and bid prices) corresponding to each transaction, 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑑 is the top-of-book depth 
and is computed as the natural logarithm of the sum of the best bid and ask sizes for stock i on day d, 
𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑑 is a proxy for volatility and is computed as the standard deviation of hourly mid-price 
returns for stock i on day d, 𝑂𝐼𝐵𝑖,𝑑 is the order imbalance for stock i on day d and is computed as the 
absolute value of the buyer-initiated volume minus the number of seller-initiated volume divided by the 
total volume of stock i on day d, 𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑖,𝑑 is a proxy for HFT and is computed as the number of messages 
divided by the number of transactions for stock i on day d. The sample period is from 24th January to 
24th March 2020. The event start date is 24th February 2020, when the COVID-19-induced shock is 
adjudged to have commenced in global financial markets. *, ** and *** correspond to statistical 
significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels respectively.  
Panel A. Pre-event period 
Variable Treated group Control group Difference between means (t-
statistic) 
 Mean Std. dev Mean Std. dev Treated - control 
𝐷𝑀𝑆𝑖,𝑑 2.5% 0.023 0.009% 0.001 2.45%*** (37.69) 
𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖,𝑑 1.328 0.261 1.332 0.109 -0.004 (-0.491) 
𝑅𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑑 61.142 7.813 61.386 5.231 -0.244 (-0.902) 
𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑑 13.778 1.305 13.724 0.464 0.054 (1.356) 
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𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑑 0.0151 0.002 0.0152 0.001 -0.0001 (-1.551) 
𝑂𝐼𝐵𝑖,𝑑 0.321 0.091 0.325 0.013 -0.004 (-1.513) 
𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑖,𝑑 17.704 6.752 17.931 2.315 -0.227 (-1.106) 
 
Panel B. Event period 
Variable Treated group Control group Difference between means (t-
statistic) 
 Mean Std. dev Mean Std. dev Treated - Control 
𝐷𝑀𝑆𝑖,𝑑 2.1% 0.029 0.009% 0.002 2.095%*** (25.071) 
𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖,𝑑 3.275 4.115 2.874 2.631 0.401*** (2.855) 
𝑅𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑑 87.952 11.146 94.253 7.705 -6.301*** (-16.176) 
𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑑 14.840 1.331 14.394 0.493 0.446*** (10.930) 
𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑑 0.0338 0.004 0.0418 0.002 -0.008*** (-62.225) 
𝑂𝐼𝐵𝑖,𝑑 0.337 0.107 0.394 0.022 -0.057*** (-18.151) 
𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑖,𝑑 19.979 5.721 18.493 2.317 1.486*** (8.374) 
 
Panel A shows that the stock-day averages of all variables between the two stock groups, 
with the exception of 𝐷𝑀𝑆𝑖,𝑑, are not statistically different from each other. This underscores 
the relevance of our matching procedure and provides evidence that both groups have similar 
market microstructure characteristics/dynamics prior to the COVID-19 shock. There are some 
important points to note when comparing the evolution of variables during the event period. 
Firstly, as evident in Panel B, the average values of all variables change substantially during 
the event period, which indicates that market conditions are different after the onset of the 
COVID-19 shock. For example, the average 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖,𝑑 increases by 2.5 (2.2) times for the 
treated (control) group. Moreover, 𝑅𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑑 widens by more than 40% for both groups, 
indicating liquidity constraints. Secondly, while the average 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖,𝑑 of the control group is 
marginally higher than the average 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖,𝑑 of the treated group prior to the event, a 
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average 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖,𝑑 suddenly outstripping the control group’s by 14% (=(3.275-2.874)/2.874). 
This is consistent with our argument that the COVID-19 shock contributes to the market 
dynamics of stocks traded simultaneously on both dark and lit venues. The observed 16% 
(=(2.1-2.5)/2.5) decline in 𝐷𝑀𝑆𝑖,𝑑 for the treated group of stocks suggests that some traders 
move to lit venues during the COVID-19 shock. However, these traders could have also just 
exited the market altogether; we formally test whether this holds in the next section. Linked to 
the second point, thirdly, we also observe (in Panel B) statistically and economically significant 
differences between the treated and control groups’ estimated variables’ values in the event 
period, thus evidencing the variation in the impact of the COVID-19 shock on the two groups 
of stocks’ characteristics.  
The findings presented in Table 2 raise an interesting question about why the COVID-
19 shock affects stocks differently. We argue that this phenomenon is linked to traders being 
able to select dark and lit venues as trading destinations when trading regular sizes in some 
stocks and while not being able to trade some stocks at dark venues. This is because when we 
compare the general market conditions (dark trading, liquidity, volatility, order-book dynamics 
and HFT activities) of the treated and control groups during the pre-event period, only 𝐷𝑀𝑆𝑖,𝑑 
differs significantly (see Panel A of Table 2). The significant (both economically and 
statistically) difference in 𝐷𝑀𝑆𝑖,𝑑 is expected as the control group’s stocks have been suspended 
from dark trading, whereas the treated group’s stocks are available for trading in dark pools. 
This is further confirmed by the number of dark trading transactions in the treated and control 
groups during the sample period. Specifically, the treated group’s stocks have a total of 223,438 
transactions in dark pools, while this number is 142 for the control group’s stocks. Thus, being 
able to migrate trading across venues appears as a strong indicator of the differences between 
the control and treated groups’ market determinants during the event period. In the next section, 
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5 Analyses, results and discussions 
5.1  Venue choice analysis 
5.1.1 Dark market share analysis 
 Based on the predictions of Zhu (2014) and Menkveld et al. (2017), we argue that the 
COVID-19 shock reduces dark market share. We test this by first conducting a univariate 
analysis, and then estimating a multivariate regression model. For the univariate analysis, we 
compute the evolution of dark market share during our sample period, and then test the null 
hypothesis that there is no difference between dark pool share during the pre- and the COVID-
19 shock periods. It is important to note that this part of the analysis is strictly based on the 
treated group of stocks, because the control group of stocks are under dark trading suspension 
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Figure 2. Dark trading 
The figure plots the day-by-day evolution of the dark volume and dark market share for 55 European stocks that could be traded at both lit and dark venues. 
Dark market share is computed as the dark trading volume for a given day divided by the total trading volume on the same day. The sample period covers from 
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Table 3. Dark volume 
This table presents average daily dark trading volume and dark market share for the treated group during 
pre- and event periods along with t-statistics of the two-sample t-tests of differences between pre- and 
event periods’ dark volume statistics. The sample period is from 24th January to 24th March 2020. The 
event start date is 24th February 2020, when the COVID-19-induced shock is adjudged to have 
commenced in global financial markets. *, ** and *** correspond to statistical significance at the 0.10, 
0.05 and 0.01 levels respectively. 
 Dark volume (mln) Dark market share (%) 
Pre-event period 1,77 
 
2.5 
 Event period 3.57 
 
2.1 
 Difference (Event – pre) 1.80 
 
-0.4 




Figure 2 and Table 3 present the evolution of dark trading volume and dark market share 
during pre- and event periods. Although dark trading volume in the treated stocks doubles 
during the event period (increments in dark volume are also observed in Menkveld et al. 2017), 
this is only reflective of the overall increase in trading activity driven by the market response 
to the COVID-19 pandemic (see Figure 3 and Table 5). Indeed, dark market share declines from 
2.5% to 2.1% (about 16% = (2.1-2.5)/2.5) which implies that the magnitude of the increase in 
trading activity is higher in the lit venue (the difference between pre-and the event periods is 
statistically significant at 0.01 level for both dark volume and dark market share). This is 
consistent with the predictions of Zhu (2014) and Menkveld et al. (2017). Nevertheless, the 
insights are based on univariate analysis and should be supported by a more robust analysis. 
We achieve this by estimating the following model: 
𝐷𝑀𝑆𝑖,𝑑 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑑 +  𝛾1𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑑 + 𝛾2𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖,𝑑 +  𝛾3𝑅𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑑                              
             + 𝛾4𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑑 +   𝛾5𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑑 +  𝛾6𝑂𝐼𝐵𝑖,𝑑 + 𝛾7𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑖,𝑑 +  𝜀𝑖,𝑑                     (1) 
where 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑑 is a dummy variable that equals one for the days between 24th February and 
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Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation.13 All other variables are as 
defined in Section 4.2 and Table 1. 
Table 4. The impact of the COVID-19-induced shock in dark market share 
This table reports the coefficient estimates from the following regression model: 
𝐷𝑀𝑆𝑖,𝑑 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑑 +  𝛾1𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑑 + 𝛾2𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖,𝑑 + 𝛾3𝑅𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑑 +  𝛾4𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑑                                
                                                                                             +  𝛾5𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑑 +  𝛾6𝑂𝐼𝐵𝑖,𝑑 + 𝛾7𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑖,𝑑 +  𝜀𝑖,𝑑 
where 𝐷𝑀𝑆𝑖,𝑑 is a dark market share and is computed as the dark trading volume divided by the total 
trading volume for stock i on day d, 𝛼𝑖 and 𝛽𝑑 are stock and time fixed effects respectively, 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑑 is 
a dummy equalling 1 from 24th February to 24th March 2020 and 0 from 24th January to 23rd February 
2020. 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖,𝑑 is the number of shares traded for stock i on day d, 𝑅𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑑 is the relative quoted 
spread for stock i on day d and is computed as a time-weighted average of the difference between ask 
and bid prices divided by the mid-price (mid-price is the average of ask and bid prices) corresponding 
to each transaction, 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑑 is the top-of-book depth and is computed as the natural logarithm of the 
sum of the best bid and ask sizes for stock i on day d, 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑑 is a proxy for volatility and is 
computed as the standard deviation of hourly mid-price returns for stock i on day d, 𝑂𝐼𝐵𝑖,𝑑 is the order 
imbalance for stock i on day d and is computed as the absolute value of the buyer-initiated volume minus 
the number of seller-initiated volume divided by the total volume of stock i on day d, 𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑖,𝑑 is a proxy 
for HFT and is computed as the number of messages divided by the number of transactions for stock i 
on day d. The sample period is from 24th January to 24th March 2020. The sample includes 55 European 
stocks that could be traded at both lit and dark venues, i.e. treated stocks, and 55 European stocks with 
dark venue restrictions, i.e. control stocks. Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity and 
autocorrelation. *, ** and *** correspond to statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels 
respectively. 
 
Variable Coefficient t-statistic 
𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑡 -1.3** -2.54 
𝑅𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑡 -0.0008** -2.21 
𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡 1.02*** 19.14 
𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 -0.0 -0.46 
𝑂𝐼𝐵𝑖,𝑡 0.07*** 3.08 
𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑖,𝑡 0. 01*** 3.14 
Stock fixed effects Yes  
Time fixed effects Yes  
𝑅2̅̅̅̅  56.2 %  
 
Table 4 reports the estimation results for the Equation (1). The estimates suggest a 
negative and statistically significant relationship (at 0.05 level) between 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑑 and 𝐷𝑀𝑆𝑖,𝑑, 
 
13 Please note that standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation in all models estimated in 
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with a coefficient of -1.3. Consistent with Zhu (2014) and Menkveld et al. (2017), this indicates 
a decline in 𝐷𝑀𝑆𝑖,𝑑 following the onset of the COVID-19 shock in European markets. The 
result is also consistent with the univariate analysis we present in Table 3 and shows that the 
decline is still statistically significant after controlling for important market dynamics/variables. 
The economic significance of the decrease as estimated with the multivariate analysis is even 
bigger than estimated with the univariate analysis. Explicitly, while in the univariate analysis 
we find a 16% (0.4/2.5) reduction in dark market share, it is about 52% (1.3/2.5) in the 
multivariate analysis – effectively, more than half of the dark trading share of the market is lost 
during periods of market stress. Another important point to note is that, statistically, 
𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑑 is not significantly related to 𝐷𝑀𝑆𝑖,𝑑 after including 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑑 in the model.14 By 
contrast, all other variables keep their significance even after controlling for 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑑. This is 
expected since 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑑 corresponds to a period of high volatility in the stocks examined, and 
therefore the significance of 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑑 disappears after controlling for 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑑 in the 
model. 
The insights offered by Figure 2, Table 3 and Table 4 allow us to speculate that, indeed, 
a fraction of dark market share moves to lit venues during the event period. However, this is 
not the only interpretation. Specifically, one may argue that dark traders delay their trading 
rather than moving to lit venues, and therefore the reduction in dark market share reported in 
Tables 3 and 4 is the result of this delay. We consider this argument by conducting an analysis 
based on the evolution of trading volume in the next section. 
 
 
14 We estimate the same model without 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑑 and find that once 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑑 is not controlled for, the 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑑 
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5.1.2 Volume analysis 
The decrease in dark market share reported in Section 5.1.1 could potentially be 
explained by two mechanisms: 1) traders that use dark pools move to lit venues during shocks  
(see Zhu 2014; Menkveld et al. 2017); and 2) these traders may delay their trading activity, in 
which case they are not migrating to lit venues (the possibility of delay is alluded to by Zhu 
2014). We employ a DiD-type framework as proposed by Goldin and Rouse (2000) in order to 
formally test which of these mechanisms explain our earlier finding (a similar empirical design 
is also used by Blank 1991).  
We demonstrate in Section 4.3 and Table 2 that the two groups of treated and control 
stocks we employ in this paper have very similar market microstructure dynamics prior to the 
onset of the COVID-19 pandemic. Specifically, both groups’ liquidity, volatility, order-book 
dynamics and HFT levels do not significantly differ from each other before the event. The only 
observable microstructure-related difference between these groups is the availability of dark 
trading privileges for the treated group of stocks, with the control group of stocks restricted 
from dark trading due to their having breached the DVC under MiFID II provisions. Therefore, 
it is logical to expect that any difference between the impact of the COVID-19 shock on treated 
and control groups’ market activities is linked to differences in dark trading privileges for both 
groups of stocks. In order to test whether this expectation holds, in the spirit of Goldin and 
Rouse (2000), we estimate the following model where the dependent variable is lit volume, 
𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖,𝑑: 
𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖,𝑑 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑑 +  𝛾1𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑑 + 𝛾2𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖,𝑑 + 𝛾3𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑑 ∗ 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖,𝑑 
    +  𝛾4𝑅𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑑     +  𝛾5𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑑 +   𝛾6𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑑 +  𝛾7𝑂𝐼𝐵𝑖,𝑑 + 𝛾8𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑖,𝑑 +  𝜀𝑖,𝑑     (2) 
and where 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖,𝑑 is a dummy equalling one for the treated group of stocks and zero for 
the stocks in the control group. 𝛼𝑖 and 𝛽𝑑 are stock and time fixed effects, and all other variables 
are as previously defined. As previously noted, in contrast to a standard DiD model, in our 
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and thus, the key interaction variable (𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑑 ∗  𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖,𝑑) encapsulates the difference in 
the impact of COVID-19 on these two groups’ 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖,𝑑 dynamics. This identification allows 
us to infer whether the reduction in dark market share during the COVID-19 (see Section 5.1.1) 
arises because of traders migrating to lit venues or because they delay their trading. If traders 
delay their trading in dark pools because of the COVID-19 shock, then the impact of the 
COVID-19 shock should be the same for both the treated and control groups’ lit volume. This 
implies that the coefficient of 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑑 ∗  𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖,𝑑 would not be statistically significant, 
because dark market availability is the only observable microstructure difference between the 
control and treated groups’ market dynamics during the pre-event period (see Table 2) and that 
difference should evaporate if traders that are using dark pools delay their trading. However, if 
traders that are active in dark pools before the event move to lit venues, then the coefficient of 
𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑑 ∗  𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖,𝑑 would be positive and statistically significant because it captures the 
excess lit market trading activity impact of traders with access to both lit and dark venues, and 
it could then be argued that they are, in aggregate, shifting at least a significant proportion of 
their trading from dark to lit venues. This would be consistent with the pecking order hypothesis 
as advanced by Menkveld et al. (2017) and the predicted effects of excessive volatility in lit 
markets on dark market share (see Zhu 2014).  
Before estimating Equation (2), it is useful to conduct some univariate analysis aimed 
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Figure 3. Trading volume 
The figure presents the day-by-day evolution of lit volume for 110 European stocks; Panel A presents the day-by-day evolution of lit volume for the full sample 
(both the 55 stocks that could be traded at both lit and dark venues, i.e. treated stocks, and the 55 stocks with dark venue restrictions, i.e. control stocks), while 
Panel B shows the day-by-day evolution of lit volume for the control and treated groups separately. The sample period covers from 24th January to 24th March 
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Table 5. Trading volume 
This table contains the pre- and event average daily volume estimates for 55 European stocks that could 
be traded at both lit and dark venues, i.e. treated stocks, and for 55 European stocks with dark venue 
restrictions, i.e. control stocks. The estimates are reported separately for the treated and control groups 
along with t-statistics of the two-sample t-tests of differences between pre- and event periods average 
daily volumes. The sample period is from 24th January to 24th March 2020. The event start date is 24th 
February 2020, when the COVID-19-induced shock is adjudged to have commenced in global financial 
markets. *, ** and *** correspond to statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels 
respectively. 
 
 Control group (mln) Treated group (mln) 
Pre-event period 73.04 
 
69.96 
 Event period 155.15 
 
161.52 
 Difference (event – pre) 82.11 
 
91.56 




 Panel A of Figure 3 presents the evolution of total trading volume, whereas Panel B 
presents the evolution of the treated and control groups’ volumes separately; note that this is 
the evolution of the day-by-day total volume for all stocks. As evident in Panel A, total daily 
trading volume increases during the event period. This is not unusual as investors are expected 
to increase their trading activity during this period in an attempt to exploit information or hedge 
risks, i.e. the event creates an urgent demand for immediacy (see Menkveld et al. 2017). Panel 
B of Figure 3 offers us a more nuanced view of the impact of the COVID-19 crisis on the trading 
activity of investors with respect to the treated and control groups of stocks. Specifically, the 
control group’s volume is slightly higher than the treated group’s volume before the event (the 
difference is not statistically significant). However, the situation changes drastically following 
the onset of the COVID-19 shock and the treated group’s volume rises above the control 
group’s (see Table 5 for more details). Another important point to note in Panel B is the 
correlation between the evolution of the control and treated groups’ volume during the pre-
event period. It is seen that 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖,𝑑 for both groups have parallel trends in the absence of an 
event. It implies that the parallel trend assumption – which is vital for the empirical relevance 
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two groups is underscored by the differences in their level of volume increases after 24th 
February 2020. Table 5 shows that while the control group’s average daily lit volume increases 
by about 112% between 24th February and 24th March 2020, this increase is about 130% for the 
treated group, which indicates that the magnitude of increase is about 18% higher for the treated 
group. This reflects a huge economic impact of the COVID-19 pandemic and is consistent with 
our main argument regarding the move of traders from dark to lit venues. It is also consistent 
with estimates in Table 4 indicating significant falls in dark trading market share for our sample 
of stocks between 24th February and 24th March 2020.  
Table 6. The impact of the COVID-19-induced shock on lit volume 
This table reports the coefficient estimates from the following regression model, estimated using data 
for 55 European stocks that could be traded at both lit and dark venues, i.e. treated stocks, and for 55 
European stocks with dark venue restrictions, i.e. control stocks: 
𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖,𝑑 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑑 +  𝛾1𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑑 + 𝛾2𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖,𝑑 +  𝛾3𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑑 ∗  𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖,𝑑 +  𝛾4𝑅𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑑 
                                                                  + 𝛾5𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑑 +   𝛾6𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑑 +   𝛾7𝑂𝐼𝐵𝑖,𝑑 + 𝛾8𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑖,𝑑 +  𝜀𝑖,𝑑 
where 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖,𝑑 is the number of shares traded for stock i on day d, 𝛼𝑖 and 𝛽𝑑 are stock and time fixed 
effects respectively, 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑑 is a dummy equalling 1 from 24th February to 24th March 2020 and 0 from 
24th January to 23rd February 2020. 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖,𝑑 is a dummy, which equals 1 for the treated group of 
stocks and 0 for the control group of stocks.  𝑅𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑑 is the relative quoted spread for stock i on day 
d and is computed as a time-weighted average of the difference between ask and bid prices divided by 
the mid-price (mid-price is the average of ask and bid prices) corresponding to each transaction, 
𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑑 is the top-of-book depth and is computed as the natural logarithm of the sum of the best bid 
and ask sizes for stock i on day d, 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑑 is a proxy for volatility and is computed as the standard 
deviation of hourly mid-price returns for stock i on day d, 𝑂𝐼𝐵𝑖,𝑑 is the order imbalance for stock i on 
day d and is computed as the absolute value of the buyer-initiated volume minus the number of seller-
initiated volume divided by the total volume of stock i on day d, 𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑖,𝑑 is a proxy for HFT and is 
computed as the number of messages divided by the number of transactions for stock i on day d. The 
sample period is from 24th January to 24th March 2020. Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity 
and autocorrelation. *, ** and *** correspond to statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels 
respectively. 
 
Variable Coefficient t-statistic 
𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑡 1.22*** 2.65 
𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖,𝑡 -0.15 -1.5 
𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑡 ∗  𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖,𝑡 0.460** 2.37 
𝑅𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑡 -0.005*** -4.72 
𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡 0.93*** 10.85 
𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 10.49*** 6.34 
𝑂𝐼𝐵𝑖,𝑡 1.09*** 4.33 
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Stock fixed effects YES  
Time fixed effects YES  
𝑅2̅̅̅̅  67.5%  
 
 We now shift our attention to the outcome of the estimation of Equation (2) as reported 
in Table 6. There are some important points to note. Firstly, 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑑 is statistically 
significantly (at 0.01 level) and positively related to 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖,𝑡 implying that indeed there is a 
substantial increase in lit volume during the COVID-19 period, when compared to the prior 
month. Economically this implies that the number of shares traded daily during the event 
periods increases by about 1.2 million or, on average, 92% (= 1.2/1.3) for the 110 stocks in our 
sample.15 This is a significant economic effect and shows that the pandemic crisis has an 
unmistakable impact on trading in financial markets. Secondly, and most importantly, the 
interaction coefficient (𝛾3) suggests that the COVID-19 shock is linked with average daily 
increases of about 460,000 shares for each of the treated stocks when compared to the control 
group of stocks; the coefficient is statistically significant at 0.05 level. The economic 
significance of this relative increase in lit trading activity is obvious. The average 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖,𝑑 
for the control group of stocks is about 2 million shares during our sample period. Thus, the 
magnitude of increases in trading volume is about 23% (=0.46/2) higher for the treated group 
compared with the control group. This is indeed a substantial change in economic terms, and 
offers compelling evidence that, although traders increase their lit venue trading activity for all 
stocks during the COVID-19 crisis, they do so on a larger scale for stocks with trading privileges 
in both lit and dark venues. This result is consistent with Menkveld et al. (2017) and Zhu (2014) 
as well as our hypothesis that traders migrate in aggregate from dark to lit venues during crisis 
periods, such as the COVID-19 pandemic. Thus, the reduction in dark market share reported in 
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Section 5.1.1 and Table 4 is linked to traders moving their trading to lit venues rather than 
delaying it.  
  
5.2  How COVID-19 drives traders venue selection 
 Zhu (2014) and Menkveld et al. (2017) identify two related channels that could explain 
traders’ venue selection. Menkveld et al. (2017) show that investors’ need for immediacy drives 
their venue selection. This is consistent with anecdotal evidence presented in some media 
coverage of the phenomenon in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic;16 therefore, this channel 
provides a potential explanation for our results. Another channel is proposed by Zhu (2014). 
Zhu (2014) predicts that adverse selection/information risk (which is proxied by volatility in 
the model) is a key driver of the venue selection decisions made by traders (see also Aquilina 
et al. 2017). These two channels are inter-related, as investors’ demand for immediacy is also 
driven by information. Therefore, we view these two channels as one, which we call the adverse 
selection channel. In this section, we investigate whether this channel explains our main 
findings.  
We note that the COVID-19 shock impacts financial markets not only through the 
adverse selection channel, i.e. volatility and the need/demand for immediacy, the pandemic is 
also implicated in shocks to price levels and margin calls, as well as fiscal policy interventions 
etc. However, in this study, we primarily focus on the adverse selection channel because it has 
a very clear theoretical basis in the literature (see Zhu 2014; Menkveld et al. 2017), and it is 
arguably a vector for the other COVID-19-related developments as they imply informational 
risk. Therefore, the evidence presented in this section should be interpreted with some caution. 
We do not claim that the adverse selection channel is the only channel explaining the impact of 
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the COVID-19 shock on traders’ venue selection. Nevertheless, theory suggests it is a 
significant driver of trader venue selection decision.  
 The adverse selection channel suggests that informed traders stay on the lit exchange 
under “normal” market conditions, i.e. “normal” condition means lower volatility and narrow 
lit exchange spread. This is because under these conditions exchange spread is not excessive, 
and thus the cost of execution risk is higher than a potential price-improvement benefit in a dark 
pool. However, when there is excessive volatility in financial markets, informed traders start to 
move to dark pools to avoid the wider exchange spread. This implies that excessive volatility 
in lit markets introduces additional adverse selection cost to dark pools. This “new” adverse 
selection cost forces uninformed\liquidity traders to exit dark pools. In this scenario, dark pool 
liquidity traders have two options, either to delay their trading, which can be quite costly when 
markets are especially volatile (leading to an increase in the demand for immediacy), as 
observed in this case, or move to lit exchanges.  The results reported in Table 6 show that, in 
aggregate, traders select the second option and move to lit exchanges. We investigate further in 
this section. If the adverse selection channel explains our findings, in comparison to the control 
group of stocks, we would expect to see reduced adverse selection risk in the lit market for the 
treated group of stocks, because only the latter group has a relatively unfettered access to dark 
pools. 
 We proxy adverse selection and informed trading activity by using the adverse selection 
component metric developed by Lin et al. (1995).17 Specifically, we compute the daily adverse 




17 For robustness, we estimate the adverse selection component of the spread by using the approach of Stoll (1989) 
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Figure 4. Adverse selection component 
Panel A presents the day-by-day evolution of the cross-sectional average of 𝐴𝑆𝐶𝑖,𝑑 for 55 European stocks that could be traded at both lit and dark venues, i.e. 
treated stocks, and for 55 European stocks with dark venue restrictions, i.e. control stocks. Panel B shows the evolution of the difference between the control 
group’s 𝐴𝑆𝐶𝑖,𝑑 and the treated group’s 𝐴𝑆𝐶𝑖,𝑑. 𝐴𝑆𝐶𝑖,𝑑 is the adverse selection component of relative spread 𝑅𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑑 for stock i on day d and is computed by 
using the method developed by Lin et al. (1995).  The sample period covers from 24th January to 24th March 2020. The vertical bar indicates 24th February 2020, 
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Table 7. Adverse selection component of the spread 
This table contains the pre- and event stock-day averages of 𝐴𝑆𝐶𝑖,𝑑 and 𝐴𝑆𝑊𝑖,𝑑, for 55 European stocks 
that could be traded at both lit and dark venues, i.e. treated stocks, and for 55 European stocks with dark 
venue restrictions, i.e. control stocks. The estimates are reported separately for the treated and control 
groups along with t-statistics of the two-sample t-tests of differences between treated and control 
groups. 𝐴𝑆𝐶𝑖,𝑑 is the adverse selection component of 𝑅𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑑 and is computed using the method 
developed by Lin et al. (1995), while 𝐴𝑆𝑊𝑖,𝑑 is the weight of  𝐴𝑆𝐶𝑖,𝑑 in 𝑅𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑑, calculated by 
dividing 𝐴𝑆𝐶𝑖,𝑑 by 𝑅𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑑 and then multiplying by 100. The sample period is from 24th January to 
24th March 2020. The event date is 24th February 2020, when the COVID-19-induced shock is adjudged 
to have commenced in global financial markets. *, ** and *** correspond to statistical significance at 
the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels respectively. 
 
Panel A 
 Pre-event Event 
Treated 𝐴𝑆𝐶𝑖,𝑑 13.14 
 
16.81 
 Control 𝐴𝑆𝐶𝑖,𝑑 15.69 
 
35.22 
 Difference (control – treated) 2.55 (1.61) 18.41***(3.63) 
  
Panel B 
 Pre-event Event 
Treated 𝐴𝑆𝑊𝑖,𝑑 21% 
 
19% 
 Control 𝐴𝑆𝑊𝑖,𝑑 25% 
 
37% 
 Difference (control – treated) 4% (1.58) 18%***(5.75) 
  
 Panel A of Figure 4 presents the evolution of the treated and control groups’ 𝐴𝑆𝐶𝑖,𝑑 
estimates during the sample period. There are two essential points to note here. Firstly, 𝐴𝑆𝐶𝑖,𝑑 
increases for both groups during the event period, indicating that informed traders are more 
active during that period. This is expected as 𝑅𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑑 also increases for both groups during 
the event period. Thus, an increase in 𝐴𝑆𝐶𝑖,𝑑 is not very informative by itself. In order to 
investigate whether adverse selection cost increases or not, we need to compute the percentage 
of 𝑅𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑑 driven by adverse selection cost and compare its values for before and after the 
onset of the COVID-19 shock. Thus, we obtain the weighted adverse selection cost component 
of 𝑅𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑑, 𝐴𝑆𝑊𝑖,𝑑, by dividing 𝐴𝑆𝐶𝑖,𝑑 by 𝑅𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑑 and then multiplying the outcome 
by 100. The estimates reported in Panel B of Table 7 show that, for the treated group, the 























VETTED AND REAL-TIME PAPERS
 
 
(=(16.81/87.95)*100) during the COVID-19 shock period. For the control group, the average 
𝐴𝑆𝑊𝑖,𝑑 is 25% (=(15.69/61.39)*100) during the pre-event period, increasing to 37% 
(=(35.22/94.25)*100) during the COVID-19 shock period. Thus, while the control group’s 
adverse selection cost increases by 12%, the treated group’s adverse selection cost declines by 
about 2%. This clearly shows that the COVID-19 crisis does not appear to have the same impact 
on the adverse selection costs of the two stock groups. 
The above finding is further underscored by the evolution of the difference between 
control and treated groups’𝐴𝑆𝐶𝑖,𝑑 , shown in Panel B of Figure 4. It is evident that the 
difference is relatively stable and close to 0 before the event. However, it increases and 
becomes more unstable after the event, which may be an indication of both the reduction in the 
proportion of information-driven trading activity in the treated stocks and the magnitude of the 
𝐴𝑆𝐶𝑖,𝑑 increases for the control group of stocks during the COVID-19 shock period. The 
difference is also found to be statistically significant when we use the standard error of the 
mean difference for statistical inference as shown in Panel A of Table 7. The estimates 
presented suggest that the difference between the control and treated groups’ 𝐴𝑆𝐶𝑖,𝑑 prior to 
the COVID-19 crisis is 2.55 bps and not statistically significant. However, the difference 
increases to 18.41 bps and becomes statistically significant at the 0.01 level following the onset 
of the crisis. The same results hold for 𝐴𝑆𝑊𝑖,𝑑 (see Panel B). While we do not have trader-level 
data on informed and uninformed traders, the reduction of 𝐴𝑆𝑊𝑖,𝑑 in the treated group 
compared to the control group  may be interpreted as, in the aggregate, informed trading 
activity in the treated group of stocks being significantly transferred to dark pools during the 
COVID-19 shock. In order to formally test the argument in a multivariate framework, we 
estimate the following model; all variables are as previously defined: 
𝐴𝑆𝑊𝑖,𝑑 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑑 +  𝛾1𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑑 + 𝛾2𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖,𝑑 +  𝛾3𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑑 ∗  𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖,𝑑 
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Table 8. The impact of the COVID-19-induced shock on adverse selection 
This table reports the coefficient estimates from the following regression model, estimated using data 
for 55 European stocks that could be traded at both lit and dark venues, i.e. treated stocks, and for 55 
European stocks with dark venue restrictions, i.e. control stocks: 
𝐴𝑆𝑊𝑖,𝑑 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑑 +  𝛾1𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑑 + 𝛾2𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖,𝑑 + 𝛾3𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑑 ∗  𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖,𝑑 
                                     + 𝛾4𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑑 +   𝛾5𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑑 +  𝛾6𝑂𝐼𝐵𝑖,𝑑 + 𝛾7𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑖,𝑑 + 𝛾8𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖,𝑑 +  𝜀𝑖,𝑑 
where 𝐴𝑆𝑊𝑖,𝑑 is the weight of  𝐴𝑆𝐶𝑖,𝑑 in 𝑅𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑑, calculated by dividing 𝐴𝑆𝐶𝑖,𝑑 by 𝑅𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑑 and 
then multiplying by 100, 𝐴𝑆𝐶𝑖,𝑑 is the adverse selection component of 𝑅𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑑 and is computed by 
using the method developed in Lin et al. (1995), 𝑅𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑑 is the relative quoted spread for stock i on 
day d and is computed as time-weighted average of the difference between ask and bid prices divided 
by the mid-price (mid-price is the average of ask and bid prices) corresponding to each transaction. 𝛼𝑖 
and 𝛽𝑑 are stock and time fixed effects respectively, 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑑 is a dummy equal 1 from 24th February 
to 24th March 2020 and 0 from 24th January to 23rd February 2020, 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖,𝑑 is a dummy equalling 1 
for the treated group of stocks and 0 for the control group of stocks. 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑑 is the top-of-book depth 
and is computed as the natural logarithm of the sum of the best bid and ask sizes for stock i on day d, 
𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑑 is a proxy for volatility and is computed as the standard deviation of hourly mid-price 
returns for stock i on day d, 𝑂𝐼𝐵𝑖,𝑑 is the order imbalance for stock i on day d and is computed as the 
absolute value of the buyer-initiated volume minus the number of seller-initiated volume divided by the 
total volume of stock i on day d, 𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑖,𝑑 is a proxy for HFT and is computed as the number of messages 
divided by the number of transactions for stock i on day d. The sample period is from 24th January to 
24th March 2020. Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation. *, ** and *** 
correspond to statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels respectively. 
 
Variable Coefficient t-statistic 
𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑡 2.23** 2.17 
𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖,𝑡 -1.59 -1.40 
𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖,𝑡 -3.08** -2.03 
𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡 -0.91*** -3.85 
𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 3.53* 1.71 
𝑂𝐼𝐵𝑖,𝑡 3.85*** 5.53 
𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑖,𝑡 0.306 0.66 
𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖,𝑡 0.54 1.35 
Stock fixed effects YES  
Time fixed effects YES  
𝑅2̅̅̅̅  33.2%  
 
Table 8 reports the estimation results for Equation (3). 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑑’s coefficient is positive 
and statistically significantly (at 0.05 level), which implies that overall 𝐴𝑆𝑊𝑖,𝑑 increases during 
the event period.18 However, the interaction coefficient (𝛾3) is negative and statistically 
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significant (at 0.05 level) implying that the treated group’s 𝐴𝑆𝑊𝑖,𝑑 reduces over the same 
period when we compare it with the control group’s 𝐴𝑆𝑊𝑖,𝑑. The magnitude of the association 
is also economically meaningful. Specifically, 𝐴𝑆𝑊𝑖,𝑑 of the treated group reduces by 3.08% 
during the event period when we compare it with the control group. The economic significance 
of this estimate is put into some perspective when we consider that the stock-day average 
𝐴𝑆𝑊𝑖,𝑑 is about 29% for the control group in our sample period. The implication here is that 
the level of adverse selection in stocks with dark trading privileges declines by about 10% 
(=3.08/29) during the period of the COVID-19-induced market turmoil in comparison with 
stocks without this privilege. This is consistent with the adverse selection channel argument 
and the results presented in Figure 4 and Table 7. Therefore, it suggests that, in the aggregate, 
a non-negligible proportion of informed trading activity is shifted to dark pools during periods 
of market turmoil, such as the one driven by the COVID-19 pandemic. One may argue that 
informed traders may stop trading, and therefore the reduction in 𝐴𝑆𝑊𝑖,𝑑 of the treated group 
is related to this. However, if this is the case, we would expect to see the same effects in the 
control group. Given the consistency of microstructure properties in the pre-event period for 
both groups of stocks, it is implausible that a different factor other than the opportunity to trade 
in a relatively unrestricted manner in dark pools is driving the differential in the evolution of 
𝐴𝑆𝑊𝑖,𝑑 during the COVID-19 shock. Thus, our framework allows us to interpret this result as 
a non-negligible aggregate shifting of informed trading activity from lit to dark venues.  
 
5.3  Market quality implications  
The empirical findings reported in Section 5.1 show that, overall, traders are shifting 
significant proportions of their trading from dark to lit venues during the COVID-19-induced 
market stress period. While reporting on these dynamics is of academic, and arguably practical, 
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also alluded to this). Therefore, in this section, we examine the market quality implications of 
the significant loss of market share by dark pools to lit venues during the COVID-19 pandemic.  
Price discovery and liquidity are generally considered to be two of the most important 
market quality characteristics (see O'Hara 2003). Hence, we examine the effects of the reported 
dynamics on both the efficiency of the price discovery process/informational efficiency and 
liquidity by using a DiD-type framework similar to those used in Sections 5.1 and 5.2 above. 
We estimate the following models with market quality metrics on the left-hand side.  
𝑅𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑑 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑑 +  𝛾1𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑑 + 𝛾2𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖,𝑑 +  𝛾3𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑑 ∗  𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖,𝑑 
        + 𝛾4𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑑 +   𝛾5𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑑 +  𝛾6𝑂𝐼𝐵𝑖,𝑑 + 𝛾7𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑖,𝑑 + 𝛾8𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖,𝑑 +  𝜀𝑖,𝑑         (4) 
𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑖,𝑑 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑑 +  𝛾1𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑑 + 𝛾2𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖,𝑑 +  𝛾3𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑑 ∗  𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖,𝑑 +
              𝛾4𝑅𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑑 +  𝛾5𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑑 +   𝛾6𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑑 +  𝛾7𝑂𝐼𝐵𝑖,𝑑 + 𝛾8𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑖,𝑑 +
                                                                                                                       𝛾9𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖,𝑑 +  𝜀𝑖,𝑑           (5)                                                                                                                                          
where the proxy for informational efficiency, 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑖,𝑑, is the absolute value of first-order return 
autocorrelation for each stock i on day d, expressed in basis points (bps). It is computed by first 
estimating 30-second returns within each stock-day (𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑖,𝑡,𝑑), where t=30 seconds, and then 
computing 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑖,𝑑 as 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑖,𝑑 =  |𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛(𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑖,𝑡,𝑑, 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1,𝑑)|. We employ the absolute 
value of the correlation coefficients as this captures both the under- and over-reaction of returns 
to information, with smaller values indicating greater efficiency. The empirical relevance of 
this metric is underscored by its wide use in the literature (see as examples, Hendershott & 
Jones 2005; Comerton-Forde & Putniņš 2015). All other variables are as previously defined. 
The first model, Equation (4), is used to estimate the impact of the dark trading dynamics in 
the treated stocks during the COVID-19 shock period on lit market liquidity, with 𝑅𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑑 
as the proxy for liquidity, whereas the second model, Equation (5), examines the impact of the 
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Table 9. The impact of the COVID-19-induced shock on liquidity 
This table reports the coefficient estimates from the following regression model, estimated using data 
for 55 European stocks that could be traded at both lit and dark venues, i.e. treated stocks, and for 55 
European stocks with dark venue restrictions, i.e. control stocks: 
𝑅𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑑 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑑 +  𝛾1𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑑 + 𝛾2𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖,𝑑 +  𝛾3𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑑 ∗  𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖,𝑑 
                                     + 𝛾4𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑑 +   𝛾5𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑑 +  𝛾6𝑂𝐼𝐵𝑖,𝑑 + 𝛾7𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑖,𝑑 + 𝛾8𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖,𝑑 +  𝜀𝑖,𝑑 
where 𝑅𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑑 is the relative quoted spread for stock i on day d and computed as time-weighted 
average of the difference between ask and bid prices divided by the mid-price (mid-price is the average 
of ask and bid prices) corresponding to each transaction. 𝛼𝑖 and 𝛽𝑑 are stock and time fixed effects 
respectively, 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑑 is a dummy equal 1 from 24th February to 24th March 2020 and 0 from 24 January 
to 23 February 2020, 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖,𝑑 is a dummy equalling 1 for the treated group of stocks and 0 for the 
control group of stocks. 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑑 is the top-of-book depth and is computed as the natural logarithm of 
the sum of the best bid and ask sizes for stock i on day d, 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑑 is a proxy for volatility and is 
computed as the standard deviation of hourly mid-price returns for stock i on day d, 𝑂𝐼𝐵𝑖,𝑑 is the order 
imbalance for stock i on day d and is computed as the absolute value of the buyer-initiated volume 
minus the number of seller-initiated volume divided by the total volume of stock i on day d, 𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑖,𝑑 is 
a proxy for HFT and is computed as the number of messages divided by the number of transactions for 
stock i on day d. The sample period is from 24th January to 24th March 2020. Standard errors are robust 
to heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation. *, ** and *** correspond to statistical significance at the 0.10, 
0.05 and 0.01 levels respectively. 
 
Variable Coefficient t-statistic 
𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑡 21.88*** 3.21 
𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖,𝑡 -1.14 -0.53 
𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖,𝑡 -7.25** -2.54 
𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡 -6.92*** -5.41 
𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 15.72*** 6.46 
𝑂𝐼𝐵𝑖,𝑡 4.54* 1.72 
𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑖,𝑡 0.04 1.59 
𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖,𝑡 -1.03*** -4.60 
Stock fixed effects YES  
Time fixed effects YES  
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Table 10. The impact of the COVID-19-induced shock on price discovery/informational efficiency 
This table reports the coefficient estimates from the following regression model, estimated using data 
for 55 European stocks that could be traded at both lit and dark venues, i.e. treated stocks, and for 55 
European stocks with dark venue restrictions, i.e. control stocks: 
𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑖,𝑑 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑑 +  𝛾1𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑑 + 𝛾2𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖,𝑑 +  𝛾3𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑑 ∗ 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖,𝑑 + 𝛾4𝑅𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑑    
                                     + 𝛾5𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑑 +   𝛾6𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑑 +   𝛾7𝑂𝐼𝐵𝑖,𝑑 + 𝛾8𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑖,𝑑 + 𝛾9𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖,𝑑 +  𝜀𝑖,𝑑 
where 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑖,𝑑 is first-order return autocorrelations for each stock i on day d at 30 seconds frequency. 𝛼𝑖 
and 𝛽𝑑 are stock and time fixed effects respectively, 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑑 is a dummy equalling1 from 24th February 
to 24th March 2020 and 0 from 24th January to 23rd February 2020, 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖,𝑑 is a dummy equalling 1 
for the treated group of stocks and 0 for the control group of stocks. 𝑅𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑑 is the relative quoted 
spread for stock i on day d and computed as time-weighted average of the difference between ask and 
bid prices divided by the mid-price (mid-price is the average of ask and bid prices) corresponding to 
each transaction. 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑑 is the top-of-book depth and is computed as the natural logarithm of the sum 
of the best bid and ask sizes for stock i on day d, 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑑 is a proxy for volatility and is computed 
as the standard deviation of hourly mid-price returns for stock i on day d, 𝑂𝐼𝐵𝑖,𝑑 is the order imbalance 
for stock i on day d and is computed as the absolute value of the buyer-initiated volume minus the 
number of seller-initiated volume divided by the total volume of stock i on day d, 𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑖,𝑑 is a proxy for 
HFT and is computed as the number of messages divided by the number of transactions for stock i on 
day d. The sample period is from 24th January to 24th March 2020. Standard errors are robust to 
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation. *, ** and *** correspond to statistical significance at the 0.10, 
0.05 and 0.01 levels respectively. 
 
Variable Coefficient t-statistic 
𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑡 60.41 0.36 
𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖,𝑡 -3.33 -0.47 
𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖,𝑡 31.34* 1.71 
𝑅𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑡 -2.06*** -7.19 
𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡 -5.41*** -13.39 
𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 -26.41*** -3.88 
𝑂𝐼𝐵𝑖,𝑡 -4.39*** -3.94 
𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑖,𝑡 -0.26 -0.64 
𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖,𝑡 1.98 0.41 
Stock fixed effects YES  
Time fixed effects YES  
𝑅2̅̅̅̅  24.1%  
 
 Table 9 reports estimation results for Equation (4). The interaction variable’s 
coefficient, 𝛾3, is negative and statistically significant (at 0.05 level) implying that the treated 
group’s  𝑅𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑑 decreases during the COVID-19 shock period when compared to the control 
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period when compared with the control group’s liquidity, or a minimum significantly suffers 
less liquidity shock comparatively, and that this is linked with the loss of market share to the lit 
venues by dark pools. The magnitude of the narrowing observed in the treated stocks’ 
𝑅𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑑 during the COVID-19 impact period is also economically meaningful. Specifically, 
on average, the spread estimates of stocks with dark trading privileges narrow by about 9% 
(=7.25/81) during the event period when compared with the control group.19 
 Table 10 shows the estimated coefficients for Equation (5). The interaction variable, 
𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑑 ∗  𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖,𝑑, is positively related to 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑖,𝑑; the relationship is statistically 
significant at the 0.10 level. The first observation here is that the informational efficiency 
impact of the loss of dark market share is not as powerful as its liquidity effects. Secondly, the 
implication of the positive coefficient estimate is that the treated group’s informational 
efficiency deteriorates in response to the loss of dark market share spurred by the COVID-19 
pandemic, when compared to the control group’s informational efficiency. The change in 
informational efficiency is also economically meaningful. The average 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑖,𝑑 for the control 
group is 1082 bps, which suggests that the treated group’s information efficiency deteriorates 
by about 2.8% (=31.34/1082) as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic market turmoil, in 
comparison with that of the control group. This finding is not surprising and is what we would 
expect to find given the aggregate movement of informed trading activity to dark pools, which 
appears linked to increased volatility and trading costs on the lit exchange. The consequence of 
this is a delay in the incorporation of information held by the migrating informed traders, since 
dark pools do not offer pre-trade transparency. Under normal conditions, when trading in a lit 
venue via the limit order book, information held by informed traders is more likely to be 
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observed earlier than when they trade in dark pools, where they are also more susceptible to 
non-execution risk. 
Although the informational efficiency dynamics are at odds with the liquidity dynamics 
earlier reported, asymmetric effects of the evolution of dark trading on market quality 
characteristics is in line with the literature. For example, Zhu (2014) shows that the addition of 
a dark pool to a lit exchange decreases liquidity on the lit exchange and improves price 
discovery (see also Buti et al., 2011; Comerton-Forde & Putniņš, 2015). Therefore, a reduction 
in reliance on dark trading, as is the case during the COVID-19 shock, should yield opposite 
effects. Ultimately, while the (negative) informational efficiency effect of the COVID-19-




The spread of the COVID-19 pandemic induced a series of interesting market dynamics 
in financial markets around the world, with some of the most severe effects observed in 
European equity markets. One of these dynamics is the sharp loss of market share by dark pools. 
In this paper, we investigate the impact of COVID-19 on aggregate traders’ venue 
selection/market share and how this impact in turn affects market quality characteristics. 
We show that, in line with the theoretical literature (see Zhu 2014; Menkveld et al. 
2017), the COVID-19 shock is linked with an economically significant loss of market share by 
dark pools to lit exchanges. The market quality implications of this loss, although mixed, are 
economically meaningful and statistically significant. While stocks with dark trading privileges 
experience suffer significantly less adverse liquidity shocks, i.e. wider spreads, when compared 
with stocks under dark trading restrictions during the COVID-19 period, the loss of 
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restrictions. However, the liquidity effect is larger than the informational efficiency effect. The 
exacerbated slump in informational efficiency could be explained by a predicted net positive 
movement of informed trading activity to dark pools when volatility is excessive in lit markets 
(see Zhu 2014), which may result in a slower absorption of information held by informed traders 
into stock prices. 
This study is timely. To our knowledge, it is the first to characterise the market 
microstructure effects of the COVID-19 pandemic by investigating the trading dynamics 
between lit and dark venues in relation to the pandemic. Furthermore, the study has implications 
for dark trading regulation given the increasingly intense regulatory constraints being 
considered for dark trading across the world, and already implemented in Europe, Australia and 
Canada.  Our results underscore the need for regulatory interventions to be flexible and account 
for large-scale exogenously driven changes in market conditions. This is because provisions 
designed for normal trading conditions (e.g. dark trading caps and waivers) become irrelevant 
when markets are impacted by events such as a virus oblivious of market structures and 
regulation. 
In conclusion, we note that the longer duration and severe nature of the COVID-19 
shock in comparison to most shocks in financial markets may have long-term economically 
significant implications for key market quality characteristics, such as price discovery and 
liquidity. Therefore, it would be beneficial for future research to build on our study in order to 
determine the long-term effects of grey rhino events like the COVID-19 pandemic on aggregate 
venue selection, given the effects of venue selection on market quality. If the impact of an event 
is as severe as COVID-19 has thus far proven to be in financial markets, could it spur the near-
permanent relocation of non-block traders to the lit venue, and what would this mean for 























VETTED AND REAL-TIME PAPERS
 
 
changes could this drive in financial markets in the medium and long terms? These are questions 
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This appendix lists the stocks included in the stock sample. The stocks are listed alphabetically using 
their ISINs. 
 
ISIN Company Name Country 
AT0000KTMI02 Pierer Mobility Ag Austria 
BE0003755692 Agfa-Gevaert Nv Belgium 
BE0003766806 Ion Beam Applications Sa Iba Belgium 
BMG671801022 Odfjell Drilling Ltd. Norway 
CH0001341608 Hypothekarbank Lenzburg Ag Switzerland 
CH0003390066 Mikron Holding Ag Switzerland 
CH0010754924 Schweiter Technologies Ag Switzerland 
CH0044781141 Gam Precious Metals - Physical Gold Switzerland 
CH0239518779 Hiag Immobilien Holding Ag Switzerland 
CH0386200239 Medartis Holding Ag Switzerland 
CH0406705126 Sensirion Holding Ag  Switzerland 
DE0005103006 Adva Optical Networking Se Germany 
DE0006047004 Heidelbergcement AG Germany 
DE0006219934 Jungheinrich Ag Germany 
DE0006569908 Mlp Ag Germany 
DE000A1DAHH0 Brenntag AG Germany 
DK0016188733 Nykredit Invest Balance Defensiv Denmark 
DK0016188816 Nykredit Invest Balance Moderat Denmark 
DK0060010841 Danske Inv Mix Akk Kl Denmark 
DK0060027142 ALK-Abello A/S Denmark 
DK0060580512 Nnit  Denmark 
DK0060642726 Maj Invest Value Aktier Akkumulerende Denmark 
DK0060738599 Demant Denmark 
DK0060946788 Ambu Denmark 
ES0171996095 Grifols, S.A. Spain 
ES0177542018 International Airlines Group Spain 
FI0009003727 Wärtsilä Oyj Abp Finland 
FI0009005870 Konecranes Abp Finland 
FI0009009377 Capman  Finland 
FI0009010854 Lassila & Tikanoja Oyj Finland 
FI0009800643 Yit Oyj Finland 
FI4000074984 Valmet Oyj Finland 
FI4000312251 Kojamo Oyj Finland 
FR0000050353 Lisi France 
FR0000066672 Gl Events France 
FR0000073298 Ipsos  France 
FR0010112524 Nexity  France 
FR0010221234 Eutelsat Communications France 
FR0010908533 Edenred France 
FR0011471135 Erytech Pharma France 
GB0000163088 Speedy Hire United Kingdom 
GB0000904986 Bellway United Kingdom 
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GB0002018363 Clarkson United Kingdom 
GB0002634946 Bae Systems United Kingdom 
GB0004082847 Standard Chartered United Kingdom 
GB0004161021 Hays Plc United Kingdom 
GB0004270301 Hill & Smith Hldgs United Kingdom 
GB0006043169 Morrison(Wm.)Supermarkets United Kingdom 
GB0006640972 4imprint Group Plc United Kingdom 
GB0008085614 Morgan Sindall Group Plc United Kingdom 
GB0009465807 Weir Group United Kingdom 
GB0009633180 Dechra Pharmaceuticals United Kingdom 
GB0033195214 Kingfisher United Kingdom 
GB00B05M6465 Numis Corp United Kingdom 
GB00B0HZPV38 Kaz Minerals Plc United Kingdom 
GB00B0LCW083 Hikma Pharmaceuticals United Kingdom 
GB00B17BBQ50 Investec Plc United Kingdom 
GB00B17WCR61 Connect Group Plc United Kingdom 
GB00B1JQDM80 Marston's Plc United Kingdom 
GB00B1V9NW54 Hilton Food Group Plc United Kingdom 
GB00B1ZBKY84 Moneysupermarket.Com Group Plc United Kingdom 
GB00B4Y7R145 Dixons Carphone Plc United Kingdom 
GB00B63H8491 Rolls-Royce Hldgs Plc United Kingdom 
GB00B7KR2P84 Easyjet United Kingdom 
GB00B8460Z43 Gcp Student Living United Kingdom 
GB00BF4HYT85 Bank Of Georgia Group Plc United Kingdom 
GB00BG0TPX62 Funding Circle Holdings Plc United Kingdom 
GB00BG12Y042 Energean Oil & Gas Plc  United Kingdom 
GB00BGLP8L22 Imi United Kingdom 
GB00BJGTLF51 Target Healthcare Reit Plc United Kingdom 
GB00BJTNFH41 Ao World Plc United Kingdom 
GB00BMSKPJ95 Aa United Kingdom 
GB00BYSS4K11 Georgia Healthcare Group Plc United Kingdom 
GB00BYYW3C20 Forterra Plc United Kingdom 
GB00BZ1G4322 Melrose Industries United Kingdom 
GB00BZ3CNK81 Torm Plc United Kingdom 
GB00BZ6STL67 Metro Bank United Kingdom 
GB00BZBX0P70 Gym Group Plc United Kingdom 
GG00B4L84979 Burford Capital Ltd United Kingdom 
IE00BD5B1Y92 Bank Of Cyprus Holdings PLC Ireland 
IE00BDQYWQ65 Ishares Ireland 
IM00B5VQMV65 Gvc Holdings Plc United Kingdom 
IT0000076502 Danieli & C. Officine Meccaniche Spa Italy 
IT0001447348 Mittel  Italy 
IT0003007728 Tod S Spa Italy 
IT0004053440 Datalogic  Italy 
IT0004056880 Amplifon Spa Italy 
IT0005331019 Carel Industries Italy 
JE00B2419D89 Breedon Group Plc United Kingdom 
JE00BG6L7297 Boohoo.Com Plc United Kingdom 
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LI0315487269 Vpb Vaduz  Liechtenstein 
LU0569974404 Aperam S.A Luxembourg  
NL0000339703 Beter Bed Holding Nv Netherlands 
NL0010733960 Lastminute.Com Netherlands 
NL0011832936 Cosmo Pharmaceuticals N.V. Netherlands 
NO0003053605 Storebrand Asa Norway 
NO0010593544 Insr Insurance Group Norway 
NO0010663669 Magseis Norway 
SE0000103699 Hexagon Aktiebolag Sweden 
SE0000105199 Haldex  Sweden 
SE0000163628 Elekta Ab (Publ) Sweden 
SE0000379497 Semcon  Sweden 
SE0000426546 New Wave Sweden 
SE0005468717 Ferronordic Machines Ab Sweden 
SE0006593919 Klovern  Sweden 
SE0009921588 Bilia Sweden 
SE0010468116 Arjo Ab B Sweden 
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This study investigates the effectiveness of lockdown and testing in 
curbing the transmission of Covid-19 infection. Using a combination 
of data from the European Centre for Disease Prevention, Roser et 
al. (2020) and Hale et al. (2020), we carried cross-country analysis 
covering 69 countries across the 5 continents. To take care of the fact 
that the number of Covid-19 cases strongly depend on its own lag 
values, we used two-step system GMM for the estimations. Unlike 
prior studies that measure lockdown in terms of a fixed intervention 
date, we relied on the stringency index from Hale et al. (2020) that 
accommodates for the gradual lockdown measures in different 
countries. We found that an exogenous lockdown significantly affects 
the number of confirmed cases after 7 days of its implementation and 
its lag effects are intact even after 21 days of its implementation. A 
one unit change in the lockdown index decreases the total number of 
confirmed cases by 0.19 percent. Testing has no significant effects for 
at least 14 days after its implementation. However, after 21 days of 
its implementation, its effects become significant with −0.03 to −0.05 
elasticity value.
1 Research Associate, School of Health Sciences, University of Manchester.
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1. Introduction
The Coronavirus (Covid-19) crisis has become a universal problem within a time span of three
months. To flatten the pandemic curve, many countries around the globe have intervened
with measures such as social distancing, school and business closures, restrictions on travel,
cancellations of sports and other public events and testing and contact tracing. This has led
to immediate economic hardships for both households and businesses and is likely to create
severe global economic downturn1. While some countries like China and South Korea are
on the falling tail of the curve, many countries are experiencing or still waiting for the peak
of the pandemic curve. Unfortunately, the problem is not over even for those experiencing
a fall in the cumulative Coronavirus cases let alone those who are still on the rising part of
the curve. After removal of the so-called lockdown, which cannot be sustained for a long
time given its economic costs, the cases may resurge. Moreover, it is not clear entirely that
those who are infected develop immunity from the virus. Thus, until a vaccine is developed
and is widely available, a clever mix of intervention measures would be needed to balance
the health and economic costs of the pandemic.
Therefore, examining the effectiveness of the different intervention measures in curbing trans-
mission of the virus will help not only in controlling the spread of the virus in the future
but in reducing the economic costs of future interventions. In this study, we estimate the
impacts of the government interventions in slowing down the spread of the virus for a sam-
ple of 69 countries. For each country, we consider the time period from the date of its first
positive Coronavirus case until 18 April, 2020. Given their different social and economic
implications, we divide the intervention measures into two groups: lockdown and testing
and contact tracing. Our lockdown measure includes school, workplace and public transport
closing, cancellation of public events, restrictions on internal and international travels, and
public information campaign. The data on the number of confirmed Coronavirus cases is
taken from the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control, while data on the total
tests conducted is taken from Roser et al. (2020). The other intervention measures data is
taken from Hale et al. (2020).
1Intentional Monetary Fund predicts the 2020 global GDP growth to be −3.0% due to what they call the
great lockdown and cumulative output loss of $9 trillion over 2020-21, far greater impacts as compared to
the global financial crisis of 2009 (IMF, 2020). For example, in the week ending on April 11, the number of
unemployment benefits claims was 5.25 million in the US. The previous week unemployment benefits claims
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The results from fixed and random effects estimations show that both lockdown and test-
ing play a significant role in slowing down the transmission of the virus. Both the policy
interventions have affected the total number of confirmed cases after 7 days of its implemen-
tation and their effects remain even after 21 days of the initial implementation. However,
fixed or random effects estimations may be biased due to the dynamic nature of the virus
spread. To overcome this problem, we run system GMM method of estimation. Under the
assumption that the policy interventions are exogenous, the results from the GMM show
that lockdown still affects the spread of the virus after 7 days of its implementation and its
effects are intact even after 21 days, though the latter effects are quite weaker. A one unit
change in the lockdown index decreases the total number of confirmed cases by 0.19 percent.
Under the GMM estimations, testing has no significant effects for at least 14 days after its
implementation. After 21 days, its effects become significant with −0.03 elasticity value.
Under the assumption of endogenous policy response, testing still has significant effects after
21 days, but the lockdown variable becomes insignificant. However, it is mainly due to the
low variation in the lockdown index.
Existing studies that try to estimate the effects of government intervention on the spread
of Covid-19 are Hartl et al. (2020) for Germany and Qiu et al. (2020) for China. In these
studies, intervention is measured in terms of a fixed intervention date and the pre and
post intervention date growths of the confirmed cases are compared. However, intervention
measures are introduced gradually in almost all the countries and deciding a fixed date of
intervention is quite arbitrary. Furthermore, the Covid-19 cases follow a strong dynamics; the
curve first increases exponentially with time, flattens and then starts falling rapidly. Hartl
et al. (2020) fail to include such dynamics in their study. On the other hand, the intervention
measures in China are deemed extreme in many European countries and US. The existing
study is based on a rich panel dataset of 69 countries and a number of intervention measures,
besides extending the study period to 18 April, 2020. Moreover, the panel nature of the study
allows us to control for the country fixed effects and problems of endogeneity.
Rest of the study is organised as follow. Section 2 discusses data construction and descriptive
statistics. Section 3 presents the estimation strategy. Section 4 presents results and section
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2. Data and Summary Statistics
2.1. Data Sources and Lockdown Index. In this subsection, we discuss data sources and
the construction of the lockdown index. The data for the study is taken from three different
sources. The data on the number of confirmed cases is available from different sources such as
Johns Hopkins University, the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control, etc. We
collected this data from the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control and cross
checked against other sources to find it consistent. Data on the number of tests conducted is
taken from Our World in Data project, gathered by Roser et al. (2020). They have gathered
this data from the national official sources for each country2. One limitation of this data is
that it is not clear for some countries whether the number of tests show the total number
of tests or total number of people tested, as some people may be tested more than once.
However, given that the success to find and trace infected people depends on the number of
tests conducted, it is important to consider this variable. Moreover, this issue is unlikely to
affect our findings in any significant way.
The data on the lockdown measures is taken from the ‘Oxford Covid-19 Government Re-
sponse Tracker’ project gathered by Hale et al. (2020). Based on the information Oxford
students and staff collected from around the globe, they have constructed ordinal measures
on the school, workplace and public transport closing, cancellation of public events, restric-
tions on internal and international travels, public information campaign, testing, contact
tracing, emergency investment in health care and vaccine for all the countries. They have
also included data on the monetary and fiscal measures as a response to the Covid-19.
Out of these variables, we have picked the first seven measures, i.e. the school, workplace
and public transport closing, cancellation of public events, restrictions on internal and in-
ternational travels and public information campaign and call it lockdown. It is because
these measures involve restricting the movement of all or a large proportion of people and
goods. Implementing these measures may involve no or little initial costs for the govern-
ments but involve huge socio-economic costs in the form of output and employment losses,
loss in government tax revenues and possible health costs for the public due to forced stay
at home obligations3. On the other hand, testing and contact tracing involve initial costs for
the government but has likely far less economic impacts as compared to the lockdown. For
2This data and the details of the national resources is available from OurWorldInData.org/covid-testing.
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example, many think that the success of South Korea in curbing the virus relatively better
is due to their aggressive testing and contact tracing. Thus, our main focus is to investigate
the effectiveness of lockdown versus testing in curbing the transmission of Covid-19.
All the sub-measures of lockdown are constructed with a value of 0 means no measure in
place and 2, for some measures 3, means strict measure in place. Additionally, for all the
measures except international travel, an additional binary variable is defined with a value
of 0 means that the measure is in place in a specific geographic area and 1 means that the
measure covers the whole country. Hale et al. (2020) have used the above seven measures
to construct what they call government response stringency index, and we call it lockdown.
The index is constructed as follow. Suppose that each of the lockdown measure is denoted
by Xj and its generality by Gj ∈ {0, 1}. Suppose that Xj can take a value ranging from 0 to
Nj. Then, the measures other than the international travel can be converted into an index








7 . To be consistent with other possible studies on this data we use this index as
it is in the analysis.
2.2. Descriptive Statistics. In this subsection, we present the summary statistics of coun-
tries analysed in our study. We also present daily and weekly distributions of the total con-
firmed cases, lockdown index and the total number of tests conducted. Likewise, we present
the geographical visualisation of our key variables.
As stated in the introduction, for each country, we consider the time period from the date
of its first positive Coronavirus case until 18 April, 2020. Moreover, we exclude countries
that do not have data on testing in our analysis. Our source data has obseravtions for 135
countries. Our data cleaning process resulted in 69 countries across the 5 continents with
observations for a maximum time period between February 21, 2020 and April 18, 2020.
Table 4 in the appendix, shows the summary of countries for our analysis by continents.
Europe makes up about 39% of countries and about 43% of observations in our sample.
Countries from the Asian continent make up 22.5%, about 21% from the Americas while
Africa and the Oceania make up about 14% of the remaining sample in our data.
Using the number of confirmed cases, we rank countries by calculating the average number
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and the least 10 affected countries. Table 1, shows that the US has the highest number of
confirmed cases, while Nepal has the lowest prevalence ranking. European countries make
up 7 out of the 10 top affected countries with no country from Europe in the low 10 countries
with prevalence.










6 Switzerland El Salvador




Notes:Data sourced from the European Centre for Disease Preven-
tion and Control, Roser et al. (2020) and Hale et al. (2020). We
exclude countries with no testing and those with no observations
for total confirmed cases. Column 2 = Top 10 countries in terms
of prevalence ranking. Column 3 = Least 10 countries in terms of
prevalence ranking. We computed our ranking using average number
of confirmed cased daily over the period of data collected.
Utilising averages of countries across weeks, Table 5 in the appendix, enables us to observe
the trends of total cases, stringency of lockdown and testing across the globe. Intervention
by countries, measured by lockdown and testing, show increasing trends as number of the
total confirmed cases increases. Total cases for the first 6 weeks is 33% of the cases recorded
in only the week 7, while total prevalence for the first 7 weeks is about 58% of cases recorded
only in the 8th week. The spike continues by the 11th week, average prevalence is about 132%
of cumulative cases for previous 10 weeks.
In the below figures we plot the three key variable of our study, namely total confirmed
cases, lockdown index and total tests conducted. Figure 1, shows the trend of cases. Figure
1(a), shows the daily trend of cases. The image confirms the upward trend in the number
of confirmed cases. Both sub-figures (b) and (c) of Figure 1, show a surge in cases in week
9 of our data. This surge translates to 99% increase against 37% increase the previous
week. The trend shows 175% increase in cases between week 9 and 10, in Table 5. Similar
review of intervention (measured by lockdown index) in Figure 2, shows that intervention was
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points (71.50) in Table 5 . Figure 2(c), shows that intervention response was not proportional
































































































































Figure 2. Plots of lockdown Index
Column 4 of Table 5 and Figures 3(a, b and c), further confirm that testing also did not
record upward surge until week 9 of our series when it recorded about 62% increase compared
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The overall scenario is presented in geographical visualisation of prevalence, lockdown and
tests for the period under study in Figure 4. The United States has the highest density
while Europe has high cluster of countries (judging from the country-name text) in the
prevalence map. Africa and Oceania seem under-represented but the map reflects the actual
prevalence level across continents. Comparing prevalence and lockdown, the United States
and Australia seemed to have lighter density in terms of lockdown when compared with
their respective prevalence density. Countries in Africa and Asia seemed to have stronger
lockdown density than prevalence density in their respective countries while Canada seemed
to have proportionate density in prevalence and in lockdown. In terms of testing, the United
States and Canada seemed to be matching the density of prevalence while Russia seemed to








































































































































































































































Figure 4. Geographical Visualisation of Prevalence, Lockdown and Tests
3. Model and Estimation Strategy
To better understand the rationale behind the econometric specification, we briefly discuss
the epidemiological model of a contagious disease. Under the simplifying assumptions of
homogenous population and that those who have been previously infected are no longer
susceptible, the simple epidemiological SIR model (Kermack and McKendrick, 1927; Allen,
2017) gives the following contagion dynamics
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where St is the number of susceptible, It is the number of infected, Rt is the number of
recovered, and Mt is the total population at time t. The coefficient β is the contact or
transmission rate and γ is the recovery rate.
This is a simplest possible version of contagion dynamics but convey an important message.
That is, an important determinant of the infection rate is its own lag values. According to
Equation (2), the infection will increase faster when the susceptible population is high, and
the infected population has reached a certain threshold. Thus, in a regression analysis, not
including lag(s) of the number of the infections among the explanatory variables can lead to
misleading results. Instead of estimating the above structural model as in the epidemiological
studies, we estimate a reduced form econometric model to identify the effects of the policy
intervention on the number of confirmed cases. This is because we are interested in measuring
the total effects of the policy intervention on the number of confirmed cases instead of
studying the underlying structural transmission mechanisms. To this end, since total cases
are less than 1% or 0.1% of the population in most of the countries and there is no evidence
that those recovered are immune to the virus, therefore, the ratio St
Mt
is stable over time and
effectively St
Mt
≡ 1. Thus, Equation (2) can be written as ∆It = ΦIt−1, where Φ = β−γ. Now
policy intervention can change Equation (2) as ∆It = Φθt−qIt−1, where θt−q ∈ (0, 1] is the
policy parameter4. We specify θt = 1TteLt to keep it in between zero and one
5. Thus, taking
log in discrete time and including international transmission factor, we can get a simple log
linearised model as bellow
(4)





µit = αi + εit,
Where lnIit denotes natural log of the total number of cases in country i at time t, Lit−q
denotes the severity of the lockdown in country i at time period t − q, Tit−q denotes the





number of cases in all the countries except country i, ai denotes time invariant country
characteristics and εit is the random error term. According to this specification, the current
4Government intervention can affect both the transmission and recovery rates through distancing and in-
vestment in health facilities for example.
5Where Tt and Lt are testing and lockdown, respectively, as defined in the next paragraph. Since each
country data begins with the first reported case in our sample, this implies that Tt ≥ 1 as the first case
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number of infections depend on the lag infections, status of government policy interventions,
the average number of cases in other countries and fixed country characteristics like location,
population density, ageing population etc. Since time span of the study is short, we expect
ai to capture many country characteristics. Also this log linear specification is consistent
with other studies in this area (Qiu et al., 2020).
The incubation period of Coronavirus varies greatly from person to person but many studies
seem to suggest a mean incubation period between 5-6 days. For example, Lauer et al. (2020)
show that the median incubation period of Coronavirus is 5.1 days, based on 181 cases. The
mean incubation period is 5.2 days in Li et al. (2020) covering 425 cases. Similarly, WHO
(2020) suggests a mean incubation period of 5-6 days. Furthermore, the average infectious
period is found to be 1.4 days (Wu et al., 2020). Thus, one must wait for at least one week
to see the effects of policy interventions. Given this, we take a q value of at least 7. We then
check for further lags, particularly the effects of the policy interventions at the end of second
and third weeks once it is implemented.
In Equation (4), even if the policy variables are uncorrelated with ai and εit, lnIit−1 is
correlated with ai since lnIit−1 contains ai for all t. This means that lnIit−1 is correlated
with µit. This implies that ordinary least square gives biased and inconsistent results. For
a fixed time span, the fixed effects estimator is also biased and inconsistent as N increases
(Nickell, 1981; Bond, 2002; Phillips and Sul, 2003). To solve this problem the standard
approach is the Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) approaches of Arellano and Bond
(1991) and Blundell and Bond (1998). The Arellano and Bond (1991) difference GMM uses
first difference of Equation (4) to eliminate the fixed effects ai as
(5) ∆lnIit = ∆lnIit−1 −∆Lit−q −∆lnTit−q + ∆lnĪjt−q + ∆εit.
If εit is serially uncorrelated, then E(lnIit−2,∆εit) = 0. This ensures that lnIit−2 and earlier
values can be used as instruments for ∆lnIit−1. The problem with the difference GMM is
that the lagged levels of regressors would be weak instruments for the regressors in first
differences if a variable has high degree of persistent, as is the lockdown index in our case.
The problem of weak instruments can lead to a bias in finite samples. The system GMM
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equation in the levels of the variables. The variables in the level equation are instrumented
with their first differences. This leads to a more efficient estimation than the difference
GMM (Baltagi, 2008). On the other hand, the week point of the system GMM is that it uses
too many instruments which can reduce the power of the Hansen test, leading to frequent
acceptance of the null hypothesis of instruments validity. Keeping this, we rely on as few
instruments as possible and collapse the instruments matrix by combining the instruments
(Roodman, 2009). Moreover, in all the GMM estimations, we use the two-step estimator to
correct for the finite sample standard error (Windmeijer, 2005). The results are presented
in the next section.
4. Results and Discussion
For comparison purpose, we present the estimation results from fixed effects, random effects
and GMM estimations. The most reliable approach for our econometric specification is the
one recommended by Blundell and Bond (2000). Thus, we will mostly rely on the results
from the system GMM estimations. Table 2 reports the estimation results of Equation
(4) from fixed effects, random effects methods. After controlling for time-invariant country
characteristics and time effects common to all countries, and by including only lag of total
confirmed cases, one can see from Column 1 that a one percent increase in new infections
today leads to 0.94 percentage point more cases the next day. This implies that lag infec-
tions are an important predictor of the current cases of Coronavirus as is well known from
the epidemiological models. Adding lag 7 of the lockdown index as an additional variable
increases the coefficient on the lag total cases even further as is shown in Column 2. As
expected, the coefficient on the lag lockdown is negative and highly significant. It implies
that a 1 unit increase in the lockdown index will decrease the total infection by 0.14 percent
after 7 days.
When the 7th lag of mean number of confirmed cases in the other countries is added into the
regression, the other coefficients are not affected by significant amount. The coefficient of
the lag mean itself is very high and statistically significant. However, in later specifications
it becomes insignificant. When the 7th lag of the total number of tests conducted is added in
Column 4, the coefficient of the lag total confirmed cases goes above one and the coefficient
of the lag of mean cases in the other countries becomes insignificant at the 5% level of
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Table 2. Fixed/Random Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Variables FE FE FE FE RE FE FE
lnIit−1 0.9427*** 0.9884*** 0.9956*** 1.0016*** 1.0106*** 1.0054*** 0.9931***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Lit−7 -0.0014*** -0.0015*** -0.0013*** -0.0013***
(0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.000)
















Constant -0.0968** 0.0544* -19.9689** -15.3983* -14.5541* 0.2030* -0.0059
(0.027) (0.058) (0.041) (0.075) (0.064) (0.061) (0.951)
Observations 2,063 1,523 1,523 1,523 1,523 1,244 927
R-squared 0.996 0.997 0.998 0.998 0.997 0.997
Number of country 64 53 53 53 53 52 48
Time dummies yes yes yes yes yes no no
Notes: *** Significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%. We report heteroskedasticity robust
p−values in parentheses. Dependent variable is natural log of total cases lnIit, Lit−q is lag of lockdown index,
lnTit−q is log of total tests at a specific lag and lnĪjt−q is log of average cases in other countries at a given lag.
Data sourced from the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control, Roser et al. (2020) and Hale et al.
(2020). Columns 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 &7 are fixed effects estimates. Column 5 is random effects estimates. The estimated
coefficients of the full set of day’s effects are not reported for the sake of brevity and are available from the authors
upon request.
implies that a 1 percent increase in the number of total tests will decrease the total infection
by 0.024 percentage points after 7 days. Estimation with random effects method in Column
5 brings very little difference in the coefficients and its significance as compared to the fixed
effects estimations.
Next, when we include 14th lags of the lockdown and total testing into the regression instead
of the 7th lags, the coefficient of the lockdown became smaller and insignificant in the presence
of time dummies, and the coefficient of the total tests is still significant. However, the time
dummies were highly insignificant in that specification6. With no time dummies in Column
(6), the coefficients of both the lockdown and total testing are exactly the same as under the
7th lags and are significant. Upon including 21st lags, the only difference is that the coefficient
of the lockdown becomes smaller and the coefficient of the mean number of confirmed cases
smaller but now significant. However, as mentioned earlier, the results in Table 2 carry
potential bias due to the presence of the lag dependent variable in the regression. To address
this problem, we have carried estimations with system GMM estimator. Our conclusion is
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based on the GMM results, as the lag dependent variable is highly significant in all the above
estimations.
The results from system GMM estimations are presented in Tables 3 and 6. Table 3 presents
results with only lag dependent variable treated as endogenous7. First of all, note that the
Arellano-Bond test rejects the null of serial correlation in AR(1). This implies that the
condition E(lnIit−2,∆εit) = 0 is satisfied. Next, both Hansen and Sargan tests cannot reject
the null of instruments validity in Column 1. From Column 1, One can see that now a
one percent increase in new infections today leads to 1.06 percentage points more cases the
next day. Now the coefficient on the lag 7 of the lockdown is negative and significant at
10% level of significance only. It implies that a 1 unit increase in the lockdown index will
decrease the total infections by 0.19 percent after 7 days. The coefficient of the lag 7 of
total tests is negative, high as compared to earlier but statistically insignificant. Similarly,
the the coefficient of the mean number in the other countries at lag 7 is now negative and
significant. This last result is unexpected.
Table 3. System GMM with Exogenous Policy Intervention
(1) (2) (3)
Variables 1-Week 2-Weeks 3-Weeks
(1) (2) (3)
Variables 1-Week 2-Weeks 3-Weeks




















Constant 0.6599*** 0.3349*** 104.6265***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Time trend no no yes
Observations 1,523 1,244 927
Number of country 53 52 48
AR(1) p-value 0.00282 0.00212 0.0529
AR(1) p-value 0.253 0.673 0.621
Hansen test p-value 0.901 0.545 0.771
Sargan test p-value 0.895 0.542 0.378
Notes: *** Significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%. We report
p−values robust to heteroskedasticity in parentheses. Dependent variable is natural log
of total cases lnIit, Lit−q is lag of lockdown index, lnTit−q is log of total tests at a specific
lag and lnĪjt−q is log of average cases in other countries at a given lag.
GMM-type instruments in Columns 1-3: lag2-lag4 of lnIit collapsed.
Data sourced from the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control, Roser et al.
(2020) and Hale et al. (2020).
7For the discussion of whether the policy variables should be treated exogenous, see the discussion at the
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Column 2 reports results at the 14th lags of the exogenous variables. Once again all the
specification tests are satisfied. Now, the coefficient of the lockdown is relatively small but
highly significant. The coefficient of the lag total tests is exactly the same as under fixed
effects estimation but still statistically insignificant. The coefficient of the mean number in
the other countries now becomes insignificant. At the 21st lag in Column 3, all the variables
becomes statistically and economically significant and take expected signs. The coefficient
on the lag 21 of the lockdown is negative and significant at 5% level of significance. It
implies that a 1 unit increase in the lockdown index will decrease the total infections by 0.05
percent after 21 days. The coefficient of the total tests at lag 21 is negative and statistically
significant. This implies that a 1 percent increase in the number of total tests will decrease
the total infection by 0.03 percentage points after 21 days. Similarly, the coefficient of the
mean number in the other countries at lag 21 is now positive and significant.
If the lags of policy interventions are endogenous, then treating it exogenous in the estimation
can create biased results (the bias can be upward or downward). We have checked for such an
endogeneity and the results are reported in Table 6 in the appendix. Now with lags 7 and 14,
only the lag dependent variable is high in magnitude and statistically significant. At the 21st
lag, only the coefficient of the lockdown is statistically insignificant. The coefficient of the
total tests at lag 21 is negative and statistically significant. It implies that a 1 percent increase
in the number of total tests will decrease the total infection by 0.05 percentage points after
21 days. Now the mean number of cases in the other countries have positive and significant
effects on the total confirmed cases in the country in question. Though insignificant, the
coefficient of lockdown is on average higher under the endogenous treatment.
Thus, with the assumption that the lags policy variables are exogenous, lockdown starts
affecting the transmission after 7 days of its implementation and its effects are intact even
after 21 lags. The testing variable effects the transmission with quite delay, it cannot affect
the transmission significantly for at least after 14 days of its implementation. The main
difference under the assumption of endogenous policy changes is in the significance of the
lockdown. The lockdown’s coefficient is mostly insignificant under the assumption of endoge-
nous policy changes. However, this seems to be due to the fact that the lockdown index has
very little variation over time for many countries. With lags and differencing, it losses most
of its variation for many countries, and hence its significance. Moreover, the assumption of
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most of the time. Given this, the other papers that try to estimate the effects of lockdown
on the Covid-19 transmission take the policy variable exogenous (Hartl et al., 2020; Qiu
et al., 2020). Additionally, we include policy variable with a lag of at least 7 days. This also
decreases the possibility of endogeneity. Given that endogenous treatment of testing does
not change its significance further strengthens our belief about this, as testing variable has
proper variation and instrumentation of it does not create any variation issue in the case of
this variable. Finally, though significant, the effects of both the policy variables are small in
magnitude.
5. Conclusion
The realisation that the panacea for the COVID-19 epidemic may be remote necessitates the
need, to find the optimal blend of policy interventions that could minimise costs of resulting
economic disruptions. Though the epidemic remains a worldwide topical issue, analysts and
policy makers are constrained by insufficient data to undertake robust analysis as it is a new
emergence. Inaction in an anticipation of herds immunity is considered costly, in terms of
likely loss of lives and subsequent effects on the labour market and health systems. Likewise,
a stringent policy combining closing of schools and workplaces, cancelling of public events,
closing public transports, commencing public campaign, restricting internal movement and
controlling international travels is also considered economically costly. Thus, the intervention
policy must put measures in place that are both effective in curbing the transmission of the
virus and create least possible economic damage.
Our analysis confirms that a marginal increase in the stringency index (lockdown) reduces
the number of confirmed Coronavirus cases by 0.19 percentage points after one week of its
implementation. We do not find any evidence that testing can affect the spread of the virus
during the first two weeks. Still, it has significant effects in reducing the virus spread at the
end of the third week of its implementation. Though both the policies are effective, their
impact is small in magnitude. The main factor behind the number of the confirmed cases
of virus is its own past values as predicted by the SIR model of epidemiology. While due
caution is required in generalising the conclusion from any analysis, as the total number
of confirmed cases depends on the number of tests conducted, our results indicate that for
getting immediate results lockdown is relatively more effective in terms of controlling the
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curbing the spread of the virus. Thus, testing and contact tracing can prove an effective tool
in controlling the re-emergence of the pandemic.
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APPENDIX A






Africa 8 Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria 175
Senegal, South Africa, Tunisia, Uganda
Americas 15 Argentina, Bolivia, Canada, Chile 430
Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Ecuador
El Salvador, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay
Peru, United States, Uruguay
Asia 16 Bahrain, Bangladesh, India, Indonesia 598
Israel, Japan, Malaysia, Nepal, Pakistan
Philippines, Singapore, South Korea
Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey, Vietnam
Europe 28 Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic Denmark 986
Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece
Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway
Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Serbia
Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland
United Kingdom
Oceania 2 Australia, New Zealand 110
Notes: Data sourced from the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control, Roser et al. (2020) and Hale et al. (2020).
We exclude countries with no testing record and those with no observations for the total confirmed cases. Column 4 = Total
number of observations for respective continents measured daily for each country.






1 2.20 14.29 31.40
2 5.63 16.12 167.06
3 11.78 28.57 775.74
4 15.88 28.57 2,793.23
5 68.81 31.11 5,092.64
6 317.50 31.16 9,937.68
7 730.73 30.07 17,712.21
8 1,002.42 48.05 19,675.54
9 1,992.78 71.50 31,809.91
10 5,481.90 81.26 61,947.59
11 10,939.69 84.47 104,207.59
12 17,485.92 85.90 158,621.26
13 22,627.92 88.12 212,712.75
Notes: Data sourced from the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control,
Roser et al. (2020) and Hale et al. (2020). We exclude countries with no testing record
and those with no observations for total confirmed cases. Column 2 = Average of
total confirmed cases in all countries in our sample on weekly basis. Column 3 =
Average of lockdown index (measured in percentage) in all countries in our sample
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Table 6. System GMM with Endogenous Policy Intervention
(1) (2) (3)
Variables 1-Week 2-Weeks 3-Weeks




















Constant -107.8778 0.0070 0.1858
(0.528) (0.979) (0.137)
Time trend yes no no
Observations 1,523 1,244 927
Number of country 53 52 48
AR(1) p-value 0.00591 0.0107 0.0538
AR(2) p-value 0.249 0.578 0.576
Hansen test p-value 0.626 0.177 0.663
Sargan test p-value 0.374 0.126 0.836
Notes: *** Significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%. We report
p-values robust to heteroskedasticity in parentheses. Dependent variable is natural
log of total cases lnIit, Lit−q is lag of lockdown index, lnTit−q is log of total tests at
a specific lag and lnĪjt−q is log of average cases in other countries at a given lag.
GMM-type instruments in Column 1: lag2-lag4 of lnIit collapsed and lag1-lag5 of
Lit−7 & lnTit−7 collapsed,
GMM-type instruments in Column 2: lag2-lag4 of lnIit collapsed and lag1-lag2 of
Lit−14 & lnTit−14 collapsed,
GMM-type instruments in Column 3: lag2-lag5 of lnIit collapsed and lag1 of Lit−21
& lnTit−21 collapsed.
Data sourced from the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control, Roser
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The paper uses Google mobility data to identify the determinants of 
social distancing during the 2020 COVID-19 outbreak. We find for 
the U.S. that much of the decrease in mobility is voluntary driven by 
the number of COVID-19 cases and proxying for greater awareness of 
risk.  Non-Pharmaceutical Interventions (NPI) such as closing non-
essential business, sheltering in place, school closings are also effective, 
although with a total contribution dwarfed by the voluntary. This 
suggests that much social distancing will happen regardless of the 
presence of NPIs and that restrictions may often function more like 
a coordinating device among increasingly predisposed individuals 
than repressive measures per se. These results are consistent across 
countries income groups with only the poorest (LICs) showing 
limited effect of NPIs , and no voluntary component, consistent with 
resistance to abandon sources of livelihood. We also confirm the direct 
impact of the voluntary component on economic activity by showing 
that the majority of the fall in restaurant reservations in the U.S., 
and movie spending in Sweden occurred before the imposition of any 
NPIs.  Widespread  voluntary de-mobilization implies that releasing 
constraints may not yield a V shaped recovery if the reduction in 
COVID risk not credible.
1 The opinions are those of the authors and do not represent the official position of the World Bank. Our thanks 
to Richard Baldwin, Robert Beyer, Nick Bloom, Xavi Cirera, Aart Kraay, Tito Cordella, Pravin Krishna, Norman 
Loayza, Cedric Okou, Cevdet Cagdas Unal, and Shu Yu for excellent comments.
2 Chief Economist, Equitable Growth, Finance, and Institutions, The World Bank.
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I. Introduction 
Understanding the determinants of social distancing is central to addressing both the medical and economic 
aspects of COVID-19. 4   On the one hand, reducing interactions among people is critical to reducing 
propagation and a variety of Non-Pharmaceutical Interventions NPIs, such as closure of non-essential 
businesses, stay at home orders, or school closings have been put in place to this end, with some success.5  
While there is controversy around whether this should be the goal in developing countries as well (Barnett-
Howell and Mobarak 2020, Loayza 2020), there is also concern about whether such measures  would work:   
government capabilities to enforce may be weaker, and resistance may be higher since the trade-off with 
livelihood is harsher.  At the other extreme of the cycle - where the debate is when to loosen NPIs as it is in 
several advance countries – preliminary evidence from Wuhan suggests that when opened, mobility and 
economic activity may not respond quickly. 6 Similarly, recent polls suggesting that 58% of Americans are 
concerned that restrictions will be lifted too soon raise the question of how much of an impact opening will 
have in practice and hence the shape of the recovery, whether V or U.7   
This paper uses Google mobility data to explore which factors are proving important during the 2020 Covid-
19 outbreak in the U.S. and globally.   In all but the poorest countries, it confirms that NPIs can be effective, 
but that voluntary de-mobilization on the part of the population is much more important, driven by fear or 
perhaps a sense of social responsibility.  This suggests that much social distancing will happen regardless of the 
presence of restrictions and suggests that NPIs may often function more like a coordinating device among 
increasingly predisposed individuals than repressive measures per se. We also confirm a more direct link of this 
voluntary effect using data on restaurant reservations in the U.S.  and movie releases and revenues in Sweden 
and show that, these, too, experience most of their fall before any imposition of NPIs.  Overall, the evidence 
suggests that moves to unfreeze the economy will fail unless there is confidence that, in fact, the risk has passed.  
4
 There are three margins upon which societies can work to reduce the death toll.  1.  Detect and quarantine so the disease 
never gets a foothold.  2.  Once established, reduce social mobility to mitigate the spread (reduce the R factor.)  3. Increase 
the capability to treat the sick. On the third, Favero (2020) notes that limitations on ICU beds led to the extremely high 
death rate in Lombardy.  In practice, developing countries have far less capability to treat- 10 African countries have no 
respirators.https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/18/world/africa/africa-coronavirus-
ventilators.html?referringSource=articleShare If northern Italy couldn’t ramp up sufficiently enough along this dimension, 
it is highly unlikely that most poor countries can. On the first, many advanced countries have missed the window to detect 
and quarantine and again, this may be more challenging in the developing world.  
5 See Chen and Qiu (2020), Gonzalez-Eira and Niepelt (2020) for conceptual treatments of optimal shut down policies. 
Hartl et al (2020) find for Germany that growth rates of Covid-19 cases fell 50% as a result of German restrictions to shut 
down schools, stadiums and eventually many restaurants and shops. See Baldwin and Weder de Mauro (2020) for a 
compilation of recent thinking on Covid Economics. 
6 https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-04-15/wuhan-s-life-after-lockdown-isn-t-business-as-usual? 
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Several recent papers suggest that NPIs have had an impact in the US.  Engle at al. (2020) use daily average 
changes in distance traveled in every U.S. county as a proxy for reduction in exposure to COVID-19 and find 
that an official stay-at-home restriction order corresponds to reducing mobility by 7.87%. Brzezinski et al 
(2020), also using cell phone data, find that a lockdown increases the percentage of people who stay at home 
by 8% across US counties. Painter and Qiu (2020) show that the introduction of shelter-in-place policies is 
associated with a 5.1 percentage point increase in the probability of staying home (see also Andersen (2020)). 
However, voluntary de-mobilizing behavior that intensifies with prevalence of the disease is also an important 
driver and affects the effectiveness of official measures.  Auld (2006), for example finds that during the Aids 
epidemic, an average respondent decreased risky behavior by about 5% in response to a 10% increase in Aids 
prevalence. Further, the 1918 Spanish Flu epidemic suggests that the predisposition of the population to 
demobilize drove both the incidence of official restrictions and their effectiveness. On the one hand, as 
Crosby(2003) details, that restrictions were binding is revealed by the fact that in San Francisco “The places of 
amusement opened first, to huge crowds starved for entertainment (p. 99)” and in Philadelphia “The long thirst 
was over, and arrests on drunken and disorderly charges bounded back up to and beyond normal levels” (p. 
85).  However, it is also true that while the San Francisco Department of Health could request that people to 
smother coughs and sneezes, only when enough fatalities were registered were “San Franciscans…scared 
enough to accept drastic measures to control the epidemic” (p.95)—and ex post, “Fear had been the enforcer 
of the Board of Health’s policies.”(p. 108) not the authorities themselves.  When schools in San Francisco were 
opened, many parents kept their children home out of continuing fear.  This resonates with the reports from 
Wuhan today of the anemic rebounding of the small restaurant sector when restrictions were released.  
Viewed through this lens, restrictions may often function more like a coordinating device among increasingly 
predisposed individuals than repressive measure- if we’re all working from home, then I won’t be viewed badly 
if I do;  whether schools are on line or in person requires a decision that individual concerned parents cannot 
effect. This, in turn, raises the question of the whether the impact of lock-down measures per se and their 
subsequent removal is overstated.    
II. Data 
Mobility and Economic Activity: Using data from the Maps application on smartphones, Google 
generates COVID-19 Community Mobility Reports8 that use aggregated, anonymized data to construct an 
index of how visits and length of stay at different places change compared to a baseline.  They can then follow 
movement trends over time by geography, and across different high-level categories of places such as 
workplaces, retail and recreation, groceries and pharmacies, parks, transit stations, and residential. These 
measures are explicitly considered proxies for social distancing and we focus on the first, workplace related 
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mobility, as most relevant to economic activity and most prominent in the policy debate.  The reports consist 
of per country downloads (with 131 countries covered initially), further broken down into regions/counties in 
some cases.  Because location accuracy and the understanding of categorized places varies from region to 
region, Google does not recommend using this data to compare changes across countries or regions with 
different characteristics. To address this, our empirics rely only on within area variation across time and 
reporting or categorization differences are absorbed in included fixed effects.  
This measure is limited by the degree to which coverage of smart phones offers a representative sample of the 
population.  As Annex 1 shows, few developing countries show coverage of smart phones above 50% and 
Ethiopia, Nigeria, Sudan, Bangladesh, Pakistan hold up the bottom of the top 50 countries with rates under 
20% of coverage. This said, several developing countries also have reasonable coverage when we adjust for the 
share of adults in the population: UK 100%, Sweden: 96%, US 95%, Italy 67%, Japan 63%, Brazil 52%, South 
Africa 50%.  While clearly not representative, the differences between Italy and Japan on the one hand and 
Brazil and South Africa on the other are not so large as to justifying throwing out the possible information on 
how developing countries may differ. Further, while we may miss the mobility of for instance, micro firm 
owners without smartphones, many of their customers will have them and the shutting down of the firm will 
be partially registered.  
Data on restaurant reservations in the US is taken from OpenTable.9 Movie release and theater revenue data 
for Sweden from International Movie Database.10 
Covid-19 Cases: Though there may be several mechanisms through which cases translate into lower mobility, 
we interpret this as a signal to individuals about the likelihood of a serious negative health outcome.  National 
cases can inform about the overall evolution of the disease, while local numbers fine tune the proximate threat.  
We standardize by the corresponding population in the figures.  In some regressions, we can expand the sample 
by using log (cases) and the population scaling is absorbed in the corresponding fixed effect. Global data are 
drawn from the Johns Hopkins Coronavirus Resource Center. Country specific regional data comes from 
national sources:  US:  Johns Hopkins Coronavirus Resource Center; Brazil, Italy, Japan, South Africa, Sweden, 
UK from national sources (see Annex II).  
Non-Pharmaceutical Interventions (NPIs):  We use mandatory closures of non-essential business as both 
most relevant to the issue of economic mobility as figuring most prominently in the policy debate.  State level 
data for the US are collected from Raifman et al (2020) and NPIs enter as indicator variables taking a value of 
1 if a given NPI is implemented and 0 otherwise.  Globally, we employ information on national NPIs available 
9   www.opentable.com 
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from the Blavatnik School of Government at Oxford University. For select countries for which we employ 
subnational mobility data to explore the impact of local case incidence, we use national data on the nationally 
implemented NPIs as controls. The exception is Brazil for which NPIs are established by states, and we collect 
data at that level. 
III. Results: United States 
Figure 1 plots the level of mobility against the log of the number of cases per capita by US state for the US. It 
further divides the sample by whether the states are covered by restrictions on non-essential businesses (red) 
or not (blue). Two drivers appear as potentially important.  First, the data are consistent with restrictions leading 
to lower levels of mobility.  However, more strikingly, there is a clear downward sloping relationship between 
reported cases and mobility independent of such restrictions.  
Figure 1: Mobility, COVID Cases and Official Restrictions, United States 
 
Notes: Workplace mobility is Google measure of work-related mobility index. See text for sources. 
Table 1 more formally tests this relationship by estimating 
𝑀𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0+𝛽1𝐶𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽2 𝐴𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝐶𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑠𝑡−1 + 𝛽3  𝑁𝑃𝐼𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝑣𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡        (1) 
Where mobility is the Google measure, Cases is the log incidence, Aggregate Cases is the national analogue, 
NPI are Non-pharmaceutical intervention(s), and ui are subnational (state) fixed effects that also effectively put 
cases in per capita terms, and vt, time fixed effects.   There are clear issues of bi-directional causality here.  
Lower mobility, in theory, lowers the number of cases and may also possibly affect the likelihood of imposing 
restrictions.  This should induce a downward bias to both coefficients on the right-hand side and our results 
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instrument which would not be feasible in most, but we lag both explanatory variables 1 period.  The results 
change modestly in magnitude, with even more lags, but the overall patterns remain consistent.  
Table 1: Mobility, COVID Cases and NPIs, United States  
      (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6) 
      Workplace    Workplace    Workplace    Workplace    Residential    Residential 
Close N.E. business -4.373*** -5.281*** -2.071 -3.075*** 2.047*** 0.830* 
  (1.235) (0.689) (2.006) (1.051) (0.356) (0.463) 
Log cases  -4.502*** -1.291*** -2.904*** -1.284*** 0.551*** 0.577*** 
  (1.153) (0.437) (0.915) (0.385) (0.185) (0.161) 
Log national cases -2.671** -3.038*** -2.193** -2.837*** 0.957*** 0.875*** 
  (1.063) (0.425) (0.860) (0.383) (0.225) (0.177) 










Stay home/SIP    -3.289 -3.855***  2.144*** 
   (2.630) (1.134)  (0.485) 
Constant 24.030*** 10.503*** 18.981*** 9.574*** -4.472*** -3.986*** 
  (5.191) (1.756) (4.526) (1.509) (1.250) (0.968) 
Time FE No Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Day of the week FE Yes No Yes No No No 
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
# of States 51 51 51 51 51 51 
Obs. 1189 1189 1189 1189 1189 1189 
R-squared 0.836 0.963 0.875 0.964 0.956 0.959 
  
Notes:  Regression of Google measure of work/residential related mobility on NPIs, the log of cases, the log of national cases, state, days 
of the week/time fixed effects.  Robust clustered errors are in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *<0.1 
Table 1 suggests that both effects are at work although with surprising relative contributions. Columns 1-2 
present the impact on mobility of just business closure restrictions, the log of local cases and the log of national 
cases with and without time fixed effects.   Of the roughly 60-point decline in mobility seen in Figure 1, roughly 
5 points appear due to official workplace closures.  This is of the order of magnitude identified in previous 
studies on other measures of mobility.  However, the component due to case incidence, both national and local 
appears to be able to account for much of the fall in mobility by itself.  For instance, with the 10-log point 
increase in local cases in Figure 1, roughly 43 points (2/3) of the fall in mobility are accounted for, and more 
without FE by “voluntary” self-restriction.   
Columns 3 and 4 introduce two other NPIs- School closures for K-12 and Stay at Home/Shelter in Place 
orders. The impact of imposing restrictions on business falls significantly suggesting that, as expected, it was 
picking up the effects of other correlated measures. The three together can account for almost 8 points of the 
fall in mobility. This remains dwarfed by the roughly 40% arising from the number of local and national cases 
whose impact stays roughly the same.   Hence, it appears that in the US, the largest effect is due to protective 
measures taken by individuals as they learn more about the prevalence of the disease.  The question then arises, 
will the effect of removing those restrictions in fact lead to the hoped-for rejuvenating effect on the economy 
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As a confirmatory test on the complement to workplace mobility, columns 5 and 6 show that increased NPIs 
and case incidences lead to a rise in residential mobility.  
IV. Results: Global Sample 
Figures 2 plot the same relationship for six countries of potential interest: Italy, Japan, Sweden and the UK and 
two upper middle-income countries, Brazil and South Africa, for which we have reasonable smart phone 
coverage.  In every case, the figures show evidence of decreased mobility with the increase in case numbers.  
Table 2 formalizes the graphs by running subnational mobility against sub-national and national COVID case 
incidence, including NPIs appropriate to the country case.   The fact that the NPIs are at the country level 
makes us treat them more as controls than precise estimations of effects for most cases.  However, again, alone 
among the six, Brazil NPIs are set at the state level and the data are therefore subnational.  Three findings 
emerge. First, in Brazil, Italy, South Africa, Sweden, and the UK the semi-elasticities of mobility with respect 
to case incidence are comparable to those found in the US while Japan has much lower, but still significant 
effects.   
Second, our tentative estimates suggest that NPIs have large effects Italy, South Africa (some with unexpected 
sign however), and the UK.  For Brazil, Italy, South Africa, Sweden, and the UK, however, the “voluntary” 
component still contributes the largest share.  
Third, Sweden and Japan, two countries with limited NPIs show curiously divergence paths.  In Sweden, 
mobility falls 60 points or almost that seen in the U.S. (The extreme 80 point falls are due to the April 10 long 
holiday weekend). Hence, the sharp contrast often depicted between Sweden and more interventionist countries 
appears overdrawn- mobility has fallen drastically.  It has not, however, in Japan and this presents a puzzle 
given that it is a country also with both effective governance and high social capital. We argue that this may 
offer additional evidence for the importance of NPIs as important coordination mechanisms. Although schools 
were closed and large events were cancelled since early March, business continued as normal until early April 7 
when the State of Emergency was declared.  But even under the SoE, governors could only request that people 
stay home and that businesses close. Tokyo’s governor asked that people not go out at night but said restaurant 
and bars could remain open until 8 PM.  These tepid measures faced strong headwinds in other social norms.  
For instance, there is resistance rooted in the country’s work culture where employees fear being seen as slackers 
if they don’t appear for work in person.11 Unless everyone is sent home, everybody goes to work.  The lack of 
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a stronger coordination mechanisms through official measures is a plausible explanation for both for the 
absence of much of an impact of formal measures, as well as limited self-motivated reductions in mobility.  
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Table 2: Mobility, COVID Cases and NPIs, Select Countries  
     (1)   (2)   (3)   (4) (5)   (6) 
      Brazil    Italy    Japan    S. Africa Sweden    UK 
Close N.E. business 2.996 -28.781*** 3.054 -5.871**  -20.337*** 
  (2.375) (0.836) (2.190) (2.166)  (0.322) 
K-12 closure -2.135     -13.583***  -12.670*** 
  (1.680)     (2.275)  (0.462) 
Cancel public events -1.697     10.798*** -7.837***   
  (1.842)     (2.150) (2.039)   
Close public transport.      4.102*    
       (1.782)    
Public info. camp.      46.285*** 12.420***   
       (7.338) (1.794)   
Restr. on internal mov.        -37.443***    
        (0.924)    
Log cases -1.413** -2.775*** 0.166 -1.294 -4.499** 0.719 
  (0.595) (0.865) (0.561) (1.982) (1.796) (0.517) 
Log national cases -3.544*** -3.157** -3.229*** -4.371** -2.601 -6.994*** 
  (0.464) (1.134) (0.553) (1.711) (2.290) (0.566) 
Constant 9.550*** 22.787*** 3.909* 25.710*** 18.885* 39.349*** 
  (1.982) (6.500) (1.976) (5.624) (9.309) (2.783) 
Time FE Yes No No No No No 
Day of the week FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
# of States 27 20 46 7 21 95 
Obs. 762 865 2361 169 758 2566 
R-squared 0.811 0.945 0.484 0.956 0.637 0.956 
  
Notes:  Regression of Google measure of work-related mobility on NPIs, the log of cases, the log of national cases. Mobility, Cases and National 
Cases at subnational level.  NPIs at national level with the exception of Brazil for which all data is at the subnational level. Robust clustered errors 




Figure 3a-c groups the global sample of countries which have national data on mobility and NPI. Figure 3a 
divides the sample into those with and without restrictive orders.  As in the individual case, there appears to be 
evidence for both the impact of restrictions and of the relationship with cases incidence.  Figure 3b breaks the 
data apart into 4 income categories, Low Income Countries (LIC), Lower Middle Income (LMIC), Upper 
Middle Income (UMIC) and High Income (HIC) which include primarily the wealthier OECD countries (see 
Annex III for categorization).  Figure 3c is the same, but only for country/periods when official restrictions on 
non-essential businesses are in place.  In both cases, the downward slope appears across all income categories. 
Table 3 largely confirms previous findings. Each specification is presented with and without time fixed effects 
which, in some categories, consume substantial degrees of freedom.  Preliminary explorations suggest that 
world COVID case incidence does not enter and we drop that term. This makes sense if we think that citizens 
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ocean.   The semi-elasticity on home case incidence appears both of larger magnitude than in the US and very 
similar across LMIC and HICs at around 4.3.  Without time fixed effects, UMICs are of similar magnitude, and 
LICs is a third to a half below that found in the other groups. However, with them, the UMIC falls by more 
than half and becomes insignificant and the LIC coefficient disappears completely.  A monotonic story in 
income is thus not clean, but it is consistent with the argument that in very poor countries, people cannot afford 
not to work and hence they will continue to do so.  
Figures 3a-c:  Mobility, COVID Cases and NPIs, Global Sample 
 
  
Notes: Workplace mobility is Google measure of work-related mobility index. LIC, LMIC, UMIC, and HIC stand for Low Income Countries, Lower 
Middle-Income Countries, Upper Middle-Income Countries, and High Income Countries, respectively. See Table AIII for income group classification. 
 
The impact of NPIs themselves is mixed.  Workplace closures are most clearly significant in LMICs accounting 
for almost 9 points of reduced mobility which in UMIC and HIC, the point estimate is roughly half that and 
becomes insignificant with the inclusion of time fixed effects. School closures are robustly significant and 
account for 10 points in HIC suggesting that having to school children at home is a limitation on job related 
mobility.  For UMICs, the coefficient is similar without time fixed effects, but falls to 6.6 pts and becomes 
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are positive. This monotonic increase with lower incomes is consistent with children playing a different role, 
perhaps helping in a business with less regard to human capital accumulation foregone. 
Again, the sampling for the LIC and LMIC samples for sure are not representative and what we may be finding 
is simply that people who can afford smart phones behave similarly around the world.  Still, either LMIC 
governments have the capability to, at least, coral the elites, or, again, are simply providing a coordination 
mechanism.  
Cancelling public events never enters significantly with full time fixed effects although the point estimates are 
often in the -6 to -10 range.  The restriction that most robustly reduces mobility among the LICs is closing of 
public transport, accounting for a massive 16.5 points.  In UMICs, and arguably in HICs, the value is a third of 
that.  This would seem the most potent tool of control in the poorest countries.  
Public information campaigns curiously enter positively and significantly in LMICs and almost in UMICs with 
coefficients of roughly 7-10.  The intuition is not clear, but it may be the case that guidance on washing hands 
and wearing masks makes individuals feel more in control and protected and hence, net the impact is to increase 
mobility.  
Restrictions on internal movement have large and significant effects (12, 14.3) in LMICs and UMICs, with 
much less impact in HIC and virtually none in LICs.  In the latter case, this may testify to difficulty in enforcing 
such shelter in place ordinances relative too, for instance, shutting down public transport.  
In sum, in HICs, and LMICs, the voluntary component is still as or more important as NPIs.  UMICs look 
quite similar to HICs with the exception of anomalous lack of impact of case incidence, and the large impact 
of restrictions on internal movement which it shares with LMICs.  It may be that in fact, LMIC and UMIC are 
more effective in enforcing such measures. Overall, for LICS the voluntary component is absent and the only 
NPI that appears to have any effect is closing public transportation.  Again, with the caveat that cell phone 
coverage in such countries is around or under 20% of the population, this is consistent, again, with limited state 
capability and more resistance from the population to stop working.  
Again, Annex IV presents the complementary regressions on residential mobility and finds patterns that mirror 
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Table 3: Workplace Mobility, COVID Cases, and NPIs, Global Sample 
      (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)   (7)   (8) 
       LIC    LIC    LMIC    LMIC    UMIC    UMIC    HIC    HIC 
 K-12 closure 3.13 0.04 1.24 0.64 -6.62 -10.60** -10.20*** -13.32*** 
   (4.83) (3.03) (4.61) (5.11) (4.80) (3.90) (3.16) (3.85) 
 Close N.E. business 1.00 -0.80 -8.83* -9.30 -3.96 -8.59** -4.73 -8.75*** 
   (7.40) (4.45) (5.01) (5.61) (3.37) (4.09) (2.84) (2.90) 
 Cancel public events  -9.77 -6.37 -5.26 -6.66* -1.49 -5.66 -2.32 -6.35* 
   (5.27) (4.46) (3.88) (3.75) (5.96) (4.45) (3.04) (3.16) 
 Close public transp.  -16.51* -16.17* -2.20 -5.35 -5.37* -4.93 -5.06 -6.44** 
   (8.37) (7.18) (4.93) (5.02) (2.86) (3.64) (3.03) (2.71) 
 Public info. camp.  0.77 -0.40 9.90*** 10.47*** 7.32 8.99** 4.71* 5.59** 
   (3.23) (3.35) (2.89) (2.31) (4.91) (4.07) (2.62) (2.70) 
 Restr. on internal mov.  -1.21 -1.85 -12.03*** -10.52** -14.32*** -16.81*** -2.72 -5.53** 
   (3.57) (3.13) (2.98) (3.81) (3.78) (4.46) (2.04) (2.18) 
 Log cases  -0.03 -2.43* -4.30*** -5.57*** -1.50 -3.85*** -4.61*** -3.42*** 
   (1.89) (1.17) (1.13) (0.56) (1.63) (0.80) (0.97) (0.75) 
 Constant 3.76 14.08** -5.82 6.46 -0.50 8.68* -1.73 10.41*** 
   (3.41) (5.84) (4.46) (4.02) (5.05) (4.75) (2.58) (2.49) 
 Time FE Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No 
 Day of the week FE No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
 Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 # of Countries 8 8 24 24 29 29 40 40 
 Obs. 193 193 720 720 945 945 1777 1777 
 R-squared 0.69 0.62 0.77 0.73 0.85 0.80 0.86 0.80 
  
Notes:  Regression of Google measure of work-related mobility on NPIs, the log of national cases, country, and days of the week/time fixed 
effects.  Robust clustered errors are in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *<0.1. LIC, LMIC, UMIC, and HIC stand for Low Income Countries, 
Lower Middle Income Countries, Upper Middle Income Countries, and High Income Countries, respectively. See Table AIII for income group 
classification. 
 
V. Mapping to Economic Activity 
Do these voluntary declines in Google mobility in fact map to economic activity?  Preliminary evidence from 
the U.S. and Sweden suggests they do.  Figure 4 presents restaurant reservations by state against COVID 
incidence for the U.S.  What is immediately clear is that the fall in reservations predated the closing of non-
essential businesses.  This is confirmed by Table 4 which suggests a combined elasticity of over 10 and virtually 
no impact of business closing measures.  That is, the entire fall can be accounted for with the increase in cases.   
The results suggest that what slowed economic activity was not the NPIs, but rather voluntary de-mobliization 
as evidence of the magnitude of the threat accumulated. 
In the same vein, Figure 5 presents preliminary national data from movie theater releases and revenues in 
Sweden, again, a country with no restrictions on non-essential businesses.  Consistent with this, releases 
continue more or less unchanged while revenues drop off entirely.  Supply remains unaffected, but, consistent 
with the declines in overall mobility, demand evaporates. Since the data are at the national level, we cannot 
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Figure 4:  Decline in Restaurant 
Reservations vs. COVID Cases 
Figure 5:  Decline in Movie Theater 
Revenues and Releases vs. COVID Cases 
 
 
Notes: U.S. Restaurant reservations against COVID incidence.  Sweden: Movie releases and theater revenues against COVID incidence. See text for 
sources. 
 
In both the cases of restaurant reservations in the U.S. and theater demand in Sweden, demand has fallen 
sharply and independent of NPIs.  This suggests that, as in Wuhan, it is likely that release of NPIs will have 
little effect unless individuals are confident that the risk has diminished.   
 
VI. Conclusion  
Several key findings thus emerge.  First, clearly, the pattern of demobilization varies across countries with the 
political choices made.  The US and Japan have radically different degrees of demobilization.  
Second, decreased mobility seems more driven by “voluntary” individual response to increased local and 
national COVID-19 case incidence, proxying for awareness or fear or social responsibility, rather than formal 
measures. For all except the poorest countries (LICs) the response of mobility with respect to cases is of similar 
orders of magnitude and can explain most of the reduction in mobility, dwarfing the effect of NPIs.   
Third, that said, there is evidence that less affluent countries were also able to implement NPIs. LMICs and 
UMICs appear to have been able to engineer as much or more of a fall in mobility through NPIs as some High-
Income Countries.  
Fourth, our global data suggest that other measures beyond closing non-essential workplaces have important 
impacts-school closures, restrictions on internal mobility/shut-down of public transportation.  
Counterintuitively, public information campaigns appear to raise mobility- information on protective measures 
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Table 4: Restaurant Reservations, COVID Cases, and NPIs, United States   
      (1) 
    Restaurant reservations 
Close N.E. business 0.818 
   (1.381) 
Close K-12  2.349 
   (1.720) 
Stay home/SIP  0.952 
   (1.139) 
Log cases  -0.678 
   (1.125) 
Log national cases -9.775*** 
   (0.884) 
Constant 31.251*** 
   (6.388) 
Time FE Yes 
State FE Yes 




Notes:  Regression of restaurant reservations (Y/Y percent change) 
from OpenTable, on NPIs, the log of cases, the log of national cases, 
state, time fixed effects. Robust clustered errors are in parenthesis. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *<0.1 
 
 
Fifth, the dominant contribution of voluntary self-restraint along with historical and anecdotal evidence 
suggests that formal NPIs may be as much coordination mechanisms as repressive measures. For instance, no 
parent may want to send his/her child to school, but only when schools force all students on line can continued 
safe learning at a distance be realized. As in Japan, no one may want to be seen as the slacker by not showing 
up at work, but if the government signals that this is the safe thing to do, then all can work from home without 
stigma.   
Sixth, these findings offer both good and bad news.  First, they imply that for many countries in the world, self- 
enforcing dynamics and NPIs can reduce mobility and business activity substantially. That mobility fell almost 
as much in Sweden, with no NPIs, as the U.S. dramatically illustrates this point and suggests that the focus on 
government NPI policy in explaining Sweden’s mortality rate may not be justified.  The finding that only 
shutting down public transport has any effect in LICs is consistent with arguments that government capacity 
may be generally low, and resistance to demobilizing is high where it implies lost livelihoods.   
Seventh, the potentially bad news is that releasing constraints may not, as appears to be the case in Wuhan have 
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Annex I.  Smartphone Coverage 
Country Smartphone penetration 
United Kingdom 82.20% 1 
Netherlands 79.30% 2 
Sweden 78.80% 3 
Germany 78.80% 4 
United States 77.00% 5 
Belgium 76.60% 6 
France 76.00% 7 
Spain 72.50% 8 
Canada 72.10% 9 
Australia 68.60% 10 
South Korea 68.00% 11 
Kazakhstan 64.90% 12 
Poland 64.00% 13 
Russian Federation 63.80% 14 
Taiwan 60.00% 15 
Italy 58.00% 16 
Malaysia 57.50% 17 
Japan 55.30% 18 
China 55.30% 19 
Romania 53.80% 20 
Ukraine 48.30% 21 
Argentina 46.90% 22 
Saudi Arabia 46.00% 23 
Mexico 45.60% 24 
Philippines 44.90% 25 
Chile 44.20% 26 
Thailand 43.70% 27 
Brazil 41.30% 28 
Venezuela 40.80% 29 
Colombia 39.80% 30 
Morocco 37.90% 31 
Turkey 37.90% 32 
Vietnam 37.70% 33 
South Africa 35.50% 34 
Iran (Islamic Republic of) 64.60% 35 
Peru 32.10% 36 
Uzbekistan 31.30% 37 
Algeria 29.10% 38 
Egypt 28.00% 39 
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Indonesia 27.40% 41 
Ghana 24.00% 42 
Myanmar 21.80% 43 
Kenya 20.90% 44 
Sudan 19.70% 45 
Bangladesh 16.10% 46 
Uganda 15.60% 47 
Pakistan 13.80% 48 
Nigeria 13.00% 49 
Ethiopia 11.20% 50 
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Annex II. Subnational Data Sources 
Brazil: Official state websites, Platforma COVID Brazil by the Government of 
Brazil: https://covid19br.wcota.me/  
Italy: Dipartimento della Protezione Civile: https://github.com/pcm-dpc/COVID-19 
Japan: Japan COVID-19 Data Repository: https://github.com/sanpei3/covid19jp 
South Africa: Department of Health: https://github.com/dsfsi/covid19za 
Sweden: https://www.boxofficemojo.com/weekend/by-year/2020/?area=SE 
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Annex III. Income Groups 
LIC   LMIC   UMIC   HIC 
Afghanistan  Angola  Argentina  Australia 
Burk. Faso  Bangladesh  Belize  Austria 
Mali  Bolivia  Bos. and Herz.  Belgium 
Mozambique  Cameroon  Botswana  Canada 
Niger  Cape Verde  Brazil  Chile 
Rwanda  Egypt  Bulgaria  Croatia 
Tanzania  El Salvador  Colombia  Czechia 
Uganda  Ghana  Costa Rica  Denmark 
  Honduras  Dominican Republic  Estonia 
  India  Ecuador  Finland 
  Indonesia  Guatemala  France 
  Kenya  Iraq  Germany 
  Kyrgyzstan  Jamaica  Greece 
  Laos  Jordan  Hong Kong 
  Mongolia  Kazakhstan  Hungary 
  Myanmar (Burma)  Lebanon  Ireland 
  Nicaragua  Libya  Israel 
  Nigeria  Malaysia  Italy 
  Pakistan  Mauritius  Japan 
  
Papua New 
Guinea  Mexico  Luxembourg 
  Philippines  Namibia  Netherlands 
  Vietnam  Paraguay  New Zealand 
  Zambia  Peru  Norway 
  Zimbabwe  Romania  Panama 
    South Africa  Poland 
    Sri Lanka  Portugal 
    Thailand  Puerto Rico 
    Turkey  Saudi Arabia 
    Venezuela  Singapore 
      Slovakia 
      Slovenia 
      South Korea 
      Spain 
      Sweden 
      Switzerland 
      Trinidad and Tobago 
      
United Arab 
Emirates 
      United Kingdom 
      United States 
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Annex IV.  
Table A4:  Residential mobility, global sample  
      (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)   (7)   (8) 
       LIC    LIC    LMIC    LMIC    UMIC    UMIC    HIC    HIC 
 K-12 closure -1.59 -1.81 1.78 1.86 4.34** 5.67*** 3.71** 5.18*** 
   (3.57) (2.00) (2.33) (2.57) (2.04) (1.74) (1.39) (1.57) 
 Close N.E. business 0.84 0.49 4.37** 4.63* 2.69* 4.68*** 1.65 3.10** 
   (1.75) (2.16) (2.06) (2.35) (1.31) (1.46) (1.39) (1.34) 
 Cancel public events  7.34*** 4.03 0.67 1.39 1.39 2.71 0.87 2.83** 
   (1.61) (2.58) (1.71) (1.82) (2.54) (1.98) (1.38) (1.31) 
 Close public transp.  2.74 4.78 -0.07 1.25 0.42 0.30 3.25** 3.19** 
   (2.26) (2.93) (2.07) (2.07) (1.61) (1.77) (1.38) (1.21) 
 Public info. camp.  -2.71** -2.34 -5.94*** -6.16*** -5.27** -5.22*** -2.32 -2.41* 
   (0.96) (2.37) (1.89) (1.45) (2.28) (1.72) (1.43) (1.34) 
 Restr. on internal mov.  2.46 3.06 6.35*** 5.83*** 7.90*** 9.26*** 0.69 1.34 
   (1.68) (1.63) (1.23) (1.67) (1.74) (1.77) (1.01) (0.98) 
 Log cases  0.84 1.37* 1.68*** 2.20*** 0.12 1.25*** 1.99*** 1.55*** 
   (0.83) (0.60) (0.42) (0.27) (0.74) (0.38) (0.55) (0.36) 
 Constant 7.28*** 1.43 5.60** 2.52 1.35 -1.25 1.01 -4.48*** 
   (1.22) (3.99) (2.28) (2.18) (2.52) (1.88) (1.35) (1.18) 
 Time FE Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No 
 Day of the week FE No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
 Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 # of Countries 8 8 24 24 29 29 40 40 
 Obs. 193 193 711 711 942 942 1775 1775 
 R-squared 0.78 0.71 0.80 0.77 0.83 0.80 0.85 0.79 
  
 
Notes: Regression of Google measure of residential mobility on NPIs, the log of national cases, country, and days of the week/time fixed effects.  
Robust clustered errors are in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *<0.1. LIC, LMIC, UMIC, and HIC stand for Low Income Countries, Lower Middle 
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Early indicators suggest that startup activity is heavily disrupted 
by the COVID-19 pandemic and the associated lockdown. At the 
same time, empirical evidence has shown that such disturbances 
may have long-lasting effects on aggregate employment. This paper 
presents a calculator which can be used to compute these effects under 
dierent scenarios regarding (i) the number of startups, (ii) the growth 
potential of startups, and (iii) the survival rate of young firms. We 
find that employment losses can be substantial and last for more than 
a decade, even when the assumed slump in startup activity is only 
short-lived.
1 Professor of Economics at the University of Oxford and CEPR Research Affiliate.























VETTED AND REAL-TIME PAPERS
1 Introduction
Due to the global coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic, 2020 is set to be a tragic year
for many businesses. Startups are likely to be aected particularly strongly, as they
nd themselves in a fragile stage of the lifecycle, being sensitive to disruptions in
demand, supply, or credit conditions. This is already showing in the statistics. In the
last week of March 2020, new business applications were down forty percent compared
to the same week one year earlier, a contraction that is even sharper than during the
Great Recession, see Haltiwanger (2020).
These developments are likely to have important macroeconomic implications,
which may last well beyond the pandemic itself. The reason is that seemingly small
changes to startups can create persistent and increasingly strong ripple eects on the
macroeconomy as cohorts of new rms age and grow into larger businesses. Therefore,
startups deserve special attention in this situation.
This paper provides an empirical perspective on what the disruption of startup
activity might imply for the U.S. economy, in terms of the severity and persistence
of employment losses. To this end, we developed a Startup Calculator, available on
our websites, which allows anyone to easily compute employment losses under various
scenarios of choice.1
The calculator allows one to vary three key margins, which pertain entry and
exit of young businesses. As such, these eects are not easily reversed and may
have important eects on the macroeconomy in the medium- and long run. The
rst margin is the number of startups. A fall in this number directly reduces the
number of new jobs created by startups. Importantly, however, this lost generation
of rms then creates a persistent dent in aggregate employment as subsequent years
are characterized by a lower number of young rms, see e.g. Gourio, Messer, and
Siemer (2016) and Sedlá£ek (forthcoming).
The second margin is the growth potential of startups. Sedlá£ek and Sterk (2017)
show that rms born during recessions not only start smaller but also tend to stay
smaller in future years even when the aggregate economy recovers. These movements
in growth potential are attributed to changes in the composition of the type of star-
tups. In the current situation, it seems particularly challenging to start a highly
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scalable businesses, since supply chains are heavily distorted, credit conditions are
poor, and customer may be demand dicult to acquire during a lockdown.
The third and nal margin included in the calculator is the survival rate of young
businesses. Startups and young rms in general have much higher exit rates than older
rms, see e.g. Haltiwanger, Jarmin, and Miranda (2013), and during downturns these
exit rates tend to increase.
Given a scenario for each of these three margins, the calculator computes the
implied change in time path for aggregate US employment, from 2020 onwards. The
Startup Calculator uses publicly available data from the U.S. Business Dynamics
Statistics (BDS). We take a conservative stance and only consider changes to rms
younger than 10 years of age. In other words, we leave 40 percent of all businesses
unaected in our calculations and as such the results may be taken as lower bounds.
Our baseline scenario is one in which all three margins fall to their minimum
levels observed since 1977 (the starting point of the BDS). Assuming that this decline
lasts for one year, after which all three margins revert back to normal, we nd that
the eect on aggregate employment in 2020 is a 1.1 percent reduction. Importantly,
however, the eect of aggregate employment is very persistent. Cumulated over the
rst 10 years, we nd an employment loss of 10.6 million.
The calculator is an accounting tool, simulating employment of cohorts and then
aggregating. As such, it abstracts from potential equilibrium feedback eects. To
adjust for such eects, we integrate the calculator into a shell of a basic equilibrium
heterogeneous-rms model. Based on this model (and assumptions on the wage elas-
ticity of labour demand and supply) we provide an adjustment for equilibrium eects.
We nd that this adjustment dampens the aggregate employment eect by about 20
percent.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews existing
evidence on the importance of startups for aggregate job creation and discusses some
early evidence on the eects of the COVID-19 pandemic on business formation. Sec-
tion 3 presents the calculator, as well as the equilibrium heterogeneous-rms model.
Section 4 presents results under several scenarios and discusses the importance of the
three margins mentioned above. We emphasize, however, that using the calculator on
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2 The Importance of Startups
There are four main reasons why we focus on startups, and in turn young rms.
First, new and young businesses are the dominant creators of new jobs. In the U.S.
an average of 16.3 million jobs are created and about 14.9 million jobs are destroyed
every year. Put together, this means that annually about a third of all jobs in the
U.S. are either new or get destroyed. Strikingly, startups create a net amount of
2.9 million jobs per year. These values suggest that startups are the only business
category which is characterized by positive net job creation and existing rms only
shed jobs on average.
It is true, however, that young rms also exhibit a higher rate of exit, suggesting
that not all jobs created by startups are long-lasting. Nevertheless, the data shows
that surviving young rms tend to grow faster than the average incumbent, see e.g.
Haltiwanger, Jarmin, and Miranda (2013). These patterns of high rates of exit and
growth among young rms have been dubbed up-or-out dynamics.
The second reason to focus on startups relates precisely to the up-or-out dynamics
described above. This high rate of labor market churn associated with startups has
been linked to measures of productivity and protability growth (see e.g. Bartelsman
and Doms (2000) or Foster, Haltiwanger, and Krizan (2001). Therefore, the data
suggest that surviving young businesses are the ones that are crucial for aggregate
productivity growth.
Third, these ndings are exacerbated by new evidence on young high-growth rms,
so called gazelles. Haltiwanger, Jarmin, Kulick, and Miranda (2017) document that
this small share of startups with exceptional growth potential accounts for about 40
percent of aggregate TFP growth, 50 percent of aggregate output growth and 60
percent of aggregate employment growth.
Finally, changes startup activity may have very persistent eects at the macroe-
conomic level, either via the number of rms (Gourio, Messer, and Siemer (2016),
Sedlá£ek (forthcoming)) or via changes in the type of entrants (Sedlá£ek and Sterk
(2017)). In addition Pugsley, Sedlá£ek, and Sterk (2017) show that most of the cross-
sectional heterogeneity in rm-level employment can be attributed to ex-ante factors,
already present at or before birth of the rm. Together, this body of evidence sug-
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Change in new business applications (%, yoy)
Decline in startups versus COVID deaths by state
Horizontal axis: Change in high-propensity Business Applications during week 12-15, 2020, relative
to the same weeks in 2019, by US State. Source: Business Formation Statistics. Vertical axis: total
number of COVID related deaths in the US. Source: Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.
Data were downloaded on April 17, 2020.
2.1 Startups during the COVID-19 pandemic
It is still too early to tell exactly how hard startups will be hit by the COVID cri-
sis. The available data, however, suggest that the situation is severe. Figure 1 plots
state-level data on COVID deaths versus the number of (high-propensity) business ap-
plications, a strong early indicator of startup activity, see Bayard, Dinlersoz, Dunne,
Haltiwanger, J. Miranda, and Stevens (2017). Haltiwanger (2020) shows that in late
March 2020, business applications in the US declined strongly, about as much as
during the Great Recession (although it is unclear how long the decline will last this
time).
Figure 1 shows that, not only have business applications declined strongly in many
states, there is also a clear relation with the severity of the pandemic. Particularly
striking is New York state (NY), which suered both the largest number of deaths
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3 The Startup Calculator
In this section, we provide details on the data and its treatment, used in our analysis.
The next section presents the results.
3.1 Data
Throughout this paper, we use publicly available information from the Business Dy-
namcis Statistics (BDS) of the U.S. Census Bureau spanning the period of 1977 to
2016. This dataset includes (among other things) information on the number of rms
and employment by rm age. For our purposes, we use information on the number
of rms, their employment and their exit rates by age, where the latter is considered
in the following age categories: 0 (startups), 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 to 10 and all. From this
information, we can also construct aggregate employment.
The number of rms of age a in year t, na,t, is directly observable in the BDS
data, as is employment by age, ea,t. We use employment and the number of rms by
age to compute average rm size as sa,t = ea,t/na,t.
2 Finally, we are also interested
in survival rates of rms by age. We compute these by using the information on rm
deaths, da,t, which give the number of rms of a given age in which all establishments
shut down. We dene the survival rate by age as 1− xa,t = 1− da,t/na,t.
3.2 Accounting for startups: methodology
Because rms aged 6 to 10 are grouped together in the BDS, it is necessary to inter-
polate information for each of the individual age categories.3 In addition, because the
sample period ends in 2016, it is necessary to extrapolate the information up until
2019, just before we perform our scenario analysis. In what follows, we describe the
interpolation and extrapolation methods employed in the Startup Calculator.
3.2.1 Interpolation of age-specic information
Number of rms and exit rates. To interpolate information on the number of
rms aged 6 to 10 years we assume that exit rates between the ages of 5 and 10 are
2This is the so-called current-year denition of size.
3Not interpolating gives similar results but overstates the impact of changes in startups. This is
because when new rms reach the age of 6, they are assigned the average size of 6 to 10 year old
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linearly related such that
xa,t = xa−1,t−1(1−∆x) for a = 5, ..., 10,
where ∆x,t is a year-specic growth rate, but which is the same for rms between the
ages of 5 and 10. Given the exit rates by age, we can compute the number of rms






for a = 6, ..., 10.
The above therefore takes the observed number of rms aged 6 to 10 years and
decomposes it into the shares of 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10 year old rms where the shares are
computed using the age-specic survival rates.








Firm size. We interpolate rm size for businesses aged 6 to 10 in the same way as
above. We assume that rm size is linearly increasing between the ages of 5 and 10
such that
sa,t = sa−1,t−1(1 + ∆s,t) for a = 5, ..., 10,
where ∆s is a year-specic growth rate, but which is the same for rms between the
ages of 5 and 10. Given the age-specic exit rates described above, we then compute








The results of this interpolation are shown in Figure 2, which depicts the actual and
the interpolated data for rm size and exit rates by age.
3.2.2 Extrapolation of information until 2019
Information on startups and young rms. In order to extrapolate the necessary
data between 2017 and 2019, we assume that rm size by age and exit rates by age
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Figure 2: Actual and interpolated data





























Note: Actual and interpolated data for rm size and exit rates by age.
averages:












for τ = 1, 2, 3 and a = 1, 2, ..., 10, and where xa, sa and n0 denote the 1977 to 2016
averages of age-specic exit rates, rm sizes and the number of startups, respectively.4
Using the above, we can then recover the number of rms for the ages of 1 to 10 as
na,t = na−1,t−1(1− xa,t), for a = 1, 2, ..., 10 and t = 2017, 2018, 2019.
The result of this extrapolation are shown in Figure 3, which depicts the actual
and extrapolated number of startups, average startup size and exit rates of 1 to 10
year old rms.
Number of older rms. The number of all businesses in the US economy has
been steadily increasing over the sample period. This is, however, essentially entirely
because of an increasing number of older rms. This can be seen from Figure 3 which
4Only startups are observed from 1977. Therefore, averages of older businesses of age a are taken
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Figure 3: Actual and extrapolated data














































Note: Actual and extrapolated data for the number of startups, startup size, survival rates (of young,
i.e. <10 years) rms and employment in old (11+ years) rms.
shows that the number of startups has uctuated cyclical around a relatively stable
mean.
The increasing number of rms is then reected in rising aggregate employment.
Given that our analysis focuses on the impact changes in young rms' performance
have on aggregate employment, we need to account for the trend growth of older
rms. We do so by estimating a linear trend for employment in rms aged 11 years
and more, using the period between 2010 and 2016. Using this estimated trend we
then extrapolate employment in this group of rms for the years 2017 to 2030.
The bottom right panel of Figure 3 shows the actual and extrapolated employment
in rms aged 11 and more, where we scale both time-series by their values in 1977.
3.2.3 Constructing alternative scenarios
Having the above information, we are ready to conduct scenarios starting in 2020
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the number of startups, (ii) changes in growth potential and (iii) changes in survival
rates.
Scenarios involving (i) and (iii) are straightforward. Upon impact, we lower the
number of startups and/or the survival rates of young rms by a certain value and
keep this value for a certain period. Growth potential works on the same principle,
but applies to the cohort of startups which enters in 2020. Therefore, lowering the
growth potential by a certain percentage value results in the entire growth prole of
rms born in 2020 shifting downwards. Importantly, the size of rms which in 2020
are older than 0 years is unaected.
To be concrete, for a given scenario, let us denote the initial percentage decreases
in the number of startups, the growth potential of startups and the survival rate of
young rms by ζj ∈ (0, 1), where j = {n, s, x}, respectively. Let us further denote
the duration of these eects by τj > 0, where j = {n, s, x}, respectively. The given
scenarios are then given by
n0,2019+t =n0,2019(1− ζn), for t = 1, ..., τn,
sa,2019+t+a =sa,2019(1− ζs), for t = 1, ..., τs, and a = 0, 1, 2, ..., 10,
xa,2019+t =xa,2019(1− ζx), for t = 1, ..., τn, and a = 1, 2, ..., 10.
Notice that in the above, the changes in growth potential apply to cohorts of
startups. For instance, if the eect of the pandemic lasts only for one year (τs = 1),
then only startups in 2020 are aected. In 2021, it is one year old rms which
have lower growth potential, i.e. the cohort born in 2020, while rms of all other
ages (including new startups), are unaected. In contrast, the pandemic aects the
survival rates of all young rms simultaneously and therefore businesses aged 0 to
10 years experience a drop in survival rates in 2020. Also note that the number of
businesses older than (i.e. a > 0) years is given by na,t = (1− xa,t)na−1,t−1.
Our calculator can also accommodate bounce-back scenarios. These are always
dened as certain values above the 1977-2016 averages of the number of startups,
average sizes and survival rates of young rms. Recall that all these margins converge
precisely to the respective 1977-2016 averages by 2019.
Specically, let us denote the percentage increase (above the respective long-run
average) in the bounce-back scenario related to the number of startups, the growth
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tively. Furthermore, let us denote the length of the bounce-back period by σj, where
j = {n, s, x}, respectively. The given bounce-back scenarios are then given by
n0,2019+τn+t =n0,2019(1 + χn), for t = 1, ..., τn,
sa,2019+τs+t+a =sa,2019(1 + χs), for t = 1, ..., τs, and a = 0, 1, 2, ..., 10,
xa,2019+τx+t =xa,2019(1 + χx), for t = 1, ..., τn, and a = 1, 2, ..., 10.
Finally, in all scenarios aggregate employment in a given year is computed simply
as the sum of employment in rms aged 0 to 10 and the (extrapolated) employment
of rms older than 11 years. Therefore, we are being conservative in the sense that
we are not allowing businesses aged 11 and more years to be aected by the crisis.
Our results should, therefore, be considered as a lower bound on the given scenarios.5
While the margins of startups and growth potential would only kick in after 2030
for these older rms, their survival rates may very well be aected in 2020 already.
3.3 Adjusting for equilibrium eects
The calculations above abstract from potential equilibrium eects. In this subsection,
we describe how to adjust for this, by placing the calculator within a shell formed
by a basic but standard heterogeneous-rm model. This model also claries how the
calculator connects to canonical equilibrium models of rm dynamics.
In the model, there is a measure M of heterogeneous rms.6 Let the production




where yi is the rm's output, ni its employment level, zi is the rm's productivity
level, and α ∈ (0, 1) is the elasticity of production with respect to labor input.7 The
wage per employee is taken as given by rms, and denoted by w. The rm chooses
its level of employment in order to maximize prots, given by yi−wni . This implies
5Old rms (11+ years) account for 40 percent of all businesses, but almost 80 percent of employ-
ment.
6Although the model is dynamic, it can be described entirely in static terms, hence we omit time
subscripts.
7We abstract from capital for simplicity. Augmenting the model with capital would not change
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1−αdF (z), where F is the CDF of the productivity distribution. Tak-
ing logs and dierentiating (keeping idiosyncratic productivities constant), we can
decompose changes in aggregate labor demand as:
d lnN = d lnM︸ ︷︷ ︸
#rms





d lnw︸ ︷︷ ︸
wages
(1)
The rst two terms reect changes in, respectively, the number of rms and their
growth potential (productivity), whereas the third term captures equilibrium eects
due to wage conditions.8 Equation (1) can be understood as an aggregate labor
demand curve, which is shifted by the number of rms and their growth potential.
To close the model, we need to specify how labor supply is determined. We
assume there is a representative household with Greenwood-Hercowitz-Humann







, where C denotes consumption and µ, κ, σ > 0 are preference
parameters. The household chooses C and N to maximize utility, subject to a bud-
get constraint given by C = wN + Π, where Π are aggregate rm prots. Utility
maximization implies the following labor supply curve: µNκ = w. Taking logs and





Combining the labor demand and supply schedules, Equations (1) and (2), we can
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solve for the equilibrium level of aggregate employment:
d lnN = Ψ︸︷︷︸
equilibrium dampening
(d lnM + d lnχ︸ ︷︷ ︸
calculator output
) (3)
where Ψ ≡ 1
1−κεnw ∈ (0, 1), where εnw =
1
α−1 is the wage elasticity of labor demand.
Equation (3) expresses aggregate employment (in deviation from some baseline trend)
as a function of the number of rms and their growth potential. The latter two we
obtain as outputs from the calculator.9 The parameter Ψ is an equilibrium dampening
coecient, which depends on the elasticity of labor demand (εnw) and the Frisch
elasticity of labor supply ( 1
κ
). Based on these two parameters and the output from
the calculator, we can thus compute the equilibrium change in aggregate employment
from Equation (3).
To gauge how large such equilibrium dampening eects could be we consider
standard values for the model parameters. Specically, we assume a unit Frisch
elasticity of labor supply (κ = 1) which is in the ballpark of the estimates in the
micro and macro literature. The parameter α could be set in accordance with the
labor share of aggregate income, which is around sixty percent in the US, implying
α = 0.6. Given these numbers, we obtain Ψ = 0.29, i.e. equilibrium eects dampen
just over seventy percent of the decline in aggregate employment.
Note however, that the above model does not contain any labor market frictions.
In the presence of such frictions, labor demand is likely to be less sensitive to wages.
We therefore prefer to use a direct empirical estimate of the labor demand elasticity.
Lichter, Peichl, and Siegloch (2015) conduct a meta study of empirical estimates
and recommend an elasticity of -0.246. Setting εnw = −0.246 (and again κ = 1)
we obtain a coecient of Ψ = 0.80, i.e. 20% dampening. We will use this value
as our baseline for the dampening coecient. This value also conforms with other
evidence that equilibrium dampening eects may not be that strong. For instance,
Sedlá£ek (forthcoming) shows that a search and matching model with heterogeneous
rms displays relatively weak equilibrium dampening eects. In a recession, the slack
labor market (increasing the chances of hiring and reducing wages) is not a strong
enough force to overturn the impact of a missing generation of startups.
Finally, we note that if a scenario is based on empirical observations for average size
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of young rms (for the startup growth potential margin), then it may be important
to account for the fact that this number itself is subject to equilibrium dampening.
Therefore, the true change in growth potential might be larger than what the data
suggest. To do so, we use Equation (1), but this time aggregated over only startups, as
opposed to all rms.10 Using Equation (2) to substitute out the wage and rearranging,
we obtain the following expression for startup growth potential:
d lnχstartup = d lnN startup − d lnM startup︸ ︷︷ ︸
avg startup size
− κεnwd lnN︸ ︷︷ ︸
equil. adjustment
.
On the right hand side, the rst two terms jointly are the change in average startup
size. From this one subtracts the κεnw times the change in aggregate employment in
order to obtain the change in the growth potential of startups.11
4 Results
4.1 Baseline scenario
At this point, we do not know whether the current contraction will be short-lived
or develop into a full-blown recession. Therefore, we take a scenario-based approach.
Based on the early indicator discussed earlier, we select as a baseline scenario a strong
but short-lived contraction. Specically, we assume that the startup rate, the growth
potential and the survival rate all drop to their lowest levels since 1977 (the beginning
of our data sample). These values are in fact closely linked to the Great Recession,
which was the worst period for startup activity since the start of the sample.12 How-
ever, we let the contraction last for just one year, based on the observation that several
countries seem to have moved past the peak of the pandemic within a several months,
and assuming a relatively swift recovery of overall macroeconomic conditions.
Figure 4 plots the eects on aggregate employment. Two key observations stand
out. First, the decline in startup activity has sizeable aggregate eects. In the rst
10This gives d lnNstartup = d lnMstartup + d lnχstartup + εnw lnw.
11Note that the adjustment only matters when aggregate employment is away from its trend level.
It turns out that in our application here, this adjustment has only negligible eects, and hence we
omit it in our calculations.
12That said, the nature of the current contraction is clearly very dierent from the Great Recession.
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Figure 4: Baseline scenario in the calculator





























































Note: General Equilibrium (GE) adjustment is obtained based on Equation (3) Ψ = 0.8.
year, about 1.5 million jobs are lost, relative to a scenario without the pandemic.
This loss is about six percent of the employment of rms aged below ten, and 1.1
percent of aggregate employment.
Second, the macroeconomic eects are very persistent, even though the shock itself
lasts for only one year. Cumulated from 2020 until 2030, the job losses are about 10.6
million. Moreover, each of the three margins plays a substantial role. The decline in
the number of startups accounts for about 4.6 million of the cumulated job losses, the
decline in growth potential for about 2 million, and the decline in survival for about
3.5 million. The remaining 0.5 loss is due to interactions between the three margins.
4.2 Bounce-back scenario
Quite possibly, however, the shock will last longer than 1 year. Based on the cal-
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Figure 5: Bounceback scenario in the calculator





























































Note: General Equilibrium (GE) adjustment is obtained based on Equation (3) with Ψ = 0.8.
duration of the shock. If the crisis lasts for two years, it will result in roughly 20
million jobs lost between 2020 and 2030. Alternatively, it is possible that the shock
will be followed by a bounceback, which is also allowed for in the calculator. Figure
5 shows a scenario in which one year after the pandemic, all three margins reach
the highest levels observed in our data sample. In this case, aggregate employment
losses are much shorter-lived, but nonetheless some eects persist. Not only is the
cumulative job loss up to 2030 about 2 million, but it is only around 2028 when ag-
gregate employment nally catches up to its initial trajectory. In other words, even
a short-lived crisis with a strong bounce-back will have a sizeable negative impact on
the aggregate economy for the next decade.
How likely is such a reversal scenario? This question is dicult to answer. His-
torically, however, strong bouncebacks have been uncommon, as in the data all three
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that older rms will hire more, compensating for the employment losses due to star-
tups. To fully oset the startup job losses in the baseline scenario, this would mean
that older rms would need to create an additional 1.5 million jobs in 2020. For com-
parison, net job creation by rms older than 10 was only about 0.6 million. From this
perspective, creating the 1.5 million extra jobs needed appears to be a large challenge.
In fact, our equilibrium dampening eect suggests that only about 0.3 million jobs
may be created by older rms in reaction to the slump in young rms' activity.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we provide an empirical analysis of the medium-run impact of the
coronavirus-induced slump in startup activity on aggregate U.S. employment. The
analysis specically recognizes three margins through which young rms may impact
the aggregate economy: (i) decline in the number of startups, (ii) decline in the growth
potential of startups and (iii) a decline in survival rates of young rms.
The key contribution of this paper is to develop a simple tool - the Startup Cal-
culator - which is accessible to anyone on our websites.13 Analysing a few possible
scenarios, the results suggest that even a short-lived disruption in startup activity
may have large and very persistent eects on the aggregate economy in the next
decade.
While the outlook for startups may look gloomy, there are also some glimmers
of hope. First, the high sensitivity of startups to economic conditions likely implies
that they may also respond positively to policies which aim to support them. Given
that startups can be relatively easily identied, such policies might be relatively cost
eective. Second, the change in our daily lives might inspire entrepreneurs, and create
new opportunities, to come up with new ideas and new ways of running businesses,
which could foster growth in the long run.
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